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IlITRCDUCTION

This year is the three hundredth since the end of the Thirty Years'
V

War, once thought the most destructive in the history of man,

Nurnberg

lies among its battlefields; a fev-r miles from here Gustavus Adolphus and

Wallenstein fought at the Alte Veste^

Those thirty years left much of

Germaiiy devastated, and dislocated its economy for decades.

Yet all that

misery vvas the merest trifle compared to the havoc recently ^vrought in

six short years, throughout Europe and the Orient.

The comparison between 164-8 and 1948 is not orii,inal, and few will
openly dispute its cogency.

Men at war have ceased to toy with popguns

and have talcen to hurling thunderbolts,' Civilization can no longer afford
such self-mutilation.

It was the acute awareness of these truths, forced

upon us by the first World War, which led to the general condemnation of

those v^c wilfully laimch a war of conquest as criminals in the deepest
and most serious sense.

These proceedings at Hurnberg, in which crimes against peace are
charged, are vitally important because the principles to be applied here

are man's best protection against his o-.vn capacity for self-destruction,
VT/hen we say that aggressive war is a crime, we mean it to exactly the ex
tent to which we are prepared to treat it as criminal in a judicial pro

ceeding,

Ne principle deserves to be called such unless men are willing

to stalce their ccnsoience on its enforcement.

In this proceeding, we ask the Tribunal to test the conduct of men

who stood at the top of the German profession of arms.

In most countries,

arms is one among a number of callings, It is a respected^and honorable

occupation, and it v^ill be an absolutely necessary profession as long as

organized force plays an Important part in the affairs of men. But it is
the high purpose of this prafessioii to protect, not to subject, Ihe mil
itary art is never t-i b© practiced for its own sake; the death and destruc
tion which the use of arms entails is redeemed and ennobled only v/hen the

aword is the guardian and restorer, not the destroyer, of peace.
In Germany, hov^ever, the military profession was not merely one among
several.

The German officer v^as accorded a very unique and exalted role,

A C92itury and a half ago, the Frenchman Iviirabeau wrote that "Prussia is
-

1

-
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not a state that possesses an Army; it is an. army that has conquered a
nation".

And it is because of the dominant part which military matters

have played in the life and thought of Germany ever since the time those
words were \'n:itten, that this twelfth and last case before the Nurnberg

Military Tribunals may vrell prove of greater importance to Germany than
any other case heard in this court-room.

In saying this, vfe in no %=:ay

mean to depreciate the significance of the issues at sta::e in other pro

ceedings which are being or have been held here.

But the evidence in this

case is closely related to one of the strongest currents in -German thought,
Vvhich may be aptly entitled "Ai-ms and the German".
The defendants are charged not only v/ith the unlav/ful uso of v/o.r, but
also with its abuse.

The laws and customs of wur, ^.hich mitigate its

ravages, have never Vv-on more than lip loyalty from the German militarists.
The Gorman military manual openly scoffs at the liague Conventions as being
I

derived from "humanitarian considerations "r/hich not infrequsruly degenerated

into soritimentality and flabby emotion"." The terrible consoquences of
this ruthless nihilism are not, even today, fully grasped.

Millions of

innocent civilians wero "VTOiitonly slaughtered by troops under the command
or ooiitrol of the defendants and their colleagues, not in pursuit of any

legitimate military objective, but in furtherance of the basest Kazi racial

and social myths. The defendant von ICuechler, for example, sbserved Christ
mas Day in pussia in 1941 by authorizing the killing of 230 incurable in
valids in an asylum at Makarjewo, on the basis of a subordinate's report
which pointed out that:

the inmates of the asylum no longer represent^objects with
lives worth living according to the Gerimm conception.

'ilG have said that the military profession y-ras esteemed above all others

by many Germans. The Goriiian officers' corps included men of groat ability
and high character. To those men vre mean no dishonor in this proocoding.
The issues in this case are far too grave to warrant my tricks of advocacy;
the evidence is sufficiently compelling and iy±ll provide its ow. olnqucncc,

•Those members of the Germ.an officers' corps who nave the capacity for clear

vision and the courage to face the facts will ^TOlcomo thi.s opportunity for
emergence of the truth,

1.

Eriugsbrauch im Landl'ricgo, translation in J. H. Morgan,
Gonnan V^ar Book (1915) pp. 55-44
"»
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COUNTS ONE .W FOUR:

Tl-IS RSICHSTOIH-: AND TEE ^.^VEIMiVR REHJBLIC

(1919 - 1933)
In presenting the evidence under Count One of the indictment, the

prosecution plans to deal summarily with the years prior to the advent of
Kitlero

But

must not overlook the fact that most of these defendants

were not Nazis in the usual sense of the word, and that they are charged
with the commission of crimes, not as party members, but as military
loaders.

The moral outlook and xjurposus which resulted in'those crimes

were not invented by Eitler, but w'oro developed by the defendants and
their predecessors in the Crorinan officers' corps.

Mr. Justice Oliver

V/cndell Holmes has observed that, in some circumstances, "a page of history

is worth a volume of logic".

M'o believe tliat the story of the German Army

since the first World './ar, briefly treated, '.vlll do much to illuminate the
issues in this case.

A.

The Arms Limitations of the
Versailles Trcatj/-

The most fundamental circumstance in Germany's military structure

during the "Jeimar Republic was, of course, the Treaty of Versailles,

signed on 28 Jmio, 1919.

Under part V of the Treaty - entitled "Military,

Naval, and Air Clauses" - precise limitations were prescribed for the size
and nature of the Gorm.an armed forces.

Compliance vdth these provisions

vj-as to bo ensured by Int.,r-Allied Commissions of Control.^ Such Commis
sions - liilitary, 'Naval, and Aeronautical - arrived in Germany in September,
1919.

The air clauses^ of trie Treaty need not detain us long. Military and
naval aviation was completely prohibited by providing that "the armed

forces of Germany must not include any military or naval air forces".
The naval clauses^ vrcre, of nccosslty, more elaborate. Like mil
itary aircraft, submarines wore completely prohibited to the Gorman Navy,

As for surface craft, the Navy was restricted to six each of battleships
and light cruisers, and tv/civo each of destroyers and torpodo boots.

1.

Treaty of Versaillos, Part V, section IV, arts. 203^210

2. Idem, section IXI^ o.rts, 198-202
3.

Idem, section II, arts, 181-97
-

.
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The

toiiD.agc of newly-built vjii'cs

limitod -- for battleships 10,000 tons

and for light cruisers 6,000 tons — and the rato at vdiich naTral uAits
could be replaced v/o.s also specified.

I'hc porsonnel oi' the Gorman Kavy

was not to oxcoc-d 15,000 officers and men.

Most important for our purposes Vioro the military olaus^.s.

1

By

2

Article 160 it wr^s stipulated that, afbor 31 March, 1920, the Gorman Army
should not oxcocd ten divisions — seven infantry and thro-- cavalry divi

sions, comprising not over 100,000 officers and men, and grouped \n:idv.r
not more than tv/o corps hcadq.uartors.

The so-callod "Great Gc-rman General

Staff" ;vas to be dissolved and not "rcconstitutod in any form".

The Army

was not to be designed for any warlike purpcso; it was expressly stated
that

The Army shall bo devoted exclusively to the me.intcn^vricc of
order within the territory and to the- control of thw frontiers.

Other provisions wore intended to ensure that the "100,000 mr.n hcich"wehr" should not be used as a moons of training a large military rocervc.

Compulsory military sorvico was abolished. Newly-appointed officers had
to agree to serve for twonty-fivo years, and cnlistod men for tv/elve years.
The armoment and munitions limitations were equally important.

Tanks

and poison gas w'sre completely prohibited. Precise schedules fixed the
maximum amounbs of g^ms and small arms of specified calibres, cuid stocks
of aroiiiunition, which v/ere permitted to be maintained, TTithin Germany, arms
could be manufactured only at factories listed and approved by the Allied
povrers; all other munition plants were to be "closed down".

Finally, special s.afeguo.rds vrcre provided by the demilitarization of

the Rhineland.^ In Germany west of the Rhine, and east of the Rhine to a
depth of fifty kilometers, no armed forces ivere to be maintained or
assembled. Forts and field defense works were likewise forbidden within
this area.

. B*

Organization of the Armed Forces

The organization of the Gorman armed forces under the Goimar Republic
1, Treaty of Versailles, Part V,- section I, ^^rts, 159-30
2, This date was subsequently postponed to 30 June, 1920
3, Treaty of Versailles, arts. 4:2->44 and 13G.
.. 4

-

....

reflected the o-rms limitation clauses of the Versailles Treaty,
v^T.s no German Air Force,

There

The x\rmy and Navy were brought together in a

single cabinet ministry, which v/as pacifically named the Reich Defense
Ministry (Reichswchrministcriurfl) •
Sovereign authority over the Reichsv/ehr wr.s divided between the

President of Germcny end the Cabinet, acting through the Chancellor end
the Reich Defense Minister.

The Preside?at '»vas the supreme commander of

the armed forces,^ But bocausc of the parliamentary form of govornment,
the development end execution of government policies vras in the hands of
the Cabinet,

Therefore all Presidential orders portaaning to the aamiod

forces had to be countersigned by the Reich Chancellor or the Reich
Minister of Defense.

2

The 100,000 man Army and the 15,000 man Navy were formally established
on 1 January'', 1921, The Army vm.s h.co.ded by a. general with the title Chj.ef

of the Army Command". (Chcf dor Ilecrcsleitung) and the Navy by an admiral
entitled "Chief of tho Navy Coimnond" (Chof der Marinoloitung),

3

These

commanders and their staffs vrore established within and as part of tho

Reich Defense Ministry, and in a governmental sense they v/urc subordinates
of the Reich Dcfonso Ministerj however, in tho military chain of command,

their supromu coimuander was tho Rx-ich President. Tho Reich Defense Min

ister himself had only a small staff, and most of tho actual worlc of tno
armed forces was done by tho staXfe of the army and navy chiefs.
Since tho first Reich President (Ebort) and the first two Dofonso

Ministers (Nossko and G-osslor) were all civilians, tho anr.y nid navy chiefs
were tlTD military coirinondors-in-chiof of the two services. Their staffs
wore organized much as were the army and navy staffs in other counnios.
4

In vlcvf of tho prohibition of tho Versailles Treaty there v/as no army

general stoff by that namoj ho-wovcr, the functions of an army general

staff wore performed by the so-called "Troops Dcpartmorxt" (Truppenrnt) of
the Army Command. Like any general staff, tho Trupponraat he.d sc-Cuions for
operations, traiiaing, intelligejice, and organization.
1,

wcimar Constitution, art, 47

2»

Idem, arts. 50 and 56.

3.

Rtlch Defense Law of 23 loarch, 1521

4,

Ti*eaty of Vorsaiiios, Article 160.
-

5
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In tho field, Germany vas divided into seven military districts

(Wchrkroise) corresponding to tho seven infantry divisions alloirod by the
Treaty.

In each Wohrkreis v^as an infantry divisional headquarters vfhich

also controllGd all military activities — recruitment, pensions, registra

tion, training, etc. -- in the V/chrkrcis.

Again follomng the Treaty

limitation of tho Army to t\70 corps headqu,^rtors, the Wehrkroiso of

eastern Germany wore grouped under a "group hordquarters" (Gruppenkomraondo)
at Berlin, and those in v-'ostcrn Germany auidcr a similar hcadqurxtcrs at
Kassel.

There were also throe cavalry divisional hoadquurters v;ithout

territorial jurisdiotionc

C.

Clandestine Rearmament:

Von Sooclcb

(1S20-1926)
Restricted by the Treaty provisions described above, the Roicliswohr

of tho Weimar Republic bor-^ little out^vard resemblance to the mighty army
of tho Raiser,

But tho purpose, tho intelligence, and the energy and

doturmination to salvage as imich as possible from the wreckage and start

to rebuild Gormcaiy's military might wore not lacking, either in the Army

or tho Navy, Thuy found their most effective focus, however, in -bhc brain
of the Chief of the Army Command, General Hans von Soookt.

There is no occasion now to dobato the merits or demerits of tho Treat
of Versailles.

Tho important fact hero is that, whatever they might say

publicly, von Soeclrt and the other milito-ry leaders of Gempmy unqual
ifiedly rejected tho Treaty, and all their plans vforo directed to its
overthrow.

Their imr.-.cdiato purpose, therefore, was to bring about as

soon "as -poGsiblc a state of affairs idiich would permit Germany to recreate
her onoo formidable military oigino.

Von Soecict's astute plan of oanpaign to achieve these ouas wtis

flexible, but vm-s based upon about Im.lf a dozen basic principles. Tho
first of these principles, doGignod to preserve the Army* s prescigo in

tho oyos of tho German people, was intensive cultivation of the legend
that the German Army vms not defeated in the first V/orld War,

Thus, when

Ficldmc-rshal von Hindonburg appeared before a legislative oommittoo of

inquiry in Novombor, 1919, he testified that
-

6
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In spite of the superiority of the enemy in men and ma.tcrial,
wo could havo brought the struggle to a favorable issue if
determined arid unanimous cooperation had existed botv/oon the
Army and those at homo#,*,. The Gorman Army 7ras stabbed in
the back. It is plain upon whom the blame lies. If any

further proof yioro rocossary to shovr it, it is to bo found
in the utter cmiazemont of our er-Graies at their victory.

Secondly'-, the traditions of the old imperial army vrore to be proservod.

There v/as to bo no "democratizing" cf the new Rcichsv/ohr. Prussian concepts

of discipline and "honor" porsistod, and the prerogatives of the officurs'
corps were jealously safeguarded. As o. practical mattv^r, the officers'

corps remainod closod to Jo7J"b. Do'spito tiic fact tno.t the Rcicnsvj'ohr *s

oath of allegiance v/as given to the Frcsidcnt of tne RopubliCj the spirit

of^thc officers' corps continued to bo autocratic; monarchism v/r.s toloratod
and Tras not •uncomruon.

Soeckt's third basic principle a,us that the ReichsYJ-ehr should hold

itself aloof from and above internal party politics in Gormnny. The .^oimar

Republic was a frail ship on a stormy sea. The economic aftcrmo.th of war,

and in particular the disastrous inflation of 1922 and 1925, caused wide
spread unrest. Cabinets rose and fell cud Chancellors crauo and v/ent amid
unstable political condi-tions. Pi,ather tlio.n risk the it-rmy's picstii^e in
this maelstrom of party politics, von So^ckt v/iscly held the Airay apart
from any party and discouraged political party activity ivithin the
officers' corps^

But this is not to say tlic.t the Array ims not a political-fact or^t}ia.t
von Seoclcb had no political attitude. Quite the contrary; the i.rmy ams

above politics because it dominated thorn. Sedulously and skillfully, v»n
Secckt brouspit about, among the leading politicio..as of all p^^tics, a

fooling that the govornmunt was dependent upon the ReiohS'/ichr for its

protection and to insure its continued existence. ifThon industrial uniost
and vforkors' domonstrations vrero ciuclled by thu Roichsvjohr, von Scuclct

appeared as the guardian of the Republic against Communism, '^cn the :.ruch
more serious threat of reactionary revolution culminated in actual attempts
to overthrow the Republic - such as the Eapp Putsch of 1S20 and the HitlorLudendorf Putsch in Munich in 1923 - the Army again emerged in the role of
aviour despite the fact that military leaders were among the participants.
Fourthly, yon Secckt brought about oloBO relations between the
,
S!
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PLcichs^vGhr cind tho Soviet Union's Rod Army*

The foot that tho ofriccrs*

corps -viras reactionary and aristocratic was not allowed t® obstruct this
policy^

Since the Amy's principal purpose was tho ovcrtlircw of the

Versailles Treaty, von Seockt sought alliance vdth the one major European

pov/or that had no interest in upholding it.

The Treaty of Rapallc, signed

by Gcrrriaiiy and tho Soviet Union in 1922, set the official seal upon the
unofficial close relations which already existed between the military
leaders of the two

countries*

Pifthly, von Seockt saw that tho Roicnsvrchr could best oonpensato for

its small size by keeping in the forefront on questions of military tech
nique.

The groc.tost emphasis vro.s put on thO'ir.provement of weapons and

equipment, and cn experience in hra..dling the novrer weapons, such as tanlcs.
German officers vrore sent to Russia to train v/ith the Rod Army in the

handlirg of heavy artillery, tanks, and other vrcapons forbidden to Gcr-

m.an;y under tho Versailles Treaty.

The trairing of German officers vath tho Red Amy ivas, indeed, only

one of many wiiys in which the arms provisions of the Trca.ty were evaded
and violated by tho Roichsv/ohr*

*lnd von Sceck-b's sixth end last principle

•^vas that tho Treaty imposed no obligation on the ITohrmacht to comply with

its provisions, and should bo violated in every v/ay jhich v/ould further
the rebuilding of Germany's armed might.

Contor.pt for the binding char-

actor of treaties v;as not an iiivontlGn of ^idolf Kitlor.

For tho time being, of course, roariiia.r.;ont had to be clandestine.

In this hidden rea.rr.aj:.it'nt, von Gocckt foui^d willing allies in various

high political officials and in tho huge armament firm of Krupp. With
•"V ' ,

tho assist'onco of Clicnci..llor Joseph Wirth and the Roich Finance Ministry,

government funds wore secretly made available to .-{rupp for illegal gun dosign and development activities clirt--ctcd by tho Reiohsv/ohr* These xnformal
arrangomeiits wore embodied in a "gontloman's agrconent" on 15 January,
1G22 butwGon army oiid navy reprcsontativos and the Krupp firm v/hich, as
Krupp records state, was

the first step taken jointly by tho Roioh Dofonso Ministry

iuid Krupp to oircwiTVcnt, and thereby bo break dorm, the regula
tions of the Treaty of Versailles v/hich strangled Gerriiany's
military freodom.

The llavy did not lag behind.

In 19E2, v/ith the approval of the Chief

of the Kavj' Command (Admiral Bohnke), Krupp and other shipyards established
a Gorman submarine construction office in The Hague, under the cover of

Dutch incorporation.

The purpose of this company (called the I<,VoS») was,

as German naval records reveal

to keep together an efficient Gcriiian submarine office and,
by pra.ctical vrork for foreign navies, to keep it in con
stant practice and on top of technical developments,
D. Clandestine Roarmcjiient - Von Schleicher

(1927-1953)

By the time af von Seeckt's retirement in October, 1926, Germany's
mj.litary and pol'itical situation was much improved. Hindenburg, the

nation's idol, '.lad become President after Ebort's death in 1925.

With

Hindenburg's support, Gustav Stresomann achieved a measure of political

sta.bility vn.thin Germany; abroad, he joined in the Locarno Pact under
which allied evacuation of the Rhinelond began in 1926, and Germany was
admitted to the League of Lat ions.

Witl.in Gormcaiy, the prestige of the Army had been roostablishod. The

olcctior. to the presidency of .Hindenburg — a retired fioldmarshal and, in

public estimation, Germany's greatest military hero — strengl^hened the

RoicAswehr enormously in a political sense. Lore practical militarj^ ad
vantages accrued from the'Locarno Pact; in the course of the Locarno settle
ment, Stresomann's arfTn.ionts that the Intorr-Allied Control Comirdssions

should be vround up and mthdrawn prevailed. In January, 1927, the last
staff members of the Commissions left Germany, and thereby Allied supervi

sion of compliance v/ith the azmis limitation clauses of the Versailles
Treaty came to an end.

New faces appeared in tho highest positions at about this time, as
Chief of tho Army Command, von Seockt was succeeded by General Hoye, who,
in turn, gave way to General Kurt von Hammorstein-Equord in November, 1930.

In 1928, Adrairal Erich Raeder became Chief of tho Navy Command, a position
he was to hold for 15 years.

In 1929, the growing influence of the Army

was again manifested v/hen the civilian Minister of Defense, Gosslor, was

replaced by Grooner "vdio, though nominally a civilian, was a retired general
and one of the leading military figures of the first World War.
-
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Behind rmr^.y of thoso personnel chrjigos, and taking a constantly larger

sharo in guiding the dostinios of the Reiohsv/chi-, vjr.s General Ruft von
Schlcicher»

A rogiinental conrado of Hindonburg^s son Oskar, von Schloicher

had bccor.e a protege and favorite of tho old Roich President as vroll as

of Greener,

In 1926, in order to provide the Minister of Defense v.nth

bettor staff assistar.co and to irr.prove coordination of patters of intv^rost

to both the Army tmd Navy, a ncvf staff section v/as ostr.bl?.siiod dirocciy
under tho Minister of Defense called the Armed Forces Section (•Acirrr.i.ohts

Abteilung)* Von Schlcichcr became its chief

and utilized this position

and his personal" contacts vri-tii Hindonburg, Groouer, and Hrjraicrstcin to
achieve great political auid military i?aflucnoo.

In 1929, his section vas

rcnamod the "Ministry Department" (Ministeramt) and von Gohleiohcr v;as

given the title of Deputy Minister (Staatsokrotaer) of Dofc-ncoo
Von Schlcichcr, as is 7/0II laioim, became the last chancellor of tho

Weimar Republic save only liitlcr himself, \fho destroyed it. Although
Schloiohcr had boon on early suppcrtv,r of Chancellor Srucning, his attitude

changed after Mindenburg's oloction to a second torn o.s President in April,
1932,

Soon thereafter, ho persuaded Hindonburg to sack Bruoning and ap

point Frcnz von Papon, vdio became Chancellor on 1 June, 1932, Schlcichcr
himself relinquished his military rank end booceac tho Minister of Defense

in Papen'a cabinet, Tho elections of November, 1932 and Papon^ s cxm ±11stability brought about tho fall of his cabinet, and in December von
Schloicher bccamo Chancellor, His tenure Tais short; Papon, v/ho.had oharriod

the aged Hindonburg, struck a bargain with Hitler; on 28 January, 1933
Hindonburg disiaissod Schlcichcr, end on SO January Hitler becomio Chancellor
in a coalition cabinet with Papon as VicG-Chanoollor•

But if the era of von Sohloiohor had been one of political vicissitvdos,

tho Roichswohr itself had boon further strongthenod. Although von Schlcichor
himself bccamo onjacshod in party politics, tno Army as a iidiolo did not, but

continued on tho general lines laid down by von Secckt. In particular,
clandestine rearmament in violation of the Versailles Treaty continued mth

quickoned pace, and with tho strong moral support of Hindonburg s secret
approval.

It wr.s, of course, v/oll understood by all concerned that this secret
rcarrrnment was not only a violation of international law, but vto.s also for

bidden by Germany's internal law. Tho legal export of the Reich Dofonso
-
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Minisiiry, in cm opinion v/ri't'ton in Jcmuary, 1927, deolcirGd •bho.'fc "»©«e'tho
Poixcc Treaty of Vorsaillos is also a lavr of the Reich, and "by reason of
this, it is binding on all members of the Reich at homoo

This commitment

ranlrs superior even to the provisions of the Constitution of the Reichoc»co"
i'md a memorandum prepare^ during the same month v/ithin the Troops Depart
ment of the Army Command stated:

l:rnen, ye!?,rs ago, prepa-rations for mobilization wore started,
a.ftor tiic clarification of the international and constitutional

legal aspect of the affair, and in full recognition of tho fact
that in no respect v;'as any lego.l foundation proscnt, othor means

wore knowingly and purposefully usedo
few serving officers
wore asked vdi-etlier they would be prepared, and Vvdictlicr their
consoience would permit them, to participcito in activities which
were necessL%ry from the point of view of their Fatherland, but

contrary to the lavfo Tho military offices as such v/cro by-passed.
Hi^-ranking officers did not partiopato openly, so that they did
^

not have to boar tho odiiun of a conscious broach of tho law.

In

important fundamental matters, they issued directives sub rosa to
individual confidential agents.

It maj/- also bo noted tho.t this accelerated secret rearmament began dur

ing the years 1926-1929, •when international relations soomod comparatively
liarmonious. As part of the Locarno settlement, tho Intor-Allicd Coranissions
of Control wore withdra^vn from Germany, but to the Gorman Government and the

Reichswohr this meant morcly tliat thoy could now proocod with olandostino
activities without fear that the Comiiiissioiis might find thorn out.

As Krupp

records r^voal, tho Commissions' departure vfas regarded as "an important
stop on tho road tov/ards froodon" because "after tho departure of tho Com

mission" tho Army and Krupp "ho-d more of a free hcuid" to carry on tho pro
hibited artillery dovclopncnt \vork which thoy vrcre engaged in together.
They also found it possible to comiaonco to-nlc and armoured oar development
worko

The Ruich govornnxjnt nov/ dared to assist more extensively; a secret

document of tho Gorman Navy tolls us that, beginning in 1927 "..faGcrman roarmamont was put on a basis which rra-s rriorc ojad more expanded by the sharing

of responsibility by the Reich Gov-jrnmont. • . I t tolls us further that a
"secret special budget" was sot up to cover unlawful military expenses,
which increased from 6,800,000 Reiohsmarics in 1928 to 21,000,000 in 1933®

By the time the VToimar Republic v^as ncaring its end, the Reichs\/ehr

had cjuplo cause for satisfaction with tho progress it had made in rearmament

despite the Versailles Treaty® At Christmas time in 1932, Colonel Zengaucr,
a department chief in the Army Ordnnnco Office, accompanied tho season's

greetings to Krupp with tho information that
-
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The denartrient is convinced that, thanks to your active
cooperation anc^ valuable advice, our armaiTiSnt de^'elopment in 19^i2 has made consideraole pro-^ress, vmich is

of great significance to our intent of rearming as a
whole a

When this v."as vrritten. Hitler's appointment as Ghai-cellor rras only
five vreeks in the future,

llany terrible changes were in store for Ger

many, but it' is a mistake to overlook that the 17eimar Republic ana the
Third Reich had numerous common donordnators, and that the ReichsT/ehr

was -she most inportairt link between the two.

',^at the German military

leaders accomplished under the Republic was a vitally iiuportant part of

the process of German rearmament for aggressive war. This vrlll become
increasingly clear as v.-e enamdne the development of events under Hitler
s

and the Third Reich,
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COUi'lTo O'LiE Al-ID i'OUA:

TIIE wiSiRIAlCIII' AlTD TH3 THIRD RSICH

(l95o - 1938)

The events leading to Hitler's appointment as Chancellor on 30 Jan
uary 1953 need 'oot here be set Torth again# We do not charge tnat the

Reichsvfehr bears any special responsibility for Hitler's selection#

^/e

may, indeed, criticise .the military leaders for not actively opposing

the appointment of a man v/hose criminal program rad been so brazenly ^
proclairp.ed; but however blamsv/ortnp this railu.re was, it is not cnar^^ed
as ci'iniinal in the indictment#

But Hitler's anpointmient as Chancellor -v-ras only dicuatership -•.n
eirbr-o. The irjfant vras actually born only vath the suspension of the

Constitution, the suppression of all civil liberties, and ohe abolition
of political opposition# Thereafter came a stoi'my childnood ai^d a liolo-jt
adolescence before the terrible full ruaturity oi the Third ..eich was

reached. During this time, the ITehrmacht's loaders did not stand as-de.

They took a leading part in the uevelopmenb of the Tnird iLeicn, and the
Wehrmacht was a key pillar in the finished structure# And in so doin£.,
the C-erman military leaders, including these defendants, committed crimes
against peace by preparing and launching aggressive wars.

In conclusion we vri.ll make a few observations on yihy this happened#

For the momont we will restrict ourselves to an account of whab acuually

happened. Dnd we will start with a description of the changes in the
structure of the T/ehrmaoht which followed Hitler's accessacn to pov/ei,

in the course of which we shall see how the individual defendants fitted
into the sbructui-e.

In Hitler's cabinet, the position of iiinistor of Defense v/as for the

first time bestowed on a general, Wernor von Blombcrg, who remained on
active service# The principal staff division of the Ministry - the
Ministeramt, which under Schleicher had acquired such iriporta^ice

v/as

now renamed the Armed Forces Depai-tinent (i/ehrmachtsamt). As its chief,

Blombirg. appointed General von Reichcnau, who had boon his chief of sta_f
in East Prussia, and '-.'ho v^as Icnovi/h as pro-Hazi«

Admiral Kaedor'a tsnuro as Chiof of the Ha.Tal Coromcoid continued

undisturbed. General Hamp.erstein, hoT.'ever, -Aias personally anti-basi and
-
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endured the Hitler regime for only a year.

It must not be thought, hov;'-

ever, tlmt at this stage Hitler viras strong enough to dictate the B©loction
of the Army's leaders. Hammerstein's successor as Chief cf the Army Com- ,
mand. General "Gerner Tron Fritsch, n-as the choice of Hindonourg and the

officers' corps; he'perpetuated von Seeclct's rosorTcd attitude toy/ard
w

pai'ty politics.

?/ithin the Army, policies ivcre determined largely by "^on Fritsch

and the senior generals. Among these, the most senior ^rcre Ton hundstcdt
and the defendant von Leob, the ccam-andors-in-chiof of the tyro "gruppenkommando" headquarters at Berlin and nasscl.

Slignoly younger

^

of tyrclvG or fifteen generals, including the dofondants von Euechicr and_
Blaskovriits^ v;ho iirorc F/ehrhreis Coimriandors at the time of Hitler's ^.ccvs-

sion to povror, or became such -.yithin a fev: years thereafter, hoth,
Heinhardt, vcn Saljnuth, and Hollidrb yrorc all in their forties and all
•J

became generals between 1924 and 1938. Roinhardt, as a colonel, 7^as

chief of the draining Section of the Army from 1S34 to 19-37, and thus

played a part in high-level iPJlito.ry planning. Heineoko V:V.s on special
duty in the War Ministry bosiiming in 1934. T/arlimrnt occupied an im

portant post in the Amy Ordnance Orrioo from 1935 to l£3fi, and then vrus
sent as liilitary Plenipotentiary to C-onora.l Franco in Spam.

We may pass for the moment the defendants von lloqucs, Vfoohlcr, and
Lohmann, vmo did not pla.y imiportant parts eintil 1038 or later. I'ho re
maining t7/o defendants - Spcrrle and Schnic/ind - were among the most
senior officers of the Air Force and the iiavy, respectively. Sporrle
,vo.s a regular army officer who wont on special duty mth the newly-created
Air Ministry in 1934 and became the ocmaandor of the so-called "Condor

Legion" in Spain in 1936. By 1937 he had been promoted thnee times in
three years to the rank of lioutonant-gonoral. Schniovrlnd was at sea
as captain of a cruiser when Hitler caune to power, but In 1934 bcoaiuc
chief of staff of the fleet. In 1937, he was mde chief of tho havy
Armament Office.

A. Reiohsyrolir to WohriTuxoht
Thus wore the

dcfoxidavts situated during the early yoars of the
14 -

Tilird Reich, v/hon Crcrmny's Edlitci.ry pov/or grew vdth such startling

smxtnoss.

In point of fact, the •speed of rearmament was so bo7ri.ldcring

largely because few people realized how completely the Roichswehr had
prepared for rco.rmamcnt under the "/cimar Republico Tociir.ologically, vory
little ground had been lestj Gastav Rrupp has told us that

After the assumption of po7/er by Hitler, I iiad tno satis
faction of being able to report bo the Fuehrer tnat }-rupp's

stood ready, after a short -warming-up period, to began the

rearmament of the Gorraaii xjcople vrnthout any gaps of ex
perience#

A secret history of artillery design states that, as o. result of clandcs.
tine activities under the hfeimar Republic:

Of the g-ons which were being used in 1039-1941, the most

importoLiit wore ci.lrco.dy fu-ly dcvcloipcd in 19o3o.o.. For
the equipment which Tuas tested in secrecy, the AriTiy
Ordnance Office and the industry stood ready to tahe up

mass production, upon order frcm the Fuehrer.

J

In this rego-rd, the Fuehrer vaos not basliful. The Reich's milit-iry
ostimatos for 1933 sho^^od an oxbraordinary increase over prior years.

Already by Octcbor, 1933, a top secret document of the Army Ordinance
Offico listed fifteen major -projects, including the mar.' facture of 135
tcrdcs, which vvcro being carried out in violation of the Vuri:)-illos Tr ^

In this same month, Gcrnnny vdthdrew from the League of Nations ^-hd
•..ii
International Diso.rmamcnt Conference.

Hitler's effect on roarmmcnt, in short, vw\s lihc uncapping a gusher.
In June, 1934, bho construction cf submarines nnd heavy hattlcships Trnis
undorv.^y.

Guns and tanhs were beginning to pour from the hiupp an

arms factories. There is no need to fill in the detail no"'.,; much of this

part of the story is contained in the record^ and judgment' of tno
first International Military Triyenal, and will bo more fully set forth
in the documents vfo will offer in this case.

In March, 1934, the Army started a program for the construction of
650 tf;nks, to bo completed by March, 1935. The second date is signify
leant; in tlia.t same month Hitler publicly repudiated the Versailles Treaty.

, See, e.g., Vol. II, Trial^oi^oJ^ejor

1.
2

. Vol. I, Trial of

-
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In tho tvidnicling of an 070, the Hcichswebr v/as history and tho Wohmacht
a foreboding reality.

Bo

"Military Freedom" (Vlehrfroihcit):

RQO.rmamont, Spaiji^ and tho Rhincland

As a matter of fact, the Jlcichs7;"ehr had not foblod eTe-ryono* to
those "in the knov/" Gornieen rcanncjnont had boon cai open secret for some

timo. But by 1935, matters had progrosscd so far that the mask of duplic

ity \ro.s becoming an embarrassment cTre-n to the most shameless.

So in

March, 1935, tho mask v/as throv/n off; this ovo ;t v/is called Germany's

"rocoTory of military freedom" (hfchrfroiheit). The socucnco of o-vonts
is thus set forth by the D^T:

Cn 10 Ilarch 1935, the defendant Gooring announced that

Germany v/as ouilding a military air force. Six days
later, on 16 March, 1935, a lav;-ivas passed.oinstitu-

ting compulsory military service and fixing tho estab
lishment of the German Army at a pcavC time strength

of 500,000 men.

In an endeavor to reassure public

opinion in other countries, the Govornrecnt announced on
21 Id-.y 1935 that Germany would, though renouncing tho
disax'mamont clauses, still respect the territorial
limitations of the Versailles Treaty, and would comply
v/ith the Locarno Pacts. Kcvcrthclcss, on tho very do.y
of this announcomont, tho secret Reich Dofonsc Law v/as

passed and its piiblioation forbidden by Hitler. In
tixis law, the povmrs and duties of tho Chancellor and
other Ministers wore defined, should Gornmny become
involved in war.

These events resulted in important changes in the top organization

of tho WohrmacUt,

In 1935, tho lanistry of Defense was ronreucd the T/ar

Ministry (Reichskrioi^s Ministorium); Blomberg booamc Minister of mr and
CoLiiaaiider-in-Chief (Obcrbofohlsliabcr) of the Y/ohrmacht. His iimaediate

subordinates, von Pritsch L.\nd Racdcr, bocai.ie Coimiiandors-in-Chiof of the

Army raid Havy respectively. Gooring, v;ho had boon Minister for aviation
since 1933, now took the title of Comr>.caider-in-Chief of the Air Force;

in nis military capacity only, but not in his ministerial status, he vvas
under von Blomberg.

For Srich Raeder and his staff - now renamed the Supreme Gonmiand

of the Navy (Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, or OIL:) - the events of
March md May 1935 were like a shot in the arm. The primary goal was

1. Vol. I, ^in_l_^o£t£e_jkdQr war Criminals, p. 184.
• ;
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recreCLtion of the Germn sute.rine fleet, end nov; the illegal subm-arine

activities of past years paid enormous dividends» The secret history

of the German Navy credited these early projects adth having made possible
the "astonishirg facts" that .

= ivds possible to put the first submarine into
service only 3 l/Z months after the restoration of

military severe?gnty declared on 16 Larch 1135, oh-t

is on 29 Juae, and then at intervals of about 8 days
to put nevf submarines continuously into service, so
that on 1 October 1935, tvjelve submarines vdth fu-ly
tro.ined persorniel •'/j'ere in service«.

Aprogram for the ocnsfcruction of bottle oruioers or.d oapitol ships
was also formlated and set under way. In 19b7, the some ye..i tha^ the
defendrnt Sohnieadnd beocuao Chief of Haaral Armomont, Gormrny entered
into the iinglo-C-orman llaval Troasy, under which both powers bound thenselves to interchange full details of their building orograns. But this
ms only a feint to gain tirao; as the B.! found, Genrnn had no ixaton-

tion of abiding by the naval agrocmonts, and pror^^tly and dolibcratoly
violated them.

Ihe Gornaia Air Force - no-wly born in 1955 - oocupied a; special

position among the'throe services. The top staff of tin Air Force (Oborkormando dor Luftwaffe, or OKL) was part of Goering's own Air Einistry,

not part of the Bar Ministry. Gooring recruited his staff from civilian
aviation administrators such as Srhard Milch, famous pilots such as

Udet, and by transfer to the Air Force of regular arr^ officers such
as F-esselring, Wever, and the defendant Sporrlc,

The infant Luft.mffo soon fo^.^.d opportunity to try its mngs in
r

actual combat. The Spanish Civil bar broke out in July, 1956, and in

September, the defendant Barlimont arrived in Spain as Pleuipotontiary
Delegate of the Bohrmacht, nlthough diplomatic reasons anrdcrlay German
aid to Franco, the Wehrmaoht was especially interested in the opportuinty
it afforded te test German equipment and German battle taouios with no i
weapons. The Army sent only afew troops, but substantial quantities of
guns and .mir.unition. The ITavy played a relatively minor part, thougn
the pocket battlo-cruisor "Doutschlcnd" and two light cruisers patrolled
the Spardsh Coast. But the Luftwaffe played the major role. In
-
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November, 1936, the defendant Sperrlo arrived in Franco Spain at the
head of the so-called "Sondor Legion", v/hich included a largo nuiaber of

"bomber, fighter, and roconnaissarco squadrons and several anta-aircraft
.batteries, i'm article by the defendant Sporrle roa-eals the groat value
of the Spanish experience to the Luftv.as.ffc in its subsoqaent .aggrossivo

campaigns, especially in Poaand uad France. In Octebcr, l-'?7, opcrile
vjUb relieved in Spain and given command of one cf the three "air groups"
into vvhich the Luftwaffe was divided.

Spectacular as wore the achicvomcnts of the Mavy and the Luftwrh'fe,
the Army's oxFansion v^v-S of greater importance. As in the case of the

the top staff was ronaiaed the "Oberkormioiido dcs Hacros" (OAh)l/ith the nood for caiaouflage removed, the Troops Department novj" emerged
as the General Staff of the Army,

The subdividing of Germany into seven VKhrkreiso was abolished m

1935, and the three obsolete cavalry divisions dissolved, GerT.i.my v^s

nov/ly divided into thirtcai hchrkroiso, each with a corps headquarters,
hurnbcrg was the center of the V/chrkrcis SIII, and the building directly
across the street from the Palace of Justice is the former j.cadquarters

of the XITIth :.my Corps. Subordinate to oaoh corps wcro t:irca (occa
sionally two) iPfa..try divisions. In addition, there wcro throe more

corps headciuea-tors, without territorial jurisdiotior., cor.trollin$ the
iiotorizod, light, and arnoured (panzer) divisions rospcotivoly. Above

tho corps hoadquartors, the two old 'e.rupponhonnandos" woro replaced by
tlu-GO territorial "array group" (hcorosgruppo) hoadciu irtors, ooni-.oaidGd

by the three no.st senior generals - von hu.-.dstodt, von Book, ar.d the
dofer.dant von Loob. Afourth non-territorial array group under von

Brauchitsoh controlled tho raotorizod, light, and arraourod divisions.
In March 1936, tho last safogusrd of tho Torsaillos Treaty was

swept away. Ayear oarlior, a plan for tho tdlitary rooccupation of
the Rhinelcuid had boon prepared by tho Ministry of V/ar. On 7March 1S36,

in open dofianoo of tho Treaty, tho dorailitarizod zone of tho Ahineland
was ontcrod by Gorman troops. Once agann, tho sooret roarraaraout activ
ities of oarlior years gavo the German military loaders eourage; the
Gorman Havy's secret history status
-

18 -

On 7 March 1936, during tho critical laomeiit of the
occupation of the deniilitarized zone on the 'iVestern

border, ergnteen s^ibraarines in service -.•."sre available,
seventeen of v/'hich had already passed the test period
and in case of emergency, they could have been em-

ployed ivithout difficulties on the French coast up tu
the Gironde.

• In .announcing this action to the Reichstag, Hitler endeax'ored to
*

/

ft

assuage the hostile reac'tion "i7h3.ch he lio doubt expected to folloYf from

this violation of the Treaty by saying;
to imake in Europe".

"We have no territorial claim-:

But the evenbs vWiich were to gave the lie to this

assurance were not far in the future.

Between Kay 1S35 and the end cf

1937, the German Army more than quadru.pledj by the time of the-* annexation

of Austria, it comprised 52 infantry, 4 motorized, 4 armoured, 3 light,
and 1 mountain division, or 44 in all.

•'

'

'

C. • The T/ehrmacht and the Nazis

The impressive-revival of the Wehrmaoht's strength Y,ras achieved by
r

Germany's-military leaders with the full suppox't of German industry and,

after January 1933, under the political leadership of Adolf Hitler and
the Nazi Party. :\nd before we describe the conquest of Poland and the
other countries overrun by the i/ehrmacht, v;e may well oauso to examine
brieflj'- the development of relatioi.s be-b.yeen the I/ehrmaol.t and the Nazis,
for it was the alliance betvireen Hitler and the V/ehrmacht — an alliance

which Yfas established and preserved desnite some points of difference
and much ill will betvreen the Nazi,Party and the, German officers' corps —
that Yms the key stone of the arch of the Third Kelch.

Reineoke put it in the notes for one of,his lectures

Aa the defendant
S

••

^ /

»

The tvfo pillars of tlie Third Reich are the Party and
_ the Armed Forces and each is throv.-n bad: on the success
or doY/nfall of the other.

Th® basis for this alliance between Hitler and the V/ehrmacht v/as

not openly aoknov/ledged during the early iryonths of the Hitler regime.
Indeed, when Blomberg took office in the Hitler-Papen cabinet, ho attrib
uted his selection to Hindenburg, not to Hitler, and, with a bov/ to-, voii

i' ' '

I

Seeckt, promised to proeerve the Reiohsv/ohr as "aii instrument. of the'

sfcate-' fibove a,If'parties,But this promise rapidfy became miee^ingless - ' ' , .
19 —
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as German.-party politics succumbed to the rigor mortis of dictatorship^o

rxfter the eloction of P llaroli 1933 Hitler had numerous opy-ositioA members

in the Reichstag put into what he called "protective custody", and then
put through the Reichstag the Enabling Act of 24 March 1933, which gave
his cabinet full legislative poY/er, even above the Constitutifrhc

A

month later Goeriiig established the Gestapo, and in July all parties
other than the b'SDAP were, declared criminal»

_

During the remainder of

1933, the vise of tyranny was tightened by the prostituti»-<n of the Judi
ciary, strangling of the trade unions, and the subjection of the press
to Goebbols and Dietrich.-,

It had boon all very well for von iSeeclct to

I

maintain a haughty superiority to "party pclitlcs" under the I/oir.iar Re
public, but by the latter part of 1933 there was no such thing left in
Germany, and there v/as o.nly one overriding and all-important political

issue:

whether to fight• against the militaristic tyranny that "v/as set

tling over Germany, or to Join v/i^h Hitler and the Hasis in estabjjsbing
the dictatorship of the" Third Reich„

The loaders of the i/chrmaoht gevo

their answer cautiously but, in the end, decisively.
Indeed, in some circles of the hohrmrcht, there "wae rati.cr more
I

enthusiasm than caution..

In February 1933, Hitler's very first month as

Chancellor, both Blomberg and Rcichcnau made public statements favorable
to the, Nazi cauvso,

1

and on 31 March 1933, Blcmbc>rg, speaking for the

IJehrmaoht, saluted Hitler as "the leader of the Goman destiny" „

Later

the same year Hitler reciprocated these manifestations of good willo On
the day of the annual Nazi Pai'ty rally at Nurnberg,

'1 September 1933,/Blomberg "vvr.s promc6ed to the ran]- of. a fviil general

(Kjoueraloberst) and the defendant Leob v/as 'appointed. Gomi:-.ande.r-in-Chi.uf
_of' GrupperQer!rnr:.ando 2.

But Blomberg and Reichenau had been specially favored by Hitler,
and the latter was a well loiovmi Nazi sympathizer<»

As yet, the old line

conservative generals — such as the Commander'^ih-Oihiof, von Fritsch

and the Chief of the General Staff, liicutenant-Goncral Beck — had not
taken a positicn." Hitler's support of rearmament was favorably received
throughout the Wehrraacht, but there ivas trouble vdth some of.Hitler's

followers, notably the Storm Troops (Sturmabtoilung, or "SA") under the
1. yoellcischer Bcobaghter for 6 February and 10 February, 1933
—. 20 n
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leadership of the Notorious RoGhin. This, the se-called "r-;-.dioal vd.ng"

of the Nazi Party/ r,'anted to break the- grip of the officers' corps by

*

t

incorporating the SA into the Reicliswehr,

"But t}iis tjiroat to the priv

ileged status of the officers' corps v.ras elicvinatod during tho so-called
-"Roehm purge" in June 1934, Yfnen Roehn and his follo\7-ers Vvero murdered

in on orgy of political assassination.

This put the quietus on the mil

itary hopes of the SA, and was so welcome on event to the Wohianacht that

they wore prepared to overlook tho brutal murder during the "purge" of
two of their ovai colloagucs —- Generals von Schloichcr o.nd von Brodov/.

.ind so vdion Hindenburg died on 2 August 1934, and hitler proclaimed
9

himself Chief of State and Supremo Commander of tho Armed Forces, Hitler
had already v/on pov/orful support conong tho leading, generals, rnd the re
mainder wore by no moans prepared to take, a stand against him,.

That same
!

day, on the orders of Blombcrg, all members of the Wchivnacht took the
folloTmig oath to Hitler:

I take this holy each before God, that I vvlll render
unooniiitional obodionco to the Fuehrer of the German
Hoich and of the German people, Adolf Kitler, and as
a brave soldier \'.H1 bo prepared at any time to saerifico my life for this oath.

But it was the repudiation of the arms liniitations of tho ••Versailles
Treaty in May 1935 which finally sealed the bargain botwoon Hitler and
'I

tho military leaders.

i

IVe have already traced their clr-udcstino roa.rria-

•ment activities during tho fiftoon years which preceded this event, 'and
have seen with wh'at unalloyed enthusiasm they Y/olcomed open roarmrmiont
in-'the spring of 1935..

And it was in tho fall of 1935 that the old lino

generals threw off their previous reserve and spoke out onthusiastioally •
and devotedly for tho Fuehrer.

The occasion v^as tho 125th L-nnivorsary

of tho German War Academy, \d-iicli had boeh founded by Ccharnhorst in 1510,

vvhioh had closed in 1920 as required by the Versailles Treaty.

Gn
%

15 October 1935, great ceremony attended the reopening of the Academy.
The Fuelirer himself was in attendance with Goebbels tind Dietricl> at hie

4I

heels; the aged Fieldraarshal von Maokensen and Genefo.l von Seeckt emerged

•

••V

from retiremontj among the active ruilitary leaders in attendance were

Blomborg, Ffitsch, the Chief of the General Staff Beck,'Goering and Milbh
from the Luftwaffe, Rundstedt, ^fitzleben, and the Commander of the War
^ 21 -

-;,Vl

. W,

Academy, Lieutenant-General Lie'oraann.

The occasion "vvas graced "by

speeches, not only by Blomberg, but also by Beck and Lieb^l:^nn,- both of
\
whom were foremost and highly respected exoonples of the so-called
"old

school" o.mohg the Germo.n military leo.ders. Addressing the students of
the ,-ica.demy. Beck reminded them "of the duty "VThich they ov/e to the man

who recreated the Wehrmacht and made it strong again and who finally
struck oif the fetters of Versailles, and to the new State vdiich assured
I

^

'

us. a foundation stronger than over in a united nation".

Addresoin-^ the
O

Fuehrer on behalf of the offioersf corps. General Liebmann declared:

We knc^-.'" and vfe are convinced in our deepest being tiiat
•we have solely your determined will and your ini'allible
leadership to thank for our froodora and - like the Geriiic!.n people'- i7o and the entire Gorman Armed Forces will

show our thanks to you, our Fuehrer, through unflinching
faithf'ulness and devotion.

There ensued a period which might be described as honeymoon between

Hit].er raid "the Weiirmacht, The military leaders were thoroughly occupied
v/ith the recreation of Germany's military might and Hitler,, for the most

I

P^vrt, did hot interfere*with their activitieso Hitler took the occasion

of his own birthday (20 April) in 1936 to promote Blomberg to the high
est military rank of fieldmarslial —"the first Germ^ fieldiparshal ap
pointed since the first World War; simultaneously, Fritsch and Goering
i

V7ere made full generals and Raeder a Generaladt.iiral,.

The attitude of •

the German officers' corps'towords Hitler during these years has been ^
V

' '

-f,

' I

well summarized by the defendant Blaskowitz;

'
The rearmament of Germany, at first (1935-35) secret
ard later unconcealed, was welcomed by me. AH -cffleers of the Army shared tliis attitude and tdierefore

had no reason to oppose Hitler i Hitler produced the
results v/hich all of us waimly desired.

In such happy collaboration v/ith Hitler,' the oiWricers' corps pro-ceeded to make the Y/ehrmacht onoo again mighty for war.

Shortly before

their creation was put to use, howet-er, a serious crisis occurred,

host

of US'are too much inclined to tHirdc of Hitler's diotatorship as un

troubled; in point of fact. Hitler v/as oonctc-uitly 'enpdurituring orisps,

some of which seriously threatened liiB-. poli^'ioal mstery. Early in 193§,
tliO: relations between "Hitler-.aad the Army wre grc.Vely offeetod by wiiat
«
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has become knovjn as the "Blomberg-Fritsch affair".

This episode resulted

in important changes in the top orgcinization of the Wehrmacht, and ha.d
other far-reaching consequences.

D. The Blomberg-Fritsch Crisis and the Establisiiment
of OM

The principal actors in this drama v/ere Eitler, Himrnler, tloering
and, within the Army, Blomberg, .Fritsoh, Beck, Lieutenant-General WilheDm
Keitel, who had succeeded Reiohenau as Chief of the Armed Forces Depart
ment of the War Ministry, and several of the senior generals of the Army,

including Rundstedt, Reichenau, Braucintsoh, and the defendsnt Leeb.
The imrtiediate cause of the crisis was that on 12 January 1938, having

previously obtained Hitler's blessing, Fieldmarshal ^Jlomberg, a mdoYrer,
married a young lady whose lineage was not sufficiently aristocrabic to

meet with the approval of the German officers' corps, liitler and Goeiing
witnessed the ceremony, and all seeraed serene, but very shortly there
after rumours vrere circulated in high places attacjcing the lady's reputa/

tionn

Criticism of the marriage within the officers' corps grew louder

and louder.

On the basis of these rumours. Hitler and Goering forced

Blomberg to resign on 25 January 1938, and two days later the Blotibergs

left Gerraany for Italy on v/Iiat was at the same time honeymoon and exile.
It is not altogether clear whether or not Hitler hii self *;/a3 anxious
to get rid of Blomberg, who wad primarily the victim of German military
• class-consciousnessfl But thex-e is little doubt that Hitler, as well as

Goering and Himrnler, wanted to be rid of the Commandor-in-Chief of the
General von Fritsch, whose arrogant behavior had rubbed Hitler the

vn-ong way, and who made no secret of his lack of respect for the military
abilities of Goering and Himrnler. Two days after Blomberg's dismissal,

Hitler, in Goering's presence, summarily relieved Fritsoh as CommandorIn-Chief of the Army, using as a pretext an absolutely false and un

speakably malicious accusation that Fritsoh had been guilty of unnatural
sex offenses•

Fritsch was held in house arrest ponding investigation,

' and k fevr weeks later v/as completely exonerated by a military cuui-t

martial, but in the meantime he had boon replaced as Comniandor-in-Chicf

cf the Army by von BrauchitsOh, and Fritsoh remained in retirement until
- 23 -
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the attack against Poland a year and a half later*

.

>

This preposterous and contemptible affair threiv the Army into an up

roar, and had fantastic overtones,

A fiery young naval lieutenant named

von y/angenheim flfew to Rome, sought out Blomberg., and offered him a

pistol in order that his suicide might vindicate the honor of the Wehrmacht*

The Viforldly fieldmarshal handed back the pistol with the observa

tion that Wangenheim "apparently had entirely different opinions and a
different standard of life than he himself".

But the effect of Fritsch's

dismissal was fundamentally much more important, inasmuch as a large part

of the officers' corps thoroughly approved Blomberg's dismissal, v/hereas
very

Gvcryone knew that Fritsch — the very model of a/German general and the
idol of the V/ehrmacht — had been most shamefully treated.
Furthermore, important issues underlajr Fritsch's dismissal.

The

officers' corps had not forgotten Roehm and the SA, and now Hiramler and'
tho S3 loomed as a menace to the Army's military monopoly.

Some of the

leading generals, such as Leeb and von Kressonstein, were strong advocates
I

of religious training for the troops, which did not fit the neo-paganism
of the SS.

Furthermore, Goering, capitalizing on the- exploits of his

Luftvroffe in Spain, v/as demanding a larger voice in military affairs than

von Fritsch v/as disposed to accord him.

It was plain that the whole

Fritsch-Blomberg affair was a frame-up, and that Goering and Himmler were
back of it.

This was a direct aiid sinister attack against the Army leader

ship, for the purpose of subjecting it to domination by Kitler, Goering,
Himmler, and other party bigwigs.

The Army's efforts to meet this

challenge failed miserablyj in this failure personal ambition, lack of
I
V

solidarity, and moral instability all played a part.

Having dismissed Blomberg and Fritsch, Hitler wa^ faced with the

question of their'replacement, and in solving this probloui appears to have
relied chiefly cn Goering and a newcomer to the top level, LieutonantGenoral Wilhelm Keitel, who, as Chief of the Armed Forces Depai-tment, had

been Blomberg's chief assistant in the War Ministry since 1935, and whose
son had married Blomberg's daughter^

On 27 January, Hitler informed

Keitel that he himself T/ould take over personal ccmmond of tho Wohrmacht,
vri.th Keitel as his chief assistant.
ister of War" were abolished,

The War Ministry and the title "Min

All this was accomplished "by a Hitler docro©

^
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®n 4 February 1938 • The Armed Forces Department of the V/ar Ministry I'Vas

taken over by Hitler as his persoml military staff and designated

"Sup2*eme Command of the Armed Forces (Oberkommando der 'i?ehrmacht orr*'OM*')j
the rest of the Ministry, passed out of existence»

Keitel v/as giVon the

title "Chief of*the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces", and thereafter
functioned more or less as Hitler's executiye officer for armed fcroes
matters.

^ Hitler did not Immediately select a successor to Fritsch as, Commanderin-chief of the Array.

The defendant Leeb and Rundstodt vfcro the most

senior generals, but Hitler at first leaned rather toward his old timo
I

favorite, Reichonau,

Rundstodt or Loeb v/ould have boon accoptable to'

the officers' corps, but there was strong opposition to Reichonau.

On

3 February 1938, Hitler finally decided to appoint Lieutenont-Gonoral von

Brauchitsch, at tho.t time Commandor-in-Chief of the army group for motor

ized and armoured troops.

Brauchitsch v/as held in high esteem among the

loaders of the offioors' corps, but several ciroumstonoes connected ivith
his selection boded ill for the unity and independence of the Army.
>

Firstly, Brauchitsch allowed himself to be chosen as successor to a man

whv had been most shamefully and wrongfully dismissed.

Secondly,

Brauchitsch himself v/as suffering domestic complications, and pomiitted

himself to undergo the indignity of having these carefully reviewed by
Hermann Goering,

Worse still, this very private problem ";vas solved only

with the assistance of Keitel and Goering, who wore instrumental in
persuading his wife to consent to a divorce, so that Brauchitsch could

remarry.

Thirdly, while Brauchitsch was given, the rank of full general •

which Fritsch had held, Goering was to receive the rank of fieldmarshal

which Blomberg had hold, and would thereby outrank the Commandei'-in-Chief

of the Army.

Finally, as a condition of his appointment, Brauchitsch v/as

required to agree to a large number of important chcjagcs.in the top
leadership of the Army, At first, Brauchitsch, balked at this last con
dition, but on the afternoon of 2 February, in conference with Goering
and Keitel, Brauchitsch gave w^y.

The result of all this was that the German newspapers for 6 February
1938 did not carry only the news of the creation of OKW, Cnnd" of Goering's
and Bi'duohitsch'8 promotionsj they also carried the nowg that the
-
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defendcjit Leeb hcid been relieved as Coiiunander-in-Chief of Army Group 2

and retired, along vdth pIx other high ranking generals, including such
respected figures as von Kressenstcin and von Kleist, and six Air Force
generals.

This third humiliation of the old lino Army leadership was

part of the price which Brauchitsch paid for his personal advancement.
Indeed, the Army's failure to cope more successfully with this
crisis shovred up its weaknesses all too clearly.

Von Fritsch himself,

able soldier that ho v/as, sooms to have been preoccupied with the attack
on his personal character, and to have tal'on no effective action against

the more fundamental challenge to the army leadership,

he realised vrell

enough that Himmler was back of it, but his unimaginative reaction was
to send Hiriimler a written challenge to a pistol duel, and it is even
doubtful that tho challenge ever reached Hirarulor,

It is difficult to sec hovf Hitler could have withstood a unanimous

stand by the military loaders, but there was no unanimity. Many of thorn,
such as Brauchitsch, Roichenau, Kcitel, List, von Schobcrt, Gudcrian,
von Maiiistein and others, woro t^o ambitious to rcjoct tho promotions

and new appointments which oamo to them in the course of the affair. A
few weeks later, on 1 March 1938, tho two most senior officers - Von
Rundstedt and Von Bock - accoptod promotion to tho rank of full general.
Even such men as Book and Adam, who later resigned, seem to have boon
content for tho moment to block Reichonau's candidacy as Commandor-in>-

Chief end secure the promiso of a court martial to clear van Fritsch^ s
ncjne.

In suimnry, tho most significant lesson of the Blomberg-Fritsoh
affair is that the alliance between tho Wohrmacht and Hitler was so

strong that even this rude blow failed to shatter it. The Wohrmacht
had soon the Hazis overthrow tho Woii.nr Republic, establish a ruthless

dictatcrship, and throw their political opponents into concentration
camps. Thoy had seen thoir oolloaguGs Schleicher and Brodow i.iurderod,
and now they saw Fritsch fall victim to a loul attack, and seven of their
most respected loaders rudely pensioned off. But they also saw in Hitler

the loader of a party which had established a strong and seemingly pormanent government, and vfhich glp.dly fumxBhod tho funds for rOsarmeanont
without the nooossity of explaining and justifying ovorything to tho
m 26 f
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'rhe3^ so.w tho factories of Gonnany hur.ming and pouring out

the anaamt-nts vriiich tlicy roedcd to reconstitute tho Wchr-aacht.

Thej-

savtf" the pop and tho part^/" vrho had created political conditions favorablo
to the floworing of ohcrPiOus military mirht,

Thoy had Icariiod that

Hitler, liko themselves, had sccait rospoot for the sanotaty of treaties,
and could bo counted on to pursue a "realistic" foreign policyo

They

knew that, in Hitler's mind, all this roarmamont wns not aimlcasj thoy
know of and shared Hitler's ultimate intention to put tho ^ohrmacht to

use*. All those things wore more import-mt to tho Wohrmacht than the
futuro career of Fritsch or tho unpleasant habits of Hirmlor,

Basically,

the reason that the Array did not to.kc a firm stand b^-hind i'ritsca i-i.cs

that they did not wont to take a decisive stand in opposition to Hitlor*^
TOiatcvor differences they had v/ith Hitler were largely on questions cf
method and timing; there wore no fundanontal differoncos of purpose*

In the eyes of tho Gornan people and among the troops, tho Army's

prestige "w-as saved by Hitler's announcomunt that Blomberg and FrituOh
had retired voluntarily for reasons of health, and by highly complimcntmy
letters from the Fuehrer to each of them*

Bitter feelings caused by tho

affair lingered on in some circles of tho dfficers' corps, but the
fundamental basis for tho Wohrmo.cht's participation in and support of

the Third Reich was not seriously shaken. iVnd the alliance between the
Tuohrmaoht and Tditler \ms to survive other serious tests in the fateful
years 1938 and 1939.
Wt:-
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CCUivTS 0N}3 xm FOUR:

FhOim. Yu^RS (BLUIOTICRIEGE)

-

AUSTRIA

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

(1958
Ono rc:?vSon that the unpleasant memory of the fate of Blomborg and
Erit5qh faded so rapidly t,^^s that tlio Army irmicdiately became pro-

occupied v/ith far weightier natters#

At least as early as 5 Hovenber

1937, at a m.ooting with Blombcrg, Frit-sch, Gooring, Raodcr, and'Foreign
Minister Yon Hourath, Hitler had annouiicod his intention to conquer
Austria and Czechoslovakia at the first suitable opportunityc

At this

secret nooting. Hitler stated:

It is not. a case of concj^uoring people, but of conquering
agriculturally/ useful spacoo It would also bo more to
the purpose to seek raw material producing territory in
Europe directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas,
and this solution \vould have to be brought into effect
for one or tvj-o generations# The history of all times —
Roman Empire, British Empire — has proved that every
space expansion en only be effected by breaking resistaiico CQ-^d taking risks» Even setbacks are unavoidable;
neither formerly nor today has spa.ce been found 7/ithout
an ovmer; the attacker always cones up against the propri
etor ao... The question for Germany is where the greatest
possible conquest could be m.ade at the lov/est cost#,.,##
The Gerv.ian quostion can be solved only by way of force,
and this is novur v/ithout risk,

• A

«

^

9

O

The intention to seize I^ustria and Czechoslovakia was made clear in the

following v^ords:

For the iiaprovement of our military-political position,
it must be our first aim in every case ef entanglement

by war to conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously,
in order to remove any threat from the flanks in case of

a possible advance yfcstwards# The annexation of the
two states to Germany militarily and politically would
constitute a considero.blo relief, ov/ing to shorter and

better frontiers, the freeing of fighting personnel for

other purposes, and the possibility of reconstituting new
armies up to a strength of about twelve divisions.
These intentions were, of course, in flagrant violation of ilitlor's
antiouncemexits in 1935 and 19SS that he had

intention of attacking

.lustria or Czechoslovcdcia, and of the agreement of July 1936 betv/een

Germany and _^ustria londer vdiich Hitler recognized "the full sovereignty
of the federal state of ..tustria".

Nonetheless, on 13 December 1937,

Hitlop approved a report concerning the military execution of the inten

tions outlined by him at the oonferenoe in November,
-
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A, Austria

Throughout 1937, agents of the German Foreign Office had been under
mining the Austrian goverrjaent and directing the activities cf the out
lawed Austricn Nazi Portj^,

On 12. Jebru-ary 195o, Schuschnigg., tho Chon-

cellor of Austria, was peromptorily suimuonod to laee-'s with Eitlor at tho

Obersalzb-erg.

V^hen Schuschnigg arrived at tiie Borghof, he foxind Hitler

flanked by the military, including the defendant Sperrle, and Aeitol
'and Aeichenau.

In a diary kept by General Alfred O'odl, one of tho do-

fendants convicted by the IHT, xvho throughout much of this pei-iod was

Chief cf Operations uixder ICoitol, the entry for 11 February states:
In the evening and on 12 Febru.o.ry Goueral Iloitel, with
Gonorr.l von Roichcnau end Gperi'lo o.t Oecroalsb'erg«

Schuschnigg vrith G« Hcln-iidt arc being pryt xnidor hoxxviest
political and milito.i'y pressure# at 2o hours Sohusohnj.gg
signs minutes,

A speech delivered in harch 1942 by a high i-anklng .rastrian Kazi,
Gauleiter Dr» Rainer, gives a fuller account of tho nature of this noooing:

The Fuehrer did not conduct the negotiations as Sohi-.schnxgg

expected.#.#. The Fuehrer

shoutod at him and roptoach. d

him with all tho dirty tricks Schusctinigg had' cormittod
m.

ft " I

during the years past

Ribbontrop t^ld mo ho really

pitied Schuschni.gg..### ScUuschnig.g tried to object to
soTaothirxg, but got so tei*rib?-.y shouted ct that he fell
back into -siicncc*

Then the meal x/as taken#

Now the defendo.nt Sporrlo will no doubt tell tho Tribunal, as ho has

already so candidly xrSormed. the proaeoutioi-., th.d; he liad no notion what

ho was doing at tho Berghof, and that the extent cf his activity in this
extortion was limited to a friendly cup of tea# Sporrlo had only a few

'.V

I

w.•

nwnths prior to the Oborsalzborg neoting rotarnod froiri Spain, '.fhoro tho
<i

bombers of his C«ndor Legion '.verG being tried nut with deadly success

•'/A

in support of the Franco foroos. It is ceusiderably less than likely
that Hitler summened this man to tho Berghof for the purpose of partoking'
«f ton. E.ainer's spotch puts tho wxttor beyoiid .all doubtj

the Fuehrer called Sperrle who had Just relinquiahbd

- vSilf

thH90Win.".ncl in Spain. Tho Fuehrer asked hi» to spsalc
about tho Luftwaffe#
•'4'S
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Schusohnigg was given a. very impressive picture of the
German Anny. Keitel too nns present.

lifter Sohuschnigg left the OborsaJEbBrg, military pressure against
sham

Austria, wa.s maintained by/r.iiitary activities near the Austrian border

organized by Sperrlo and several army generals, and a few da^'s later

Schuschiiigg granted amnesty to a nuraber of Austrio.n hazis.

ij. month

later, on 12 March, Gorman troops occupied Austria, end the follc'..'irig
day Austria was annoxod to Gcrmruiyo
The defendants vdll no doubt em.pliasize that they had no advance

Icnowledge of the .oocupation of Austria.

This is totally irreleva-d,

since Hitler himself lonev; of his or/n intention less then forty-eight

, hours' in adviu'ice.

The occupation v;as not carefully planned in advance,

but was precipitated unexpectodly.

On 9 March, Sohuschnigg had arinoui'icod.

his intention of holding a plebiscite on the question of Austrian indepOiLdoncG,

Hitler decided to act at once, and on 10 March, in a'flurry

of extemporized military preparations, the nearby troops were mobilized,
and Sperrle assembled o. miscellaneous assortment of combat and transport

'pianos at airports in Bavaria, Backed by these forces. Hitler's agent
Keppler prosonted an ultimatum to the President of Austria, Milclas; in:d
Q'

informed him that'200,000 German soldxers were at the Austrian border

ready for invasion. . Faced with those threats, the Austrian goverimicut
succumbed on 11 March, and the next laarning the f/ohrmacht rolled into

Austria, This v/as the first of the so-called "flovrer wars", so called-'

because, according ts Hazi propaganda, the German troops wore greotod
vrith flovrers instead of bullets.
B,

The Gudotcnland

That Austria sucounbed to threats without the actual uso of military

force must not obscure the fact that hor annexation was aooonplishod by

military conquest. The Wotoiaoht'had made it possible. -\ud the rolo
of the Tifehrmaoht was sYan noro deoisivs in the oaso of Caoonoslovakia.
Following the usual Nazi diplooatio pattern, oategorioal assurances

were given by Germany to the Czooh gavornmont at the time of the
"AnsobluBB% But two months later, at a rdAitary ooiifcronOO in May

1958, Hitler ordered the preparation of plans for military action ,
•
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agaiiiS"b Chechoslovakia not latoz' than October 1933. Two days later,
* Hitler i.ssued a revised directive v/hich began v/'ith the statoncnts

I't

is ]:iy inialterable decision to s?Tiash Czechoslovakia by military action
in the near futui'e".

Pursuant to this directive, plans for the attack were developed

which envisaged the formation and omployracnt in the attack of several
"armies'*

a unit which did not exist in the peace-time structure of

the Oeman Army but was the standard large unit for war operations.

Despite his curt dismissal at the time of the Blcmborg-Fritsch affair,

the defendant Loeb emerged from retirement to take comiuand of the 12th

Army; the 3d Army mb-s oorx-ianded by Kucchlor with Hollidt as his Chief
of Staff, ar.d Salmuth v/as Chief of Staff of the 2d Army. Sperrlc devel
oped plans for the omploynont of Air Fleet 3 in the attack.

Tho plan for the attack on Czechoslovakia led to another crisis
.J

between Hitler and some of tho senior generals.

It was not that there

vfas any disagreement with tho obooctivo of conquest of Czechoslovakia
or any doubt about the ability of the German Army to do this; once again,
it was cntiroly a question of timing. A number of the generals were

firLily convinced that, if Germany should attack Czechoslovakia, Frai.ce

and En-gland would honor their guarontoo to Czochosl -vakia and v/ould

attack Gorriony in tho V/ost, Gcrr.iany's western fortifications were by
no means completed, ar.d vfhiio the growth of the Y/ehrmacht had been phenom
enal, it had not yet nearly approached its peak. Tho leaders of tho
Uohrmacht did not v/ant bo see the fruits of their labor, as yet unripe,
.A

spoiled by being plucked too early, Brauchitsch, Beck, Adam, and others

presented those viovfs to Hitler, but wore juet with the rejoinder that
Franco and England would not intervene in a y/ar between Germany and
Czechoslovakia,

This conflict in points of view never reached a shov/dorm, as tho
imaediato crisis was resolved through the conclusion of the Munich Pact,
u d'.-r v/hich Czechoslovakia was required to code the gudetenland to Ger-

T.iany, C-orman occupation of tho Sudotenland was oarried out in part by
troops und^r tho comr.iand of the defendants mentioned above.
^
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Bohemia, Moravia and Slcvalci^

In the casG of Austria and the Sudetoniand, Hitlor had made.great

diplomatic capital out of the fact that the inliah it raits of the areas

forcibly annexed by Germany vTcre of Germanic origin.

Tvfo days before

the Munich Pact ims signed. Hitler, in a public speech carefully cal
culated to induce the vrcstcrii poYrers to appease Gorniany onco more,
described the Sudotenland as "the last territorial claim vrhich I navo
to mako in Eurono".

Hitlor continued:

I assured (Mr. Chainborlain), norcovor, and I repeat it
hero, that when this problem is solved, there i.dll bo
no more territorial problems for Gorriany in E^iropc.
And I further as suited him that from the nomcnt when

Czechoslovakia solves its problems, that is to say,
when the Czechs have ccmo to an agroomont -s-mth their
other ninoritios, poaoofully, v/ithout oppression, I
shall no lonrcr bo intorostod in the Czech State.

And that is guaranteed him,

Vjc don't want any Czechs

at a l l .

But the stress which plitlor laid on the "Goruianic" character of

Austria and the Sudotenland wo.s just as spurious and insincere as his

declaration that Germany had no more territorial claims,

The defendants

knew that Hitlor novc-r intended to honor these promises.

As early as

11 October, he asked the generals what additional forces would be neces

sary to break Czech resistance in Sohomia caid Moravia. In December 1958,
a directive was prepared under the defendant 'iVarlimcnt's supervision in
the 0157 which vjas later initialed by the defendant Scliniowind, and which
stated:

Roferoncc "Liquidation of the Rest of Czochoslovokia"
the Fuehrer has given the following additional orders

The preparations for this eventuality are to continue
on the assur.'-ption that i-o resistance wj'orth mentioning
is to bo c:cpootod.

To the outside world, too, it must clearly appear that
it is merely an action of pacification and not a war
like undertaking.

In tho meantime, the hatchet men of the Gormen Foreign Office wore

busily fomenting separatist sontimont in Slovakia. By ?>larch 1939, Hitlor

i;vas ready to strike again. Under strong pressure from Hitler,. Slovakia
-
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dcclarod hcrsolf independent, and at the sane time the President of
Czcchosdc-irakio., Hacha, was suirmoncd to Berlin and, in the prcsoiioo of

C-oorin^ and Keitol, wo.s threatened v.-ith iiiir.odiato inTasion and the
dcstrucnion of Prague froo the air by the-pianos of Sporrle's Luftflotto.

Under this terrible threat, Hacha agreed to the incorporation

of Bohcmda and Moravia into the Pcich as a protectorate; the follovring

day, Gornian troops under the coim-iand of tho dofcndont Blasko-i."itz
mo-rchcid in, and Sperrlo's air forces took over the Czech airfields.
This was tho last of tho "flb-ivor v/ars", but v/o do not bolievc tlic-t

Blas'iovdtz will tell us that there 7/oro many floivers tiiroini as he marched
into Prague»

-
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COUNTS ONE AND FGQR: THE CONQUEST OF EpKOPE
(1939 - 1942)

Immediately after the Munich settlement, the Wehrmacht was already
looking ahead to the conquest of Poland, and the estaolisinnent oi an

"independent" Slovakia in March 1939 was a calculated step in that direo—
tion#

The Wehrmacht had advised the Foreign Office in October 1958 that

"a weak and independent Slovakia would be tiie best solution" in order to
"avoid the creation of a common frontier between Poland and Hungary"

which the Uehrmacht thought "undesirable."

Uhy it ---vas thought ""undesir

able" becaiae abundantly clear on 1 September 1939, \7hen the German

Fourteenth Army invaded Southern Poland from Slovakia.
A.

The Nelirmacht on the Eve of War

No such disagreements between Hitler and the generals preceded the
attack on Poland as had accompanied the Munich crisis.

Th® Wehrmacht

had been greatly strengthened during the intervening year. The submarine
fleet under Admiral Doenitz was larger, and the Liiftwaffe wa.s very much

larger; a fourth luftflotte based in Vienna had been added after the con
quests of Austria and Czechoslovakia.

The army had made great strides. Two new corps headquarters in

Austria and seven iievj- divisions had already been set up by the end of
1938 as a result of the Austrian and Sudeten annexations, 3y Septemioor,
1939 the German-Army comprised at least seventy-five divisions ana was

still growing very rapidly.^ In relation to the aimaies of neighooiing
countries, of course, the Geivaan Army's expansion was even more formid

able, as the substantial and ^veil-trained. Czechoslovakian Army had been
disbanded ydthout the firing of a single shot.

As we approach the outbreak of war, we may profitably fit the de
fendants into place once more; all of them iiave risen in the military

hierarchy since our last recapitulation. During the second World War,
the German Army oonductod throe major campaigns, the oojnpaign of Septemberj
1939 against Poland, with a holding action in the west; the conquest
France and the Low Co^mtries in the spring of 1940; and the overrunning
1, See the testimony of General Jodl before the HAT, mimeographed
transcript p. 10999,

-
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of Westei*n Russia in 1941. .. It is, perhaps, not generally realized that

all three campaigns were conducted "by very much the same set of amy

group and army commanders. Indeed, the army group commanders were iden
tical in all three campaigns.

Three army groups led the Gorman troops

in each of these campaigns, and the three commanders-in-chief of these

army groups wore the three most senior generals of the Gorman Army — the
defendant von Loeh, and von Rundstedt and von Bock.

B.

Poland

For the opening campaign. Loot's role, though defensive, was vitally
ira-oortant. He was given command of all the German forces in the West,
vfith the mission of holding any attack v;hich the French and British might
launch. His headquarters vras called "Army Group C", and under him were
two armies

the First and Seventh — facing France and the Maginot Line,

raid a third^eakor army — the Fifth —to the north on the Belgian and
Dutch frontiers. The dofoiidDJat Hallidt, by then a brigadier general, was

Chief of Staff of the Fifth Army. The bulk of the air forces supporting
Lccb in the vrest VTOrc those of Luftflotto Throe, oommandod by the defend
ant Sporrlo.

The invasion of Poland vmi-s accomplished by tii/o army groups

.Army

,

Group Horth under Book, and Army Group South under Rundstedt. The latter
had retired from active scrvico in November, 1D38, but was rcoallod to
active duty in Juno, 1939 to prepare for the campaign. Under him wore
throe armies. The Fourteenth Army, commojidcd by List,

deployed in

the so-called "indepondont" state of Slovakia; the dofondant Woohlor,,by
then a colonel, was List^s operations officer. Well to the north, in

Silesia, w:.s the Eighth Army under the defendant Blaskomtz, Between tho
two was the heavily armored and motorized Tenth Army, under Roichenau,

which -was to push into Pol-aid as rapidly as possible v/hile the armies of
List and Blasko^vitz protected its flanks. Tho dofondLmt Both, then a
lieutenant general, was a corps oommandur under Roichenau, and Romhardt,
a major general, commanded an armorod division.

Bock's northern army group, vfith the defendant Salmuth, a m.ajor general,

as chief of staff, comprised two armies. The F»urth Army, under von Klugo,

v;as to push castv/ard from Pomorania into tho Polish Corridor. The Third
^
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Tondor "fcho dGfondc.n"b Liou'fccncua"b-GenorG.l von Kuecb.ler, "vvas stationod

in East. Prussia=.

The Third caid Fonrth Armies were supposed to act as a

pincers, txnd trap as much as possible o.f the Polish Army between them
in the Corridor,

In NoTGinbor, 1938, the dofondont Schniov/ind was appointed Chief of

Staff of the Naval War Staffs a position roughly comparable to that of
Chief of the General Staff of the Armyt

In 1939, ho became a Vice Admiral

At the outbreak of war, tho Navy had two principal missions.

Naval sur

face craft participated in the roduccion of the Po].ish port of Gd;^-nia on
tho Eaj.tic Soa, cjid German submarine warfare in the Atlantic bec^m imme
diately upon tho outbreak of v/ars
In tho OlWi, tho defendants P.einecke, Warllment and Lchmann all hold

important positions by tho time tho war broke out,

Lehmann, still a

civilian, had boon Chief of tho Legal Lopartment since 193S,

Warlimont,

0, colonol, was Chief of the National Defense Section (Landesvertoidigiing)
which Tjr.s tho section chiefly ooncornod with military plans within tho

Operations Staff (^/ohrmachtrTdirimgsstab, or "7i/FST"), of which Jodl "v/as
Chiofo

Roinocko, a brigadier general, wc.s Chief of the General Office

(Allgovieinos Wehrmachtamt — "ANA") with general supervision over pris
oner of war affairs, as vrall as over most of tho GIWIT's fiscal and adiainistrativo work
/

Althougli the plan to invade Pci.l.and did now uake concrets form initij.

1939, the return of tno Free City of Danjfig to tho Fatherland had long
been contemplated.

Two months aft^r tho signing of tho Munich Pact and

the public statement by Hitler that there wore no more territorial problems
for Goniiany in Europe, an ClfV dirootivo emanating from Warlimont^s section

ordered that "proparaticns arc a?.so to bo niado to enable the Free dry

of Danaig to be occupiea by Gcrmcn troops by surprise," In December,
1S38, Brauchitsoh sent instractiona to I'uochler in Fast Prussia to pre

pare for tno surorisc occupation of Danzig„ The defendant Schnie^vind
also reooived those directives^

After the conquest of Czechoslovakia, Gorman pressure against Poland

dovoloped rapidlyo In Ivktroh 1939, Hitler instructed Brauobitsch that the
military asceots of the Polish question should bo studied.. He added;

A solution in the near future vrould have to be

on especially favorable political conditions. In that
case Poland shall be Imocked do^m so coJ^Pl^;tely tnat

it need not be taken into account as a political factor
for the next decade.

Therer.fter, milit.-.ry preparations were in the hands of the V7otomaoht.

On 3April 1939. Kcitel issued a new directive to the Commanders-in-Chiof
of the Anay, Kavj- and Air Force concerning "Fall Ffoiss" (the code name
for "the invasion of Poland) "vvhich stated:

The Fuehrer has added the following directions to Fall Weiss:

1) Preparations must be iac.do in such a ^vay that the operation

con be carried out at any time from 1 September 1939 onwards.

2) The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to
draw up a precise time-table for synchronized timings

between the three branches of the Armed Forces.
r\

warliittont assisted in drafting this directive and ms active in the high

level planning of this and all subsequent aggressions. The initials of
the defendant Schniemnd appear on tho copy of the directive received by
the ITavy.

On 23 Kay, Hitler held an important military conference with the Chiefs
of tho Wehrmacht ond their staffs to present his views on the future tasks
of tho armod forcos. In addition to Cooring, Raedor, Brauchitsoh, Miloh

and others, the defendants Schnievdnd and V/arlimont were present. There
Hitler laid bare tho criminal conspiracy against the peace of the world
in words which no man could fail to understand:

A mass of 80 million people has solved the ideological

problems. So, too, must the economic problems be solved

This is impossible without invasion of foreign states or attacks

upon foreign property.....
The national-political unity of the Germans has been

achieved, apart from ridnor exceptions. Further successes cannot
be attained vdthout the shedding of blood....,

Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a

question of expanding our living space in tho East and of socurin,"
our food supplies, of tho settlement of the Baltic problem. Food

supplies can be expected only from thinly populated areas. Over
and above the natural fertility, thoroughgoing German o3iploitation will enormously increase tho surplus

There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and vre
are left v/ith the decisiont To attack Poland at the first suit

able opportunity. We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech
affair.

There vdll ho war.

Our task is to isolate Poland.

The success of the isolation will bo decisive.
-
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Hsre then "was a naked statement of Hitler's dotermination to wage aggres

sive war; it was made directly to his military leaders.

This criminal

plan could not have boon carried out without their whole-hearted coopera
tion.

The target day for tho attack v/as 1 September 1939.

In the intervening

months, military preparations for "Fall Weiss" proceeded apace.

The over

all operational plannDJig \ms developed by Rundstodt, -with von IlanstoDja as

his Chief of Staff©

On 28 April,-SohnievrLnd va'ote to the Havy Commander

in the East ooncorning tho occupation of Danzig, advising tho latter to
consult vri.th Kuoohlor, Coiimiander of the 3rd Arm^'- in East Frussiao

Qa

14 Juno, B].askovri.tz issued a detailed battle plon. for Fall Weiss to his
subordinate units, stating in part thats

The operation. :n order to forestall an orderly/ Polish mobili
zation and cori-Qentration, is to be opened by surpriso ¥..lth
forces 7;hich are for the most part armored and motorr zed, placed
on alert in the neighborhood of the border. The initial super
iority ovor tho Polish frontier-guards and surprise that can bo

expoctod with certainty are to be maintained by quickly bi inging
up other parts of the army as well to counteract tho marching up
of the Polish Army.

Aocordingly all units have to keep the initiative against the
foe by quick acting and ruthless attacks.

iVnd on 15 June, Brauchitsch issxiod orders to Blaskovritz and Kuechlcr,

among othors, stating that tho object of Fall h'eiss was "to dostrcy tho
Polish Armed Forces" and that "high policy dcjnands that tho war should be

begun by heavy sui-prise blows."

Numerous planning and operational con

ferences took place throughout the summer of 1939.

All the defendants

(except von Roques, who had not yet returned to active servioo) participated
significantly in planning and initiating the war; with the Pol.ish campaign

itself, the defendants Kuechlor, Blaakowitz, Hoth, Reinhardt, von Salmuth,

Bchniuwiiid, Warli-raut ard WceMor wore most dii-eoxLy cor-cwriiod..
There is no evidonco that any substantial number of Germany's military
leaders felt any qualms or compunction about the ruthless and aggressive
attack which thoy wore planningo

decided minority.

If any wore hesitant, they wore in a

With tho western fortifications strengthened, the Czech

Army eliminated, and the Y/ehrmaoht itself burgeoning like tropical vegeta

tion, the whole spirit of the offioers' corps was far more bellicose than
•i

the previous year#

Furthermore, recovery of the territory lost to Polcnd
-
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after the First I'/orld n/ar had been a cardinal objective of the German

officers' corps for ir.ony years#

Onoo again, the defendant Blaskov/'itz

has summarized their vievvpoint:

From 121S, and particulo.rly from 1924, three critical terri

torial questions occupied attention in Germany, These v/crc
the questions of the Polish Corridor, the Saar and Ruiir, and
Memel,

I myself, as vfoll as the -whole group of German staff and front
officers, believed that these three questions, outstanding

among which was the question of the Polish Corridor, would
have to be settled some day, if necessary by force of arms.

About ninety percent of the German people vrare of the same
irdnd as the officers on the Polish question.

A v;ar to v/ipo

out the political and economic loss resulting from the crea
tion of the Polish Corridor and to lessen the threat to separatedSast Prussia surrounded by Poland and Lithuania vns re

garded as a sacred duty though a sad necessity#»
^'iftor the annexation of Czechoslovakia vrc hoped that the

Polish question would be set-clcd in a peaceful fashion through
diplomatic means, since "we believed that this time Franco and
England -would cone to tho assistance of their ally. As a
matter of fact, v/e felt that, if political negotiations came

to naught, the Polish question would unavoidably lead to -war,
that is, not only with Poland herself, but also vath the
liostem Pow-crs.

Tjhoii, in tho middle of J-une, I received an order from the CKH
to prepare myself for an atta,ck on Poland, I Icieiir this
caaae even closer to tho realm cf possibility#

-This concliu-

sion -vw.s only strengthened by the Fuehrer's speech on 22 Au
gust 1939 on the Obersalzborg "when it clearly seemed to bo an
actuality#«•• •

At the raeeting on tho Obersalzberg to -ivhich Blaskowitz refers. Hitler
reiterated his inflexible decision to crush Poland even at the risk of

v/ar with England and Franco,

This confero-nce v/as attended by all tho

<9

CoLTmanders and their Chiefs of Staff dcnm to Army level, and their equiv

alents in the Mavy ^nad Air Force, including the defendants Lceb,
Blaskovri.tz, Kuechler, Spcrrlc, Scl-u-iiowind, u"arlimont and Salmuth,

Hitler

began by statixig that "It v/as clear to me that a conflict with Poland
had to come sooner or later,

spring."

I had alroac^ made this decision in tho

He wont on to recapitulate the reasons which soomod to him to

dictate the advisability of on immediate -war against Poland rather than

its postponement; his own political ability was stressed as the first
consideration, and the loyalty of Mussolini as the second#
on "The third factor favorable for us is Franco#

Hitler went

Vic can ask only bonev-"

olont neutrality from Spain, but this depends on Franco's personality,"

This "benevolent neutrality" was, of course, what Hitler had counted on
-

39 -

achieving by German intervention in support of Franco during the Spanish
Civil vVor.

iifter roviev/ing other factors v/hich he considered to favor an imme
diate attack, Hitler said;

The enemy had another hope, that Russia v;euld become

our enemy after the conquest of Poland.
count on my great poY/er of resolution.
l i t t l e worms.

I

The enemy did not
Our enemies are

savj* them in Munich.

I T/as com'"inced that Stalin would never accept the

English offer. Russia has no interest in maintaining
Poland
I brought about the change tovrard Russia grad

ually.

In connection vrith the commercial treaty we got

into political conversation.

pact.

Proposal of a non-aggression

Then oame a general proposal from Russia.

Four

days ago I took a special stop, which brought it about
that Russia answered yesterday that she is ready to sign^
The personal contact with Stalin is established. The day
after tomerrow von Ribbontrop will conclude the treaty.
How Poland is in the position in which I wanted her.

This v^as indeed music to the generals* ears.

Al\myB pursued by the fear

of a two-front war v/hioh had proved so disastrous tv.'-enty years earlier,

the news that Russia vfould remain neutral quieted their last misgivings.
Furthermore, the German officers' corps had alvnys deprecated Hitler's
violent language against the Soviet Union.

As a document sigjied by tine

defendant 'Aarlimont and four other leading German generals states;
Good relations Y/ith Russia.,.,, were valued very highly in

the Arry whioh had many points of close contact with the
Red Army. It was considered a disappointment, therefore,
that the Government evidently had not been in a position

to fight the battle against Communism at homo in such a v/ay
that friendly relations Vvlth Russia night, nevertheless, be
naintodned — as had beeiY the case in the years folloYjlng

the Rapallo Treaty,

The violent language against Russia

in Hitler's and Goebbels' speeches was by no means approved.

Two days after the noeting on the Obersalzberg, England entered in
to on agreement of mutual assistance mth Poland which embodied informal

assurances provinusly giyon.

This, together Y/lth Italy's unYj"illingness

te embark on war, caused Hitler to hesitate mumentarlly, but as s®on as
he realized that England and France would not c-snsent to the destruction

of a third European coiuitry by Germany, he issued "Directive No. 1 for
the Conduct of the War", previously prepared in V/arlimvnt's office, and

on 1 September the Wehrmacht unleashed the Second V/orlcl V/ar by invading
Poland, thus also precipitating war vdth England and Firanoo.
-
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The

defendants and their co-partioipants and iiitler were all in G.groenenti
as Hitler had said on the Cbersalzberg:
In starting and making a war, not the Right is v/hat
matters, but Victoryo

C#

Offensive in the V;est

Poland was overran:, and conquered within a fovj- v/ecks, and thereafter
the iiiiehrmacht found ittelf in a very favorable military situationo

The

•M

Soviet Union "VTas neutralized by diplomatic agreement, and the Polish Arn^
was no more#

The i/ohrmacht had suffered only insignificant losses during

the Polish campaign, and these were more than compensated by the valuable

•?

experience v.hich had been gained aiaong both the leaders and the raidc and

file«

Furthermore, the '.vehrmaoht was still grov/ingj the peak of Germany's

military effort had by no means been reached.
But if Hitler had hoped that the F/estern powers would sue for peace,

he was disappointed, and the question arose "VAiat to do next?"

The bulk

cf the ariry vro.s rapidly moved to the Vjcsteni Front, leaving only a fow
troops in P^lraid to oovor tho Eastern Front caid perform cocupational
duties0

For the second time in twenty-five years the Gorman Army faced

the French across the Rhino, and the hapless Lovf Gountrios lay at:iv;art
the German line of advance into Northern Frances

•w

Imd in this situation,

tho Army High Command and tho Fuehrer onoo again fell into disagrocmento
Hitler wanted to strike in tho V^'ost at onoo.

On 9 October, ho cir

culated a memorandum to Kcitel, Brauchitsoh, Goering and Raeder stressing

that Germany's war aim "is and remains the destruction of our '.lostorn

enemies" and pointing out that "the successes of the Polish oempaign have

made possible.,,#,a war on a single front, awaited for past decades

But the generals thought otliervj-ise •

Now that thoy wore at grips vfith

France and England, they "imnted to mobilize greater strength before attack
S'.vj •

U;'

ing the TTestcrn powers, and proforrod to spend the winter training tho

l&Yi.-

newly recruited divisions and testing their battle plans in war games.

Opposition to Hitler's demand for an immediate showdown v/as absolutely
xinanii.ious; even the ambitious and impulsive Roichonau, loyal Nazi that

he was, woiitod to wait until spi-ing,
-
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on 25 October 1939 cittGiided by Hitler, Brauchitsoh, Hc.lder (who had

replacGd Beck as Chiof of tho Army General Staff in HoTrembor 1938),
Bock, Kluge and Rciohenau«

Roichonau enphasizcs bad weather, wo gain bettor training
during wintcrtmo, v/c must bo able to draw out operations
over tho vn.ntor«

Fuehrer says yes, but tho enemy gains strength and one
winter night England and France will be wn the Maas with
out firing a shot and without our Imowing about it#
Roichonau says I prefer that#

Book;

'Ae still lack a great deal of replacement material.

In a determined effort to swing tho generals around to his opinion,
Hitler called another meeting of all commandors-in-chief and chiefs of
staff at the Obersalzberg on 23 November 1939, and delivered a harangue:

If the Polish vra.r "^vas %^jon so quickly, it was due to
superiority of our armed forces
Now the Eastern
is hold by only a few divisions# It is a situation
YTQ viewed p?roviousl3" as unattainable•♦#••Everything
determined by tho fact that the riomont is favorable

the
Front
vdiich
is
now;

ill six months it might not be so any more•.. •
decision
is unchangeable. 1 shall attack France and Euglaxid at the
most favorable and quickest moment#

But the generals vroro totally unconvinced. In a fury. Hitler announced

that he would proceed onyhow, and set 9 December as a tentative date for
the attack.

But, for one reason or another, the attack was postponed,

time after time, for five months, and did not take place until May, 1940,
1#

Norway and Denmark

Vihilo the generals and Hitler vrore squabbling, the master minds of
the Gorman Navy wore not idle#

In September, 193S, a German admiral

named Carls pointed out to the Coinmandor-^ln-^Chief of the Navy, Raedcr,

the advantages which the Navy would derive from an occupation of tho
Norwegian coast. His interest aroused, early in Octobor Raedor addressed
a questionnaire to the Naval 7jar Staff, of which tho defendant Sclmiewind
was Chief of Staff, directing that the follovung points be studied:

(a) '^nt places in Norway con bo considered as bases?

(b) Can bases bo gained by military force against Norv/ay's
will, if it is impossible to carry this out without fighting?
48 «

(c)

biDiat arc the possibilities of defense after the

occupation? «e.a.

(e)

uhat decisiYG adTantages would exist for the con

duct of the imr at soa-in gaining bases in North Dermiark,
e«g» Skagen?

A week later, Raeder brought the iriatter up with Hitler, who agreed

"to give the matter considopation"«

Early in December, 1939, the Nor

wegian traitors Quisling and Ilagelin came to, Germany and conferred with
Hitler, Raeder and Alfred Rosenborg«

During the ensuing ruonths, 5c?-niov/ind

maintained contact with Hagelin, and information so received vmis passed
on by Schniewind to Warlimont in the OKTiTe

In January, 1940, Hitler finally decided to adopt the Navvy's proposal

for a military occupation of Deruiiark and rIor;7a.y»

The project was given

tho code name "V/cser Exercise*'; its overall preparation was entrusted to

the 0IC7, and the naval planning to OEM.

The basic OlCu order, prepared

under V/arlimont, vmis issued on 27 January 1940.

Sclmiewind and './arlimont

both played leading roles; Jodl's diary entry for 29 February 1940 states:
29 February - Fuelircr also vdshos to have a strong task
force in Copenliagon and a plan, elaborated in detail, shovring
how individual coastal bapteries arc to bo captured by shook
troops, Warlimont, Chef Landesvorteidigung, instructed to
make out immediately the order of tho Army, Navy and itir

.11^

Force, and Director' of Armed Forces to make out a similar

- order regarding tho strengthening of the staff.

On 1 March 1940 V/arlimont prepared a.nd issued a Hitler order for the
'Pr'/

completion of preparations o General von Falkenliorst v/as placed in charge
of the combined unit which v/as to carry out the operation.

At the same

time, a naval working staff ivas fon.ied under Schniewind, and on 12 March

1940, Schniewind issued orders concerning alternate landing locations
for the invasion of Norv^ay in tho event the first locations should prove
unusable.

On 3 a...pril 1940, the 0Ki7 forwarded a letter to Foreign Min

ister Ribbentrop's Office, prepared and initialed by the defendaiat
Uarlimont, vj'hioh requested the cooperatioi; of tho Foreign Office with
the various Military Commanders •vdio were to be appointed in Denmark and
Norway and stateds

The military occupation of Denmark and Norway has beon,
by oommnnd of the Fuehrer, long in preparation by the High
Command of the Vjehrmachta
-
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The High ComL.and of the V/ehrmaoht
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has therefore^had ample time to occupy itself with all

the questions connected with the carrying out of this
operation.

The invasion of Denmark and Nonvay had, of course, been preceded by

the usual Judas' kiss of treaties and assurances. In May, JL9o9, Germany
cuid Denmark had signed a non-aggression pact. In April and- September,
I

1939, Grermany had solemnly promised "to respect the territory of ,;fche
Norwegian state©" NoiTvay had not been at war with any nation for one
hundred tiiventy—six years, and Denmark's peace had been ^mdisturbed since
Germany had last attacked her

in 1856®

None of the defendants — least

of all Schniewind and Vi/arlimont — can have failed to realize the aggres

sive and treacherous character of Germany's invasion of Denmark and Norway
on 9 April 1940.

2o

The Low Countries and France

Throughout the winter of 1939-1940, the major German attack in the

west was repeatedly scheduled and postponed© The reasons for the post
ponement were various©

The plans called for a v/eather forecast of five

or six days' clear vreather, and the forecast was never quite favorable
enough©

In January 1940, a German airplane carrying impoid^ant documents

relating to the attack made a forced landing in Belgium.

There was dis

agreement 7/ithin the Army High Command as to whether to follow the

classic "Sohlieffen" Plan vhich had been used in the First World War or

whether to adopt new tactics©

All these factors played a part in the

delay, but it may well be doubted whether Hitler really wanted to over

ride the unanimous judgpient of the generals and take sole responsibility
for a premature attack; at all events, the attack was not finally mounted
until 10 May 1940,
Whatever may have been the differences between Hitler and the

generals as to timing, they were completely agreed that the Low Cpimtries
should be overrun as part of the overall plan cf campaign.
treaties and guarantees meant nothing.

Existing

The independence of Belgium rested

upon international guarantees which had never been broken save by Germany
herself in 1914-v

During the Weim^ir Republic, Germeiny had entered into

arbitration treaties with all the Low Countries, and between 1937 and
^4 -T

1939 the Third Reich had given assiirances to those •countries at least

eleven times.

The G-erman generals had some-jjause to recollect the un

favorable effect on world opinion which Germany's breach of Belgian
neutrality had caused in 1914, but they had learned nothingp

All trieir

plans .for a campaign in the west vrere based on the invasion and occupa

tion of the Low Countries, in violation of treaties and agreements.
they were in no doubt as to Hitler's point of view®

And

On 23 Kay 1959, at

the conference attended by Sclmiewind and Vfarlimont vz-hen Hitler announced
his intention to attack Poland, Hitler said;

Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied

Declara

tions of neutrality must be ignored....„Therjfore, if England
intends to intervene in the Polish war, we must occupy Eoiland

Y
\

-

with lightning speed,... .Considerations of right and vn'ong or
treaties do not entor into the matter

.If Holland and Belgium

are successfully occupied and held, and if Prance is also
divided, the fundamental conditions for a successful v/o.r
against England v/ill have been secured.

German reassurances to Belgium and The,Netherlands were reaffirmed

on 6 October, at the conclusion of the Polish campaign.

But, the very

next day, Brauchitsch ordered von Bock to take oomriiand of on army group
and to prepare for the immediate invasion of Dutch and Belgian torritoryj
copies of this order were rocoivod by the defendants Loob and Salmuth,

among others.

And finally, during Hitler's speech on 23 November 1939

on the Obersalzberg, when he endeavored to persuade the generals to
attack immediately in the vzost, he said:

I shall attack France and England at the most favorable
and quickest noraont. Breach of tho neutrality of Belgium
and Holland is meaningless, Ho one will question that
when wo have vroiit The arguments 7/e mil choose for the
breach of neutrality shall not bo 'as idiotic as they vzoro
in 1914.

In deploying the Gorman forces for tho attack in the v/ost, Lceb's

Army Group C retained its position along the French border, opposite the
Rhino River and the Maginot Line.

Inmediatoly to Leeb's north, Rundstedt'-s

Array Group A constituted the center of tho German line, and cn his right.
Army Group B under Bock constituted the northern wing,

fho" original plan

of attack, ©mbodiod in "Directive H®, 6 for the Conduct of the V/ar",
dated 9 October and prepared inWarlimont's department, called for an
attack based on the old "Sohlieffen" Plan, v/ith the difference tliat
-
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this time both Holland and Bel|;;iiffii vrare to be overrun, whereas in 1514
Holland had been left untouched.

Under this plan, the main concentra

tion of forces was in Bock's northern army group, which v/as expected to
S'.ving rapidly throu^ Holland and Belgium and doan the French Chanitol
coast.

Daring the v/intcr, this plan was abandoned, and by llarcli a nevj' clan

had been adopted under which the main concentration (".SchveriDuri:t") of
forces was entrusted to Rundstedt's Array Group A in the center. This

plan called for a strong attack through Luxe-mbourg and the Belgian
Ardennes ivith tho purpose of brcakring through the haginot Line near,
Sedan. It

expected that, as soon as Bock's Ari;iy Group pushed into

Holland and Northern Bolgiiim, the bulk of the French and British forces

would bo dra-'-vii north for the'defense of tho Low Countries, that Rundstedt's
attack tlirough Sedan, if pressed rapi'dly through to the Charmnl coast,
would result in splitting the Allied forces, and that those cut off to

the north could bo armihilatod. And this, indeed, is what actually
Happened, with uhe exception that the cv:'.cuation from Dunkirk saved a
substantial part of tho British Army from dostruction.

T/llhon the attack was finally delivered. Bock's arr^ group, of which
the defendant Salmuth was still Chief of Staff, comprised the Eighteenth
Army xinder Kuechler, xvhich invo.ded Holland, and the Sixth Army under

Reichenau, which pushed into Horbhorn Belgium. Rmidstodt' s army group
included tno Fourth, Twelfth and Sixteenth Jirmics under lAuge, List end
Busch respectively, and •.m armored group u;ider Klcist. Hoth's STI Corps
v;o.s part of Klugo's Fourth Army,

P.oinhardb, a divisional comaandcr in

the Polish campaign, had no-.v been given command of the XXXXI Corps in
Kleist's armored group.

Air support for Rxnidstodt's attack vmis itirniehed

by Sperrle's Luftflotte 3,
In reserve wore the Second and Ninth xirmios.

Blaskovatz, who had

been made a full general after the Polish campaign, brought the Ninth
Army to the front as part of Rundstedt's army group after tho break
through, but was relieved shortly thereafter.

Hollidt, by then a major

general, was the Ninth Army's Chief of Staff.

x'vfter the first phase of tho campaign in the Low Countrios and

Northern France had been successfully concluded, Franco's downfall was
-
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acM^^d^ tha second phase. Up to this time Leeb's Atw Group C had

" played a purely defensive role, but in this second pho-se Leah's fnrc-,s
attacked directly into France through tha Ivlaginot line. The operation

progressed so wall that by 10 June the vulture Ivlussolini decided to
. feed off the kill, -and Italy mounted an attack on France from th. south.
Afew weeks later tha campaign was concluded, and for th^ second tim-- in
t'wenty-fiva years Gerim^ny's brazen violations of neutrality -nd blc-t^nt
contempt for international agreements shocked and antagonized th- cialiaed world. Once again the German people were fated to pay a heavy price

for their leaders' mental and moral shortcomings. Th.re are some things
that'German generals never learn.
♦

p.

Offensive in the East

Germany's campaign in the west v/as concluded with the signing of an
Armistice at Compiegne on 22 June 19U0j
the fighting c-^^-s,d thr—
days irter. The vehrmacht had'achieved an amazing military success, whic
Hitler cnuld not fail to acknowledge. Indeed, Hitler gracelessly n^/ -rdid

matters; a session of the Reichstag on 19 duly 19^0 in c-l-br<-ti
German victory was made the nccasion for such an orgy of promotions that
many of th= newly appoint :id field marshals and full g^n^r^ls must
that I-iitler had only succ.ed^d in cher.pening the high ranks bestowed. No
less than nine Army and three Air Force officers - a round doa
were made field marshals that day. This was quite unprecedent.d| during

the entire First 'Norld Vlar only five (other than th=i roy^l princ-s) h^.d
receiV'.d the coveted baton.^ In addition to the def:.nda.nt L^eb, the high
est rank was now conferred on Bock, Brauchitsch, Keitol, hlug3, ^ist,

enau, Rundstedt and vfitzleben. In the Luftwaffe the defendant Sperrle aa.

Kesselring were given double prom'^tions from lieutc:nant g^n^sr^l fi-ld
mfirshal, and liilch also m-"'de the grade. To ke-p matters straight, it •Wc..course, n=cessary to give Hermann Go;ring an evsn higher rankj this dilej.
'j

-

•• t

»

1. Gerrnau field mJiz^als in the First i.'^orld •l^.r included, in order of
appointment, von Eindenburg, von Bu.low, von Uack.ns.n, von -.oyrsch,
and von Eichhorn. In addition, the Princes Ruppr:;cht and b^op ld oi
Bavaria and albert of Vmertt..mb-.rg were made field marshals.
-kl

SDlvsd by-calling him a >'Riichsmarshal"',

•=v=ra dispensed even nc;re liberally.

Ths honors cf a fiill gansral

The defendants Kuechler and doth

7/;re joined by tv^ilve other Army officers and five Air Force ofiic^rs^
or nineteen in all.

After the fall nf France^ it becam- incri^asingly clear that tne
British vrere not- in the 1-ast disposed to quitj, and th-. '-Tehrmacht again

confronted the problem '''rhat nexfi" Three alternative courses of actic^n
found support vrithin the "lehrmacht, Th=: first i.'ra.s to prepare for an
amphibious invasion of England,

dnder th; code name "Sja lion"

("Sei3.ov/e"), plans v/ei-s drae>n up for a cross-Ghann el attack. The
secmdj lavcrad by Brauchitscli, vj-as to strike England in the
Mediterranean by reducing Gibraltar rath th- assistance o.f a fri-.ndly

t

Franco^ 3.nd sunporting aii Italian offensive against rg/pt, , Th- uhird^
suggested as --arly as 22 July at a c-nf >r .no betve-n :iitler and
Erauchitsch, was thconquest of ta> S-^"viit Union.

Th^ plan ox invading Fngl^nd vras plagu.d iroin th-, outs -t with
inter-Service friction and the slender reSourc-S of the German wavy.

The diary of General Tald.-rj th. Chi^f of the Army G-ne?.el Staff, under
dab-, of 6 August I9U0 states;

•ye hav-; her e th - v-ry strange situation "fherd the havy is

full^if misgivings, bh. Aii- Force is very r-luctant to put

a hand to an assignment -.-hioh els entirely up t- them at tn.

outset, -and th : OKI,
has a real Combined
F-rc.s op-ration, jusb plays d=ad.
-;_-nly driving f--rce

I

in th . whol; matt .r is suppli xi by us /bn . wrmy/, but

3,1. nw-.; •••'•'^' n't

By iN;-v®,b-;r ISl+O

b

a.bl e b * s ing th • j'"'b.

had

aband.--njd, and -/.-as n-.vir r2viv=.d.

Th >in-b r .sting id,a -f c.-no sntrr.ting th^ /Uis attack in thi

fc^ditarran .an n-.v,r got b:ynnd th. sp.oulativ stag-.. Bitl.r and vpanco
«,r. n=v.r abl, t.^ agr,. on a pr-gram far tha reduction of Gibraltar,
and C--.rman action against Fgypt, dospit^ R<mmal's sp,ctaculai- suco .ss.s,
w£.s n.v,r put on a larg—scald basis.

It became increasingly appa.-nt, th-r-dfor,, tixt c.n • ±fensive

against th-. S'-vi'et uni^n ''"as mst likely to b thv n-xt st-.p, Th-^re can
b;e no d ubt that Uitl-r intmd.d ir'm th.. outs-.t to discard the treaty
of 1959 with th--. Soviet Union as sooti as it h£id s,rved its usefuln-.ss.
-US -

Russia's annexation '-f Bessarabia at tb-- and <^r V:C,y 19^0 had air-^ady
caused Hitlir and the generals un-as:/ m'-in-nts.

As ^arly as Jl July

19i.0j during a c--nf'j:renci v/ith thi Irmy snd Nav:/ high Commands at tlij
B^rgh'fj Hitl=r ^xpr^ssed skepticism c-ncerning tho success of an attack
' n England, and went "n to says

Rngland's .h^p^ lies in Russia and Amn-'ica, If hope
Russia
is tak^n av/ay, Am-.rica t' '• is lost for ^nglana, b ecaus -

eiiminaticn -^f Russia is f llo-^red by a trem--nd''us build-up
Japan's p'-w-^r in "^ast-.rn Asia, ilussia is ''England's and
Amvrica's dagg-r against Japan. Current t.nd^ncy in Japan

is inc nv^nient for Tnglandt.

Japan^j lik-:> Russia, has a

pr -gram that is t -> b-- c?.rri ;d ' ut bet'-r.-. th

Russland is th . lact-r

var

:,ndSo

n ''hich "England is charting th ;

most. S '-m.thing mus b hav^ happ^n-.d in L-^ndonl Th.- English
Wire c'-mpl stelv dwvn,. nw thry he.v •, been rr/ivid. Russia
is som-j'/vhat disturbed ab ut th i rat; at wit.ch th; Eur'^p.an

r

situati'-n develops.
All Russia has to d~ is t * say to "^ngland that it d'les n "t

car; t-" hav; a great 3 ;rr;ian3r, and th

English imm-;diatily

hop:, vdth the strength -f dro'-.-vning m ^n that the situr.ti-n
will bi radically changed -'ithin 6 or ^ m'^nths.
"Tith Russia smashed,

"ngland's last lv\:e would be g-ne.

Germany th-.n vdll be th. master of

and th-; Balkans

j't f Hows from this r .as ning that Russia must b; d n.
z:.\-;c.y vd.tli.
Spn.ng IRd-l.
Th, s--on.;r Russia is crushed, th.- b .tt .r

f £ we ar;

(,p .rati n

achi;V.s its p''upos-. ^nly if Russian Stat - is shattered I;—
f undi.ti'n with "n. bl w, i ^rrit rial gains al 'n - •,;ill n t
d « S- it is b ;tt .r t"' ^rait a littl. long .r, but sustain the
resolution to eliminat - Russia. This is n=c;ssar2.'" als
b;caus.

"f l"cation

--n Baltic.

iav; no us.-, for a

s ^c-nd

first-rate p-nv.er 'n Baltic.? ?ay Ul« Five m-nths' tim; tfinish j-bp This year yet W'^uld be the best, but unified

'
•.a',;

actio-n ".'o-uld n t b.; p ssible.

And s •, during the fall

f I9UO)

th - plans f r "S .-.Iw/e" wer-

shelved and the Luftwaff.: mob def sat in th.e Battl-;

f Britain, I-Iitl-ir

and th. military leaders turn-.d th.-ir thoughts increasingly tward the.
age-old C.erman dr .am

thpath
Tf'""'

"•?V

f an enrpir-i in the ..ast — toward thS vi-t

Uni"'n.. But as v-.nts dev -.lop-d, t\y^ small Balkan states stumblad into,

sr"\:\

i
.'111

f this nw and gigantic aggr-.ssiv-. war —^ Greece and

Yug slavia.

Thr ugh no d'-ing -.f their orn th.;y b-.came the nexb t
;- iff

Bufy" ;r th-. living hell "f g ^rinan attack and '>ccupati -n.
I- • ;.!••...
ni

',

fe':

if

On 2S Get b.er

'\|t

19ij.O, i^iueS'lini launched at surprise attack against Gre^ee fr 'm Albania

'.'/Ti

iji-an eff rt t- sxpand Italian 4 •mini'>n in th-s Mediterranean,

• o.

But the

strik. w^;nt amissj the valiant Greeks gatherr;d thc^ir forces and drove
th-. Italian invader back to-mards the Albanian fronti -.r»

Bv th •- end of

ISil-O, the Italian fore-s had taken a ennsiderabl- mauling from th> Gr^iks,
' Th^r^ is -^v-.ry indication that iiitler strongly disapproved of

Mussolini's Greek adventure, and that the German generals were n- t

displ-as-d at th^ discomfiture 'f th=ir Italian ally, ikmeth^l-ss, the
possibility tnat th - British Mould :.stablish a foothold in Greece made
it desrrable for Germanv b'"' c m-- t •> th-. aid of the Italians,

By December

1914.0, iitler had definitelg d-;cided to s-,nd a G^rmo.n fore- into Gr:;^ceo
An 'rder dat.:d 13 Decemb ^r ISl+O and drafted by .arlimont stat d;
'Phe result of the battles in Albania is no-t y-.t decisive,
B-caus e of c. dangerous situation in Albania it is d-^iibly
nec--ssary that the British nid-^avor b-- foil.d to creat ; air
bas-s undsr th - pr ^t^cti-n f a Balkan front, which would be
dariK-rous abovj all t' Italy as -.veB. as to the Rumanian
fi--ids.

ky plan, 11irefor 3, is (c.) t^ form a slowly incr-iasing task
f ^rce in 3*uth rn Rumania mthin th - next months, (b) aft-r
th - s-tting in of fav rail w ath^r, probablv in i'arch, t-'
s ;nd the task I'^vcf'T th- ccupation "-f the Aeg-an Il^rth
0 T-st byway 'f Bulgaria, and if n--c-;ssrry t-" occupy the
entire Greek mf.inland (Op rc.tio.n Tarita), Th ^ support f
Bulgaria is to be expected.

In pursuanc- of this plan, Ri-.Idmarshal List's 12th Army headquaru =rs
-stablishrd its .If in Rumania sh rtly ther--after, and ....rly in rarch it
cr-ss,d th; Danube int'. Bulgaria t • d.-plny f^r th= attack against

Gr;,c-j. On ''f th 3 di.'isi'ns in List's arny "was th- 50th Infantry
Divisi ";n^ c'"'nniand"3d by th- d ;i-aidant .i-illidt.

In ta. .n:antim =, Ribb.ntrp s-cur.d th- adh.rmc- -'f fug slavia tn

th- Tri-Partit -; Pact, i-raiall./ "liv-u in '1-nna n 25 -arch. But th 3

n«t day, a coup d' 3tat in 5.Igrad, '-/irthr-w th. g"V-rnm-nt, and tha
nms .va-m-nt r .pudiat-d th . Axis pact. O-rmen r >toti -n was ami ft and
•9 3rci.l ;ss. On 2? Karch hitl-r 0 laC Tr-d with th - military l3ad ;rs and

Pdnt ;d at that .lug-Slav U: was n wan unc-rtain fact--r, n t "nly with
r-sj-ct t" th. c ;min£ attack n QrsiC- but .v.n m

s" with rssp-ot t^

th. plannid inyasi-n f th . 3 yi.t Unim. Th. n-t-.s -m this c nfir-nc-,
inj.tia.l .d by arlim'~nt, sti t 1
- 50 -

w-.-.Lfe-sA

Ths

is d =t armin

7fith^ut vfaitins f<''r possibD. a

l^^yalt7 dacliirati'^ns f tli; n m g'->v -irnm^nt ^
mak ^ all
pr .^para-tions in -'rdar t • d-;str''y Yug''-5lavia militarily cjid
^

as a nati-'nal unit.,, •

Th a attack "will start as s<^' -n as

tha m^ans and tr'ops suitable f-^r it ar = r^adyoco' P-'litically,
it is ^sp =cially important that th;; bl'^w aga-inst iug slavia
, is carried ^•'ut with unmerciful harshn ,ss and that th •military destruction is d"ne in a lightning-like undertakings

As a result

all this,, a c-^'"^rdinated plan of campaign against

b th Greece and fug"sla.via was inmiedia.t^ly deviSed©

Naval supp rt for

th^ 'P ;rati'^n against Greece -/va.s arranged by the Naval Tar Staff under
Schniewind.

On "29 iiarch further OIC/!i ''Tdars draft ed by /iarlim'nt Were

distributed t"^ Iteinacke and Leiimann, among

thers.

^ The attack v^as set in m ti-n 'n 6 April 19^0, v/h^n pc.rt, -f List's

y

f rc es in Bulgaria (including II llidt's 50th Division) m-ved s ^uthv/ard.
t

'

.

i

int^ Gr eec e and west-ward int • iug slavia,. Simultanyusly, Belgrade
.J

_ Yfas ruthlessly b-^mb edo

Tw- days lat=r, an armored f^rce under LI eist

detached itsjlf fr'^ra the 12th Army and attacked n^ rthw-.st fr m Bulgaria
V

t wT.rd Belgrade,

-t

.

by the German Second Army, --^hich h£'d been deployed in Austria and
Hunga.ryo

%

On 10 April, Lug slavia waas attack--d fr, m the n rth

A sp-ecial task f-Tc-. iiad als«" been assembled in ^rst Tn

Ruina.nia und :r th , d-f-.ndant l.einhardt, by th .n a li 3ut-.-nant-gvn ^ral o

On 11 April this f^ rc v struck s >uth t -^v:ard Belgrad , and 1-.ss than

f-Tty-eight h'ws Ir.tir R^nhardt's and Kl-ist's f -rc-.s met in Silgrade,
••ithin a few days, the bulk

^

f the Yug slav i-rceS had capitulated,

and within am^.tter -f wdeks Greece hcid also succumbed, L=<v.VLng behind
a f^w divisi ns f• r occupati n duti es, th e bulk f th e German f re es

vf-Ti rapidly pulled --ut '"•f tie Balkans in ^rdir t-' mak. them available
f r the campaign against thi S- vi et Uni'n.

In the meantime, plcns f r the gigantic military und-.rtaking

against thv S -vi et Uni-n h£.d b.^n vig r usly pushed. Cn 6 p pt mb ;r
1914.0, tr p m v-ments fr-m Frrnce t' th-.. T^ast w-r - bigun in acc rdance
with an
th.rs.

rd^r issu-d by Brauchitsch t'> Leejb, e Uechl ;r, and BaLiiuth, am-ng
An OK"

dir ectiv-i fr

arlim^nt's d-epartm i-nt instructed c unturI

intelligence agents h''-; t" cc.m uxlag^ th build-up -^n th-e east ern b rd-er,

A few days later, a military missi n was s-;nt to Rumania t

lay th ^

gr undv^ rk f'r a j lnt attack agaj.nst Russia fr-'-m that c ountry,
- 5i -

*>

JP ^litical .discussi ns which t

'^k placd vxith

in 3-rlin lats in

ISUO did n-^thing t • change? Hit1 sir's int ;nti ns, and on 16 D=c-imbir ISi+Oj
«

hi issu-d th.- basic strategic dii-sctiv^s to th^ ';:>hrmacht f• r "Casi

'Barbar •'ssa", ths cod-2 nam- f^r ths attack ag£'.inst th i Soviet TJni~n, v.-hich
• stat id;

Th:i German armsd fcrcss must b-; pr^ared to cmsh S'^viit
Russia in a quick campaign b:;for3 Idi 5 =ind of ths waragainst Inglando

Pr ^para-ti'^ns jr -.r -j t '"" bi compl-stsd by 15 May 19i-p.*

As ws hav s just

siin, th.:- campaign in Gr ;-3c > and Yugoslavia int erv:>n id, and causid a
"iv^ waiks' postpon-sm?nt, a circumstanc ; which turned "-ut t > bi

V

f

gria.t importance.

In th5 planning and -;Xr.cuti "^n 'f th-. aggr-^ssivii 7/ar against the

S -viet Union, all th s dsf^ndcjits participated sxc ^pt Spsrrl ;^ and
Blask v/ite,

Thi f-rmsr remain-.d as Commr.nd^r'-in-Chief of Luftl^tte 5

and in chargw of the air war in th-: '.est.
^

.

was appint^d Commandeh-in-C hi
in Southern Fra.nci, and he t

^

In October 19^0^ Blask-wltz

f the First Army, viiich 7/as deployed
remained in the 'A .st until the end -^f

th e Virar.
F-'r the initial onslaught against the Had Army, Ssven armies, and

f. •ur%.rm''ur id groups war^ depl yed along the Russian b-rder from '^'ast
Prussia t

Ruriiania,

Once again, the attack v/as directed by three army

groups, vd.th the sa^me three army gr-up commanders as in th tw^ preyi us

maj ^r campaigns. The jumping—off point for Army Gr--up N rth, c mrmnd ed

by L--eb, was Fast Prussia, On this occasion L.;=b's rols was by n means

defensivij his mission was t • push through the Baltic territ ries and
capture Leningrad, Under him were the 16th Army commanded by Fuechler,
the 16th Army undar Busch, and the Iqth Armoured Gr-up under H'-.ppner|
' the d ef endant R inhardt commanded a c rps und.er Ho .ppner,

Army Group C-uter under B ck c mprisced th - Fourth and Ninth Armies
under Kluge and Strtuss r espectively, and thre Sec ud and Third Arm ured

Gr-ups und-er GuderiSJi and the dei endant H'''th respectively© Army Gr up
S uth under Rundstedt c-mpris-ed the 6th Amy und,.-jr Rjichenau, the First
-52-

Ariw-ucid Gr-iip imd.r Kl-ist^ ths 17th Amy und-.r Stu.lpnagaj and th-j

lltli Army unddr v"i>ri Sch'^b-.rt^ 7vi,th th- d-f::nd:;nt if^ihlvr as Chidf
Staff, fha 11th Arny vras assAabl-.d in Rumaniaj I'rid ^-ras to attack tiirough
B -ssarabia and eastwards along th^ Black S-;a north coast in conjunction
vdth RuDia.nian iorc^=s.- Schob->rt's army included th. XXX Corps und .r

Salmuthj and th^ pOth Division und^r dollidt, 7nd
-bim.

for tn^ xirst

^ncount^r th^ d -.f-.ndant von Roqu:3s, v:h= had r^tir5d from ac'orv =

s^^rvic:: in 19p3j but was called up again in April 19dO=

thi rank nf li-ut .nant-gsnAralj hi i"/as appoint-d Command^r o^. th-

Ari of Rundst,dt's Army Oroup South,

.c.r

this capacity, hi aaas risponsibl

for thi s ecurity of c^-'mmunicati >ns and supply rout--s b'.hind Rundst-.dt's
arny group,

Thi dif^ndant -Schnis^^and, Vvho had becom, a fUll admiral in 19i4.0, was
in chargi of th^ naval planning for "BarbarossaS', f f w d'./s prior t-^
thi actual attack, howiv.r, h. was apprdnt.d Command ;;r-in-Chi if of thi
Hiph S-.as 'f'liit, and thirifor^ was not closely concern id vdth th actual
ixicution of th; Russian cimipaign. Thi d.findants R-dn:;ck., •;'.arlim..^nt
and L^hmann continued in th . sam . positions at o^iOT that thxy had
previously occupied,

Thr'ughout the spring of 19^41? all th-. d .fondants ( except Sp-errl5
and Bl£.sko-witz) w.re enga:;.

in int,nsiv>. preparations for tn ;ir part

in th-! attack. For eXimiple, on 21 r.arch, the OKH requ-.sted all arm.;/

groups or army coimTir.nders Cind chiefs of staff to attend i. c;nxiriUC;i
on 'iBarbarossa'i as well as t" have breakfast vdth the Japan-^se c..mbf..ssadoTo Br 12 liarch, doth ha.d issued d-xployment orders to his Pana .r

Group 3 and ,Xeinh:-rdt vm-s pr ^paring a plan of attack for his XXXXI C- rps,
Kuichlar had b^en ordered by I, ^eb to take the necessiry m-''.sur

for an

assault on th-. Baltic Islands, Frequ .nt -.-ntri.s in the diary of the
daval '»ar Staff giv, .vid-.nc of th . activity of its Chief of Staff
Schni-.vdnd, H. was so ,.:.g.;;r to j dn battl= tb t, as --arly as 22 April

1914.1, h: requested p-.rmission fr-vm the Olf ' toi us e arras against Russian
naval units since camouflage of .pr ,,paratims could not b. perfect

anyv/ay. On 25 April, harlimont prepared a memor;..ndum concerning

qu ;Sti ens which should be discuss-ed vdth the Finnish delegation on th^. •
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-ai-; if in'n'i --"'^^-

Russian invasion.

Subs^qumt discussions l^d tn tha conclusion of a

Finnish-1 •-rman military agr i.::m5nt, undir vfhich Finland vfould j-in in tha
vfar against Russia.

PursuJ'.nt to this agraisn-^nt, tht; Garman 20th I'vojntain

Army Y;as sant to Northern Finland^ hoYvav-.r it did not coma undar tha

ordars of th:; Finnish army, but r=mainad undar th^ direct command of
OlOie

In pr^Ssnting th = avid^nca undar courts Two and Txnr:;3 '^f tha indict-

mant, w- will hava ampla occasion t- obs-rva that th-. G-rjiuni plans with

rasp act to t.'n - invasion of th ; £ viat Union vrant vary much fui'th.-r than

tha usual typa of military planso

It was IIitl--.r's intanti.n that, as

tha GarmJ?Ji armi is procaadad into Russia, all vastigas of th. pr-.-axisting
g v.-.rnmant shouD.d b^ v/ipad out, and all Jaws c.nd impfrtant political
functionari as axtarmiiiat ad; that a compl^t 3 n aw SY'-sbam

%

f 1 cal and

regional g.-v-.rnm.;nt should "o- sat up; and that tha Russian

^n.-my

sh uld ba m^biliz^d for G>rman;:^is yLir- n-.-jds in c-TmpI.ta disregard -'f
tha raquiraradits of thd indigenous populatione
w:ra s

Sine a G-•.ly.ir? ny fs purpos :iS

brv.d, and indi-^d s-. d;3=ply criminal, much tr'T^ alab'^rat-.

orders and dir^.ctiViS had t'^ b-• praparad in advanc-: of th t attack

^

against th . Sovi .t Union than on pr avious -ccasi-^nso

Thus, f^r -xampls,

on Ip larch Kc;it=l signed a dir.;ctiv;., pr=par=:d in •iarlim'>nt's d^partmint, which statwdj

,

e<.

^

In__th . araa <\f ' -p .r-ati-ns, th-. k=ichsf a-hr :;r 6S

^iiTLil-er/ is, on b-.half -f tha Fu.-hr-r, -.ntrust^d Ywith sp^cia.l

tasks f. r th-. pr.parati n f th ^ political administrati n,

tasks v/hich r ;sult from th . struggl vrhich has to b-i
ca^rri^d -mt between two p-p-^sing p-litical systems.,
'ithin
th - r aim of thiS = tasks, th= R-.ichsfu hr ^r S3 shall act

•

ind-pend.;ntly i:nd under his - an r sponsibility.j

Th.

-•X-Gutiv
pow5r v-st-.d in th-; Supr-m.. C'imm-nd-jr of th.; x--.rmy
and in c.g.;nci-.s d itj;rmin ;d by him shall no.t b . aff:.ct -;d
by this. It is th ."vSp ncibilitv f th-. K:.ichsfu .hr ir So
tlu.t through th.; :;X:;Cuti n f his tasks miliU^r/ ••p:;rati ns
shall n"^'t b-. disturb .do D-tails shall b. arranged dir ;ctly
thr . ugh th. OKf-I v/ith th. R-;:ichs.fu .hr ..r SSo

Th; "special duti.s" r f :or :d t ' r; i'nt th

me ss murder

-i J Y'S,

th; intillig;ntsia, and communist functii nari .s by th. "^^insatagrupp .n

of th ; S ^curity P.-•lie- e.nd SDs
n. phe.s e

This, as 'nn proof --ill sh

".-as

nly

f th.- criminal plans laid by th.s-. d;fende.nts c.nd th .ir

i

c llab ^rat' rs to destr y ruthlessly Russicni S'Gdi ;rs and civilians v.tio
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might bz; zixp^ctid t" ••^ppr'Si- th.z "N-^'w Ordar" f'^r ^^urop-, . Only a fav/
w-.aks le.tr.r, ""ferlim-'nt and Lahmann drafted an -^rdar pursuant t^- Yfhich

tins

th'^usands ••£ s-'-callad p->lit;Lcal commissars of the Red Arnry were

killed in c-^ld blond by thz! Tehrmacht -^r handed over t'^ the T?.insatzgruppen
f")r execution.

It vias th-ss > sam.> two w-rthies whn prepared th ; rd-r

rem ving jnamy civilians fr"m German military jurisdiction and permitting
German's Idiers to engage in vra-nt >n slaughter at the whim

and with 'Ut fear of any punishment.

f any

fficer

Bef' re ^v-r a sh' t was fired, orders

were issued f< r the screening -f Russian prisoners nf war under the

jurisdicti'^n of th:; d^f:;ndant ieinscke for the purp^-'S- of weeding ••ut
and executing all "suspicious el em.?nts",

shall sp-:5ak '-'f thes e

matters in m'-re d.itoil at a lat.^r p-'int,

By th^ z:nd of April, plans had sn far progressed aS t- permi.t the

fixing ••'f D-Day f^nr 22 Jun-^,.

The Russian g''Vz;rnmant had m-antime d ne

everything in their p wer t ' av id conflict "vvith Germany,

Thus, th i

entry f ^r 6 Jun e in thw diary 'f the German i\la.val 'lar Staff stated?
Ambit,s sador in Ir sqow rep rts^.o.

Russia Y/ill only fight

if attacked by GeriUciny. Situati'n is c nsidered in ivi sc w
much ro'->re s erii us than up t n'W, All military pr-eparati-ns have been made quietly — as far as can be

rec gnized

nly def ensive.

Russian p-ilicy still strives as

bef T-e t^ produc-i the best p-'ssibl e r elati-nship t^' Gjrmany.,.,
But the dihad l-ng since been ca^stj

the leaders

f the Third

-

.Reich were dst-rrained t^ d ;str y Russia and n-thing could dissuade
I

th:em fr m th-ir criminal aims.

On llj. Oune, th-^ military leaders, in

cluding Leeb, Kuechler, il"th, and barlim nt r-ep >rted t - .Hitler the
»

state f prepa-rations f-r "Barbar ssa", and eight da.ys later the attack

was launched.

In a pr-•clamati n publish.ed shortly after the b rder

had been crossed. Hitler stated?

I have decided t- giv > the fate <f the German pe pie and -f
. th . Reich and of Tr',_,r p. again int • th- hands >f ur s Idi ^rs.

Six mnths later, GeriTian]^' s Axis partn ;r Japan attacked the United

States at Pearl Harbr and in the Par Past, German piicy vfas generally
pp Sed t

inv Iviment ' f the united Statss until IS'l+l, Dur.ing that

year, h w-ever, strenu-us .efforts w =r3 mc.de t
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brin.g Japan int th3

cnflict on Germany's ,sid^ end policies

urg^d upon h^r which wirs

alraost contain to involve th-s dnit-jd States in th= wa.r.

F^''llowing c.

C'>nf=r3nc:s b-stv^i-jh Ribb^ntrop £Lnd tha Japan^si Ambassador Cshrma in

Fabruary 1910.? Kaital issued an ordir, draftad in WarlimontTs offica
and initialad by Schniamnd, dir-.cting tha Armad Forcas to collabnrata
in a I'ci'hupr ahansivs and g-n~r<~>us manner" with Japan-.sa raquasts for
military inf rmation and'stating that;

It must b.= thi aim of th5 coll£.boration basad on th ; Tri-

Partit i Fact to indueJapan as S' on as possible to taks
activ-j m:iasur-^s in ths Far Fast»

Strong British fore -^s

mil th-irsby b - ti id d-nvn, and thi c-snt^r of gravity of
thi intrusts of th^ ^nit^^d States of jun-rica will bi
div^rtsd to th^ Pacific.

Following th- Japr^niS v attack-on. p^arl _i2rbor and hanilaj G-rmany d^
clar 3d v.-ar on th ^ Jnit -;d Stab 3S r)n 11 D=c snb 3r IS'J+l? pursumt to commitm^nts previously givejn th- Japanese,
•K-

•»/- -it

•«•

In concluding .our outlins "of the evidence! under Counts Qn^ -nn Four, '
>

tha prosecution wi-shes to recall the-International i'-iilitary Tribunal's

declaration that the deliberate launching of a war of aggression "is uhe

suprane int irnational cr^me di.ffaring only from ither war crimes in that
it contains vathin itself th; accumulated iVil of the whole,"

It is the

responsibility of th - prosecution to prov-; th£.t thi^se grave charges have
not be-n lightly brought,

:^V;r th- mc.tt-r at hand here is far weiantler

i

than any v/hich we
I

face again.

as Judges, lawyers, or s^ldi-rs — are aver likely to

As r'jr, Henry L, Stimson has profoui^ly observed:

,.,.the Second " orId 'var.brought it home to us that our re-r-

pugnanc 2 to aggressive v/ar was incomplete v.dthout a Judgment
of its leaders,

vhat we had called a crime demanded punish

ment; we must bring our la.w in balance with thuniv-rsal
moral Judgment of mankind,,,.

Th:- law mad;; effective by th- trial at Nuremb-erg is right-ecus
law long overdui. It is in Just such cases as this one that
th; law becomsS mor.-i nearly what Ivir. Justice HolmeS called it;
"th= witness and external deposit of our moral lif^,"

I

1,

Vol. 1, Trial of th; Fajor vfar Criminals, p. 1S6,

2,

Henry L. Stimson, Th Nuremberg Trials
. in "Foreign Affairs" for January IShl'
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f^anctoiark in Lav:,

print sd

COul^TS T'.fO Airo THR'P'F: 'jAR CRIiri^S AI^ CRBTfi.S aGAINST HiJ)'''i--.IITy

turn nnv, to bhe TTar Criraas end Crimes Agr.inst Huinanit/ in vAiich

ell the difindents perticipetad in the cnursi of viraging ^vr.rs -if eggr-ssion,
Und^r C>unt 'Vxro nf tha indictmant, tha difandcnts er. cherg.d v/ith tha

c->rrms3i-n -.f crimas agriust anamy balii gar ants and prisoners of war, whil.
C unt Thra^ charges tham Yfith crimas against civilians of c^untrias ovarrun oy th^ 'v-iiirmachte

Ev.ry war invnlves killing. Any war m-ians diath and pain and griaf.
For centuries th2 oivilizid nati ns -f thi vnrld havi atterupt =d to reduce

the death and suffering by observing the lews and tsages of vr.r. By inter
national co.nv=nti'-ns and agreements, such as the tk^gu^ and Geneva CMnven-

ti-ns, and by ge^neral custom, c-rtain practices are internationally regard
ed as cruel, inhurrU-n: end criminal. Such barbarities include thi killing
of suiTnider.ed belligerents, the r .xusal of quart .r, and torture or •thsr
ill treatment

V-

belligerents -r the inhabitants of occupied countries.

Such .,cts arve crimes and, if they result in d;ath, armurderso
- It will be said that in time 'f war s-me such crimes must ••cour in

I

.3V;ry ^I'my. That, undoubt::;dly, is true. But as ivir^^ Justice Jaclcson h-s
Si^.id, "It is n''t bTicause they yi-elded to tlwe normal frailties --i humL,n
beings that we accuse thxa.

It is their abnormal, and inhumr.n conduct

which brings them t'~ this baro^'^ The pr''Secuti'^n vdll n^t present is^'lat^
cases i sp "ntan^'-us brutality by German soldiers.

Instead, it wall p r-

tray a deliberate p'ilcy - ^uia.natlng from the highest levels if the erehrnu.cht r- -if murd-r and ill trx.tm :nt d ci'dlians and prison ::rs of wrar,

applied in every th-atre -f ria.r and by all 'f theSe difandants.

This

policy is r -ot .d in the cnt empfcu -us and sc rnful attitude t-wrard the laxre
of war which has characterized tha Gerinan 'ffic^rs' c^rps f r decades past
At th. very outset, we mentioned the scoffing attitude toward the He.gU3

W'

Qinventi'ns expressed in the Garriian military manual; on this matter, a
distingud.shed American commentat t

has writtens

2

rr' .

. F*

1,

V I, II, Trial of the ivk.j --r t^rr Grimin.-'ls, p. 102,

2,

Jt A'o Garn-er, The German -Aar G-de, published in Vol. XV, University
Illinois Bulletin, 5 August 191B»
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Oni ci.n scare ily d-^t-rmr.ni fr^ m a reading

ths German

inanuc?-! vfhath-sr th- rulis '~if the Hagua G--'n-/snti?n v:ir2
intsnd^d t'^ bind billigirsuts in th-j conduct
--.^are In

fc.ctj thiy ar2 raraly mani:i~nid and Yfam thay ara rafarrad
t"' it is usually in darisi-^n# 1 g'^'-^d many
its rul^s
e.r-i clic:rly in c'^nflict vri.th tha C''^nv5nti^'n and vari'"^us

r igulc'.ti'ins anu^x^d
tha C 'nvantian ara cynically dis
miss id -vith the statarrant that thay ara -xcissivaly humcn^,
T that thay ara g'"''^d in tha'-ry but ^^i.ll navar ba obsarvad

by billig.-rants in practical, stc.,

Tha fact iSj tha G^nsral

Staff d'^ as n'^t l'-'< k adth fav t up'-n thi m'^v=mant t-^ reduce
th- law 'f -"..ar t" v.Titt in f rmj f^T thi r=as'^n that tha
=ff.2ct W'-uld ha t^ limit thi arbitrary pn-j^rs ^f military
c 'mmandsrs and thus t"' put an bstacls in thi way af mili
tary SUCCoSS«
Th^ First j'orld Viar accomplishsd nothing in tha way of changing the

attitude of the German officers' corps toivard the laws of war.

A most

riv=;r.ling memorandum from the files of the Aeich Defense i^inistry, written

in September I924 by Lisutenant Colonel Otto von Stuelpnagel^ embodies

-

his suggestions as to what attitude the VJ'ehrmacht should take tovrard a
revision of the iiague rules_, in the event of a new Hague conference„

idt-er

conceding grudgingly that it would be wise to participate in such a con

ference^ inasmuch as "refusal to accept an invitation..would only be
used to Germany's detriment for propaganda purposes by our ex-eneiry nations
and would again be nu-srepresented as malicious intentions on the part of

Germany", the author stc.ted that "the first basic question to be ansv^ered
isJ

'.^Jhat -attitude should the German delag: tion take at a new Hague Con-

f-erence?"

In view of th-3 small size of the G-rman armed forces at that

tiiae and the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, the writer thought
that the answer to this question depended upon wh^-sther "the possibility of

a struggle for liber.,tion exists in the not too distant future".

His

memorandum continueds

G.?.n W;;, in c^nsid^rati' n of the present political
situation, i.t all aff-'rd to advocate a ruthless use of
fore.e?

Is this not lik-ly t'"> result in another hate-

campaign against G irmany, in n-v; and more intensive meas
ures of control and a clos ;>r c^ordinrtion of cur enemy

n^-.tions'?

Th-.^ .-ex-cnjmy po-./ers, quite aware of their present

military sup-eriority, will undoubtedly advf^cate a strictly
regulated conduct of war and lay the greatest stress upon
observance of all law-s of humanity.
The evidence under Cfunts Tw,' and Three will abundantly dem'->nstrate

th.e poisonous eff ect of thise views on German methods of 'Nv.rfara during the
Second World aar, and especially their shocking and disastrous impact upon

the civilian populations of countries nccupi-d by Germany.
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Fthe most

part, these crininal policies v/oro embodied in orders and directives
frraied at the very top level of the Wchrmacht, usually with direct parti

cipation by Warlimont and LehLic.nn, and, within his fields of v/ork, of
Roinecke also. Those orders were distributed tinrough rcj;,ular military

chaTiiicls to the hi^,hcst fiold commanders,, including all of the other
dofondants in this case, and wore by then passed dovim to tho lower forma
tions, Ydierc the orders were actually carried out.

In outlining the charges under Counts Two and Throe, it will be most
convenient to deal first with the criminal orders and directives vdiich

wore chiefly intended for the conduct of the v/ar and the German military

occupation in lirestorn and Southern Europe, and secondly vd-th those v/hich

I;

wore especially connected v/ith the war against the Soviet Union. In all
theatres of war, of course, those crii.:inal orders and the crimes which

^

resulted therefrom sprang from the same disregard for the laws of war and
the dictates of humanity, Likevdso, numerous typos of "vvar crimes and

crimes against huijianity were common to all theatres. Nevertheless, there
^

\v-oro certain significant distinctions, arising chiefly out of differences

in the technique of varfaro in the west as compared to the east, and out
of the different occupational tactics, which the Gormens chose to apply as
cjr.ong the various occupiod countrios.

Finally, after sketching the chief catogorios

crimes in the west

and in the oast, wo -vvill outline the Wchrmacht^s participatioii in the
Goriuan slave labor progrvam, which las a malignant coimT-on denominator of
Gorman occupation policy in all countries*

^

.V, War Crimes and Crimes hgainst Humrjiity CoiTimittod in Western
and Southern Europe

Under Count Two of the indictmout, the principal charge- of v/ar crimes

committed in Western and Southern Europe relates to the so-callod "Cemmarxd
and "Terror Pliey" orders.

Under Count Throe of the indictment, we will

be chiefly conoornod with criminal measures taken by the Gorman hrmy in

the occupied countries, involving tho oxocution pf hundreds of thousands
of hosta OS, and the secret deportation onid oxocution of many others under

the notorious "Night and Fog Dccrco" (Nacht uaid Kcbol Erlass)p
— 59 —^

1. Coui-t Two: Bollic^roiits c.iid Prisoncro of' Wo.r — The "Cor.3:icu:ido'' Order
In "fcho auhviiTin of 1942, "fclic Ilc.zis v/oro still cit "fchc clinax of their

povror and the hllios in the ini'oial staoc of tnoir preparations for the
invasion "wnich v/as to follow two ;;)'ears later.

In .ni^^ust of that j-^ar,

British t.md Canadian conr.iandos raided Dieppe.

I'u vras the firsu thi^ since

Dunhirk that Allied Forces ha,d crossed the channel in stren^tii to prooe

the Gorman fortifications in the rn.st, as a first rehearsed i or tne still
dist'ant im'asion of "Fortress Europe",

In the follov.dnt; months, sraall ^roups of Allied soldiers •dressed an
uniform and carrying v/oapons opciily

so—called conu.;a.ido uniuS

"v-ero

landed on the cox.tiiient, r.iainlp in Franco and Norway, to acconplich

special cQj.ib-at nissions vdiicn co..isastcd prodo:'.iirian"cly in ^ho a'Ostruction
of highly iuportcjit military installations. The V/ehrmacht's answer to

these Icjjitinatc acts of warfo.rc vnas the notorious "Coin.n-oido Order",
vdiich directed the suimiary onecution of c:-pturod coro.ando troops, •oven

if fully UTi-iforLiod, Tilhc-n the dofcndr.nt Narlinont camo to nas cfiicc
at the OETiT on 8 October 1942, he found on. his dcskhfcler's directive for

the drafting of the "Cornvando Order" to-ethcr vdth the text of the cf;Ticial CTornooi radio a2.inouncemciit of 7 October 1942 vdiich read as follows:
All terror and sabote.go troops of tjio eritisn and

taioir aocoinplices ••.Aio do not act like solo.iors beib
bandits have in future to be treatod as si-.cn bp i..nc ij-.T—

iae.n troops, and they must bo slaUj^htorod rutiilesslp'" in
couLbat wherever thop' turn up.

li.nacdiatoly after receipt of the to;-cb of the radio canioemcci.wno, .-/^rlii-oiit
rave tho follovfin;^ instructions ivith respect to its or-foroomwntj
l)

2)

Trauspositioii into order-form,

....this order too, must - in accordance with "JR

/tho Le^al Dopartmont/ end couater-intv^llipence be very carefullj'" oonsid>:.rod and correctly wcr...ed.
Distribution only as far as tho Armies, from o.Lorc

only orally.

To bo destroyed after roadin.^,,...

By 9 October, the defendant L^luuann had completed a draft of 'biic
order, which vaxs trnisaittod by t/arjinont to the
vau-nt under .'^di.iiral Canaris for his corraienta.

Intolli^-enoo Dv.part^

Csuiaris voicjcd stron^ cbr-

jootionj his words desojrvc to bo Cjuotod boca.use thoy show not only taat
t]io utter illegality of tho Cor.m\ando Crdcr was well kno\m to those a/ho

prepared omd executed it, but •also that some of Hir-ler's military l-;.aders
-
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dcired to voics their opposition whan they vrere so minded.

In a memorandum

rec-iived by "^iTarliiriOnt, Lehmann and Reinecke, Canaris stated:
....Sabotage units in uniform are soldiers and have

the right to be treated as R'vse...

Reprisals on Fvis,

according to the agreement ratified in 195U 2.re absolute
ly not permitted.

This respect for international law nas not unique to Canaris in
the days whan the Germans were themselves raking widespread use of para
troops for sabotage purposeso

as early as June 195^^ the defendant

Sperrle had stated in a plan f-^^r the employment of his Air Fleet 5 against
France in case of her intervention against the seizure of Czechoslovakia
that:

It is intended to use parachute sabotage troops,«,

for the purpose of destroying suitable targets, against
which bombin<z raids cann'^t guarantee d.ecisive puccesso

And in June I9U0, the OKH advised all Army Groups and Armies that:
German parachutists are elements of the German 'Tehr-

mc^ ("Regular Troops"). The?/ are legal combattants and
they carry out justified acts of warfare,

^here they are

coiiiiTiitted (whether at the front or behind; the eneiny lines

or v/ay in the rear) d^es not affect their quality as com
battants,

Their position as justified by martial law re

mains unchanged.

But the accepted German view imderwent a marked reversal when the
shoe was on the other foot.

Lehmann put forward the follcrwing pseudo-

legal justification as- an excuse for murdering commandos:
hlioiver performs acts of sabotage as a soldier with the
idea in mind to surrender without a fight after the act

is successfully completed does not conduct himself as an
honorable warrior. He mi.suses the rights of article 23c,
Hague Convention since such iiiethods of warfare had n'^-t
been thought of at the tin: this article was formulated.

On 17 October 19^2, Jodl submitted the final draft of the "Gommando

Order", prepared by harlimont and Lehmaimi, to Hitler and on the follovdng
day it was issued, stating in part:
....From now on all enemies on so-called commando

missions in F,--j7op2 or Africa challenged by Ger nan troops,
even if they are to all appearance soldiers in uniform or
demolition troops, whether armed, in battle, or in flight,
are.to be slaughtered to the last man.

It doee not im'.ke

any difference whether they are landed from ships and
airplanes for the actions or v/h-sther they are dropped by

parachute.

Even if these individuals, whan found, shoifLd

apparently be pr-jpar:=d to give theins^slves up, no pardon
is to be granted tham on principle,,,.

If individual members of such commandos, such as

agents, saboteurs, etc., fall into the hands of the Armed
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Forcas by soma othar maanSj through tha police in occupiad
territories, for instance, thsy ara to ba handed over im
mediately to tha SD...,'

Because commando operations Vv'er-e most prevalent in the ^vestern and

southern theatres of "vjar, it was in these theatres that the order v/as of

most importance. It v/as, hov^ever, distributed by the OK'is to all three
branches of the service — Army, Navy and Air Force ~ and to all theatres

under the OIIV, including Nnrv>:ay, Africa, the Balkans, ths Mediterranean,
and France and the Low Countries.

J-t vras passed to Himmler's SS and Follce

Force, and the OKH sent the order doiTO to all arngr groups and armies in
the east.

From them it went do™ to the divisions and lower units. Each

and every defendant in the dock — except L-.eb, who had retired some
months earlier — was familiar vdth the Commando Order, and 'each of them,

'like every other Gern^n officer, knew perfectly w=ll that it required the
commission of murder.

Pursuant to this*-order, British and Norwegian com

mandos were exebuted in Noreay in I9u2 and 19u3j American commandos were

shot in Italy in 191^1;, and other Allied soldiers v;ere murdered in these
countries and els-ewhere.

The first executions of captured commandos occurred not more than a

fortnight aft'er the order 7fas issued. On 21 November 15^, b'arlimont re
ceived the following report from Air Fl^=t 5 in Norway:

Following supplementary report is made about landing
of a British freight glider at Hegers in the nigh-t of ^^overab=r 11s

a)

.

No firing on the part of German defense.

b) The to'ving plane ('•. Ellington) has crashed after

touching the ground, 7-inan cr=w daael. The at
tached freight glider also crashed, of the 17-man

crew, Ih alive.

Indisputably a sabotage force.

Fuehrer ord-:r has b^eji carried out.

And so the reports came in — British, American, Fr ;nch, Norv.regio.n,
Gr9.3k ooiBToandos slaughtered in battl=, slaughtered in captivity; the laconic

reports t,ll a story of foul murder. Ateletype signed by iisrll-uont to
the Commander in Chief Southeast directed!

,,,,The English radio operator Carpenter and tha

Gr-ek'sailor Lisgaris "captured at Alimnia are no longer

needed and are released f'^r special treatment according
to Fuehrer Order.
•r:

"Special treatment" is a German euphemism for murder-; another is

'i... '•
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On 15 O-c.^Lib-r-r

th.^ following vras circulct?d in 520

copies ovar thi signature oi' Fi^ild li:.!rshP.l von Rnndstwdt?.
.^;3'must count to an incroas^d ixt^nt on various

attainpts hy tha en;^Tny to'damage onr shipping lanes arid
other important military objects^ Proof of that is the
landing of Fnglish saboteurs from an English submarine
at the mouth of the Gironde Rivar on S Dec-:;mb3r 19'-!2«
Evin though on^ gang v/as caught and dealt -wdth^ further

sabotage troops^ neVi;rtheless have reached Bordeaux and •
succeeaed in damaging valuable freighters by explosives

V'dth attached magnets,, on 12 December 19U26

Yes^ thos3 British commandos were "dealt vrith"| they were shot dovn in
cold blood after capture and interrogation.

Their relatives did net even

have their anxieiy ended by a death report.

In an interpretptinn of the

Comma.ndo Order given to the,

Department for'Prisoner of Mar Affairs

under R.eineckej \iarlimont saids

Th« •'fjpSt /Jodl's and •;arlimont's SwOtion of OKT.'j/
considers it to b-s out of the question hcr^jaftor,'tiiat
saboteurs should be treat-.d as soldiers^ in accordance

with the Fuehrer's orders, which woiil.d bo the caso if
their death should be reported to th-^ enemy-n-^tion in
accordance v/ith the regulations valid for fallen en^rny
soldi ;rs. Thus the hrPSt is of the ripinion the.t no re
ports of deaths should be made.

Reineoke's Prisoner of V/ar Department r ec-:.ived .r-;port3 on the execu

tion of commandos and on o.cca.si'^n, whsn a commcuido was "comniittid to a

prisoner of war camp by mistake, he was later turned over to the SD fop
executif^n.

For example, Stalag Je., under th 3 jurisdiction of H3in:;cke,

was dirjct -^d to surrender a British commando to th^s SD on l6 April 19'ii4-#
On 22 June ISIaU, ^-.orlimont gav^ rn vilightening -explanation of the
1
,

"German concent of usag,. and customs of rrrfare" in a memorandum to the

Legal Department under Lehmann:
Ths Fuehrer order is to b-3 applied -.van if th3 ineiixy

employs only

person for a task.

Tli-rafore, it d-^as

not make any difference if several persons or a singls

person t:.ke part in a commando op^^r-ation. The reasons
f^>r the special treatment ^f participants in a corinahdo

operation is tiiat such operatifms do not correspond to
the German conc -pt of usage and customs C'f warfare.

Nr did the ffi''ard-3r of Alli«(d cominrndos ceass with the invasion f)f

Franca by Anglo-American forc.js on 22 June 19iti|.. Gn 25 June, H-ondstadt
r-equastad OID/^ to clarify the applicability of the order in vi:;w of the

iU'^ge-scala landing. In a reply the following day, Marlimont directed
tha.t the epmmandcT Order should be enforced against all paratroopers fopnd
V •.

.. 1'-

/.-I" r?,\/y -I • • •

outsidi

the immediata combat zina.

Daily reports
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tha numbar

"liquidated" vrara also required. This order was sent through military
channels ou 39 Juna to the defendant Blaskovdtz, than Commander-in-Chief

•if ;irmy Group C- in S'-^uthern France# He in turn pass=id the -^rder d-^-wn
t' units subordinated t" him, including the First --^rny, 7fhenc3 it r;;ach3d

the LXXX Corps under the First Arn^y# The order passed dorn by Blasknd.tz
\h

explicitly required all executions of doimand'-s to be reported thr'^ugh
Army channels. A few days 3at er, on 3 duly 19^J-3 thirty odd British and
AmeriCcan conmandos were captured by tr^.-ps of the LXXX Corps and summarily
execut 2d#

2. C'unt Two: Belligerents and Prisoners of ^'var — the "Terr >r Flier" Ord
;"ihen any Allied method -f warfare started to prove effective against
the V'i elurmacht, the usual first reaction of its leaders was to declare
such methods of wr^rfaxe criminal and threaten with der.th the enerty tro-^pe

engaged therein, a year after the successful commando raids aroused the
German wxath, the grovdng strength ^f the Allied Air Forces began to be
acutely felt. In view of tha wondrons shortness of the G-rman memory,
we will do well t^ remind oursiilves that in the field of aerial attacks

against enemy cities, the Allies were imitators, not originat^ors; Tiarsaw,
R tt jrdam, London and other cities wer e flattened or badly scarred I'tng

before ary German city suffered severely. Nonetheless, by th=; fall of
I9I4.5 Allied attacks in Germnn^^ aroused indignant screeches from Gvebbels
and lilmmlar. The former us-,d the press and other means to incite the

German civilian population to lynch American and British fliers who had

been forced to parachute from disabled planes over Gvrmany, and Himmler
direct-d the German police not to prdect Allied fliers fr -m these
lynching-bees.

As was often the case, th3 German soldier v/as more chivalrous whan

acting on his 'wm initiative than v^hen following the orders of his high
est superiors. Cn several occasi'ns V, •ehrmacht tro' ps pr^^t^ctsd Allied
fliers fr

civilian attacks, as indeed the laws of ^.-ijar required, f r

the airman were unarmed, endeavored to surrender, and v/ere entitled to

the status of prisoners of war* Such soldierly conduct c uld n t be

tolerated by GET; on 9 July 194-i an order prepared by Warlimont's section
was issued by OIuY vfhioh directed that V/ohrnacht troopc should not protect

so-called Ym^lo-^'imcrican "terror fliers" against action by the civilian
population.

This crder stated in part:

It has happened recently that soldiers have turned
against the population to protect iniglo-A.iiorican terror
flyers and have thereby aroused their jiistified indigna
tion.. I request to 2na]-cc sure speedily that this will
be provontedo..«

No Gjrman fello\7 country-Tean can bo capable of undcrstai'.ding such conduct oX* our armed .forces • Also, the

population of the occupied torritorios is net to bo pre
vented from rosorting to self-help in justified indi^yia.
tien at Anglo-vlmorican terror flyers*,®.

This ordoi', togGthor with a similar order by Hitler and laurdcrous incateuont by Gocbbols through the press, led to the slaughbcr of numerous Allied
airmen in flagrant violation of the rules of v/ar.

3,

Count Throe:

Civilians — "higlit and Fog" Decree

The Wohrmacht's policies and practices in governing the occupied
V,:'

cjuntrios were charactcrizod by a blind and unimaginative faith in the use
of ruthless force and laothods of intimidation and terrorism.

This policy

was not only brutal and criminal; it was senseless o.rid bcimd to end in

failure.

Catastrophe was the price that the leaders of the Third Reich

had to pay for their arrogant disrcg-ard of lav/ and'for their fail-'oro tc

realize that in the end stupid violence is a v/capon uiiich recoils up®n

its user.

The so-called "Night and i'og" ("Nacht and hebol") docroo was

the fcui'Ldation of a system which ombodiod these principles to porfeotion.

It v/as the means through ••mhich
countries of Western Europe.

the Wohrmacht sought t© "pi.cify" the
The U,4T foxui.d, in connootion v/ith this

dccrpG, that^ "the evidonoo is Quito over.vhclming of a systoimatic rule
of violonce, brutality and terror,"

The circumstancos surroimding the

issuartoo and enforcement of the Night und Fog dc-crco were the subject of
oxtonsivo testimony bcfcro Military Tribunal No. Ill iu Case No, 3

(United States vs. Alstoettcr, ot al).

That Tribunal stated, in its

Judgment:

1.

Vol. 1, Trial of the M'^jor har Criiniu Aa, p. 232,
r.
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The Night CiJid Fog Dccrco (N:-.cht ijnd Nchol Srlass)
c-rosc cxs the ple-ii or schonc of Eitlcr to combat so-c-,llcd

rcsistc-nco movements in qccupiod territories.

Its on-

foroomont brought about a systematic rule of violence,
brutality, outrage, ojid terror against the civilian
populations of territories overrun and occupied by the
Nazi armed forceso

.^..civilians of occupied countries accused of alleged
crimes in resistance activities ag^-.inst Gormcvn occupying

forces were spirited, r.-.vay for secret trio.l by special
courts of the Ministry of Justice v/ithin the iioichj
... gtho victim's vjhcreabouts, trial, and subsequent

disposition v/cro l<Dpt completely secret, thus serving
the dual purpose of terrorising the victim's relatives
and associates end barring recourse to ovid^nco, vritncssos, or counsel for dofenso.

If the accused T/as

acquitted, or if convicted, after serving his sentence,
ho v/as hcuidod ov^r to the C-ostapc for "protective custody"
for the duration of the vm.r. Those proceedings resulted
in the torture, ill troatucnt, and murder of thousands

of •ocrsonso^

On 12 December 1941 "the OllY, through Eoitcl, issuod the Night and Fog
Decree, T/hich had been prepared by the defendant Lohmaiiii in the 011/ Lo^-.l
Department.

It provided in part as follovrs:

I.

In case of criminr.l acts cemiiiittcd by non-Gorman

civilians and v/hich are directed aaainst the heich ar the

occupation power endangering their safety or striking
povv^or, the dcauh penalty is applicable in principle.
II. Criminal acts described in paragraph I v;ill, in
principle, be tried in the occupied territories only -;:hoii
it appears probable that dco.th sentences c-.r^ going to be
passed against the offenders, or at least the main cf~
fcndcrs, and if the trial and the cxecucion cf the death
sontunco Cc-ii bo carried out •'.;ithout delay. In other
cases the offenders, or at least the main offenders, arc
to bo taken to Gormanye

In a covering letter, also vn'itton by the OIG/ Legal Dopartmv^ht, the
purpose of the dccroo vns given:

Efficient and enduring iiitiiaidatian oe.n only bo
achieved, either by capital punishiuent or by me-.surcs
by v/-hich the relatives of the orirainal e.nd the papulaticn do not Icnov/ th^i fate of the criminal. This aim is
achieved v/hcn the criminal is tr.uisforrcd to Germany.

A copy ®f this order,'which was mado offoctiyo in Franoe, Hollejad, Norway,
Bohemia and Moravia, ai:Ld the Ulcraine, vr.\s received by the dofenduits

1.
2.

TJ.s, vs. Alstoott-or, et al, miracographed transcript, p. 10715.
NcS, vs, Als-b.-.^otoor, ot al, mimeographed transcript, p. 10714.
-
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TTarlimont and RcincGko.

Aoout t-.ro months prioi' to tho issuoncc of this dccrco, tho defendant
Lohmann had been informed by Keitel that iiitlcr desired now moons to be

found for combatting tho gro-.dng resistance movement in Franco^ Lchmann

^K'.s a guiding spirit in the formulation, issuance, and execution of tho

Night and Fog decree. Seme of its unfortunate victms were tried in secrci
court sessions, and in many in.stancos no indictment -^/as served. But many
victims wore not afforded oven t.ds miser dole semblance of a trial; they

wore simply shipped directly to a concentration ccmp„ "NN" prisoners, as
they were called, vj-cre held in iviauthauscn, Auscmdtz, Flossonburg, Dachau,
Ravensbrucck, Buohenvaald and numerous other concontration camps. There
they wore starved, tortmcd and killed. Those in charge of tho camps wore
instructed that absolute secrecy of detention v/as to be observed and the

prisoners denied all mccais of oommunication vdth the outer vrorld.

:Tow vm.s there any dclivcrcaicw for the wetchod victims after trial
and acquittal or after oonviction caid completion of their sentence., Thus,

on 6 November 1945, L^innann^s Legal Department issued the follevdng
directive over Kcitcl's si^aturos

Perpetrators who have been acquitted in the course of
judicial proceedings by tha army or u.inst .^hom procoodings have been suspended or who ,havo fuUy served a term of
imprisonment during the v/ar

^

court, o-rc

to be handed over to the- Secret otato Police for detention
for tho duration of tho waro

As tho war continued, the "Night and Fog" decree v^/as supplcmontod by
the Ec-callcd "Terror -nd Saootago" decrees.

On 1 July 1944^ the dofcndai

IJarlimont informed Lchmann tlw-t "because gf incidents that have occurred o

Copenhagen, the Fuehrer has crd-rod an Lmacdiato cessation of court marti;-

prcccodings against members of hho civilian population in the occupied

ti^rritorics". Thereafter, by decr'-^f^ xn tho formulation of which both

Lelimc.nn :nd Aarlimont participotod, civilians charged vdth acts of violcn.
w-.rc to be sumiaarily shot ydthout trial if approhcndod "in the act", raid,

if 'irrcsted later, v/ero to bo turned over t th,. Security Police, a dolir
tar.tuao'irit to cxocuticn.

Tho defendant L'..hmam cm h -rdly
^ el -

ho was unaware of the

..pco.; O. .... ^rao.ou. .u^xnoss. On 30 npn.X XO... ...
dopartmont roocxTod the foXlo^ring'ocmmunxcaticn:
Tho Prosccutor-Gonoral
ticn to- tho fact «xat the

n,,4--i-rMTirn hns

and Fog prisoner^/ who woro so -

..v

ox-ooutod/ arc burned

SoooiaX Court in OppoXn

si, I: •

D.'ti'ton-*

jg.prisonors ^ight
by tho

whether, because

by tho Gestapoo He

porfornod in tho dis-

of -tliG Inrgo nuiTxbor ox.

trict of Cattowico on aoccoixt

nuiTicrous deaths

,

. .4.2 -^nd on account

occurring in Concentratior. ^^P .w -w
-of tho
of thrindiwidua^ dead is
the scpo.ration of tho -snc &
guaranteedo

.

4. count Throe: civiliaas - Hostages and Reprisals

intho previous section tho orhaihal measures devised

Tj"o have soon m uno px-vj.

,

,

ut for the haurisoxxment, deportation or oxeoution, without

bv tho bchrmacht i or uao x. ^

^

.

t- " tr-"l of persons suspected of-hostile

trial or vxith only tho form-ot

tr...l, of p

. t th- Gonacux authorities. Tho other principal method aUoptco

action against the C^orii-ui

ty the Gerraan occupational authorities was equally savage and^sonsc ess;
it con-sistod in tho indi'scrminato murder of many thousands ox xxn.ocn
__ murder coxmaittod under tho pretext of calling such persons

„,„,tagos.. - in the absurd belief that the civilian population woul

„...cs Ir fact, as could have boon .orosoon,
to "oacified" by such nc>,.su. cs. .
.,
,-orl r-ther to arouse and enrage tho inhe.bi-

suoh whole sale oxocutions sorvea r.-th.r

thouscnds of t-noir friends and relative, oxoouto ,
oven though thoy had not lifted
ixxtod ca,ixn.
^
fin--or against tho oooupying authorxtxos
.

• tdnts, vxho thus sax. tnous

P.hilo terroristic
X- mcxsuros
no-suros oof this iclnd vjoro not ooni-.no

o .-y
+ thov wore applied vAth particular severity
particular occupied oountr,
, thoj w PI,

„.,a inx.
in Tlostorn ,Europe, .nd

the Balhsns.' Particularly
lu,o^ in Grooco endonocutx::-

4-. M1V hi'^h
slavia, fantastically
hi^^

execution ratios - r.n^in,

_

, , x^eos for the hilling of one Gorman - 'wore applied.

of- one hundred,, hostu.,jOS

• .1041
,,oh ratios xvoro ddoptod as Standard .Gomaux
19^1 ^
4,,

During the fall

16 Sopto'ibor 1941, an
partraent end initialed by hm,

order, prepared in va-r men s

^aied attention to disturbances v.hich had

r^iioicd oountrioB and stated:
occurred in the ^occupi

r» 68 »-

-. !<• u., ,4vy

j

circuQstcinccs, thr.t it is of Coinraunist origin.

"b.

Ill ordor to nip these machinations in tho bud

the nost drastic ncasuros should be taken imniodiatcly and
on tho first indication, so that the authority of tho occupy-

iaig foroos racy be mainteinod and further spreading prevented.

In this comieotion it should be roiTioriberod th.^t a lMe-.n j.ife
in tho oountrios oonoornod frequently counts for nothing,

and a dotorroiit effoot can be attained only by ^usual sever
ity. Tho death penalty for 50-100 Copiiunists should genorally be regarded in those oases as suitable atonoTient for cno
Gorman soldier's death. Tho way in which sontciioo is canlod
out should still further incroaso the deterrent effect.

b/liilo this order laid groat stress on Communist responsibilitj for

those uprisings, it was by no moans intended that tho hostages executed
should in all cases be Communists. Quito tho contrary. On 28 September

1941, another OH: order - again emanating from harlimont's departe.oih. laid doim tho following:

Because of attacks on members of the T.bhrmacht which haye
taken nl"'CO lately in the occupiod territories, it is

pSStod ou? Lt It is opportuno^ for the Military G™d^

Ls to have always at their disposal a number of nost„gos
of different political persuasions, i-o.,
1)

Kationalists,

2) Douocratic Middle Class,
S)

CoiiF.iunists

It is of mportanoe that among thoso
or ncnbcrs ol thoir-fe.jiilios •

f

h

eL ?n case of axi attack, hostages of the group corresp..ndi.g

to tliat tc v&ixoh the culprit belongs are to bo snot.

Tho execution of hostages in Greece and Yugoslavia is one of tho major

char60S against tho defendants "in Case No. 7, now pending before Eilit-x y
Tribunal Ho. Y. In tho present case, WO will present ovidenoo of similar
crimes in other oooupiod couirtrios, including France. For example, dur

ing July and August 1944, nuraorous hostages vmro oxecutod in the• area of
Army Group G, connaandod by tho dofondant Blaskowits. Amonth earlier,
despite tho fact that units of the French resistance forces fulfilled all
•A-tho conditions for recognition
as -nroccrlY
propori^
. .1 part4. of tno
liad boon proclaiEiod
4.1 4subordinate units an order th-t

constituted arncd forces, c-jid

AT Tied Forces, Blaskov.'itz issued to his
nlii
"rAornhpra
of tho French resistance rioToment
mombor

aro to be treated as guorill'-s •

>

tion upon capture.
-
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of course, noant iiimiodiato oxccu-

B.

V/c.r Crincs and Criiios Af;ainst Huncaiity Cor.ir.:ittv-d in Sastc-rii Eurcpo

In turning from tho i;cstcrn to the eastern theatre of Vifar, 'tc vd.ll

find nothiiit^ to mitii^o.to tho blo.ck criir.iiiality cf tho OorraLindo Order and

tho Mght and Fffg Decrooa

Quito tho coiitraryo

In hostcrn and Southern

Europe, tho V/ohrraacht vms at least .anxious to hcop up the appoaroaicc of
coraplianco -with the laws and custoEis 6f war. But during the warfare in
the oast, the loaders of tho '..'ohriiio.cht were totally uninhibited bj/ consid
erations of lav;- and humanity.

Hitler and the gonor-als laid their plans

for tho y/ar against Rvssia on tho basic assurAp-Sion that every Slav is sub
human and every Jew is subhuivaai and criminal as mmll. The Russians, thoreforo, wore to be treated lihe boasts, mid the Sevrevtrcrc to be killed like

dangerous boasts.

Orders-mid directives in lino -with these malignajit views

and policies wore prepared by the edlitary leaders, end distributed through
out the uohriaaohto

In the fomulaticn m'id onforccr.ont of those orders,

tho Gorrr.an vrarlords s anlc far boloTiT the imagined qualities of tho peoples

they affoctcd to despise, ond brutc.lizcd tho Gorman soldiers •'rdio trusted
their leadership,

Gormmiy's troatmont of tho Jews of Europe and tho Slavs

of Eastern Europe is the blackest page in tho history of European civiliza
tion,

Tho nurderbus measures laid down within tho Gcrria.n -'i.rmy in advance

©f tho attack on Russia i7cro dirootod both at tho soldiers of tho Soviet

Army and at tho Russian oivilimi population. xi.ttachod to th^- combat units
of tho Russian xirmy vrcro spooial officers who can best bo described as

"political coinmissars"j tho^'- reprosontod tho Communist Party end vffiro rosponsiblc for the political indocbrination md morale oi the Russian

troops, Ho'wcvor, thoy v/oro not just pep talk boys; mhoy wore part of the
Russian .may, wore its uniform, carried arms openly, -and fought with con
spicuous courage as

of the anaay at tho front.

But by yxpross orc,^,r of

tho .Gonrion militmy loaders, laid doim at the highest level, these soldiers
were not te be taken prisoner under any circumstances but, like tho cornando
units on tho western front, vroro to be slaughtered to tho last man.
\nthin the Russian territory overrun by tho -./chrmacht, all the safo^

guards required by tho laws'of war for the maintonanee of order and tiho
-
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prctcction of tlio civilirji popul.i'.tion Yrorc done-

mth»

Gori.nn -fcroopB

were cncourrv^cd and, indeed, ordered to praotico the utnost brutality 'iii
doAling with the Russirai populationo

Except under' very lirAitod circura-'

I

.

'

stanoos, no Gcman soldier was to be punished for oxcossos -o.gainst the

civilian population,

As ^if this wore not cnou>;qh, very special noasuros

wore taken t< 'ihako sure that all Jews and all political officials if any

inportaiico vrauld bo hi^tod down and nurdcrod as soon as possible.
purpose, special SS and Police forces •vfcro

structod by Hirnralor,

For this

organized;, furnished and in«

Those gangsaTcro to move into Russia with the- Gorman,

Army, and, vdth the full administrative support of the army, vrcro to carry
out their murderous mission,

"

.

(

The horrible purposes which v/o have 'just doscribod vraro discussed
A

botiToon Hitler and the loading gcnorais' raorc than throe mcnths before the
attack in the oast was launched.

On 17 March 1941, at" a confcrcnco in,

which Hitler and the Chief of. the Army General Staff, General Haider,
i

participated. Hitler stated;

.ooeTho intelligentsia vrorking for Stalin must bo'oxtorminatcd. The hierarchy of the Russian Empire must bo
crushed, ll-aximum'brutality must bo cp plied throughout
thcTuUssian area, The idoologioal ties of tlic Russian

people are not str-ong enpugho

They v/ill br^ak wdth the

clii'iiination of the functionaricso

,

Twro weeks later,, these sami) views wore outlined in greater detail ;?.n a'long'
address by Hitler to a largo number of generals on 30 March 1941 in Fcrlin,
iVftcr announcing tha.t, after the victory over the Russian ^'-rmy. Northern

Fwussia would bo annexed to Finlcind, and that the Baltic territories, .vhito

Russia aild the Ukraine would bo "jDrought uj'idor Gorman dominion as "pro^tcctoratos". Hitler wont.oni
- Extermination of the Bolshevist commissars and tho Comunist

intollootuais#

Tho rxow states must be Socialist but have no

intelligentsias of their omi,

tlio grovrth of a now, iiitelli»-'

gcntsia must bo provontocl. All th?.t is needed hero is a
primitive Socialist intqlligcntsia. The fight must bo diroqt-i
od against the poison of disintegration. That is not a pro

blem for military courts,

Tho officers with the troops must

know what is at stake, and must bo leaders in this fight,
^r troops must defend thoriisolvos with tho •vweapona vfith
which they arc attacked.

Commissare and GPU people arc

•briminals and must bo truutod as such.
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That doosn^t mt'on

•

.

j-!'/
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that troops nust get out of hand» Officers must give the
orders in accordojioc T,vlth the spirit of the troops.
This war v;-ill differ greatly fron^thc v;c^r in the '.,'cst.
In the East harshness today means mildness in the futuro«
The officers must accept the sacrifice of ovcrcordng
their personal roscrire.tionso

Such is the general background of the several crminal orders the fotnulntion and execution of vdiich "vvo will now describe,

As the above aocoiuit

clearly shows,'these orders wore in no sense issued by v/ay of reprisal for
or in retaliation against any actions of the Soviet Ar:.iy; on tho cdntrary,
they wore coldly and' deliboratoly formulated months in advmcc of the
actual invasioiio

For those manifold crir.ios in "..ostern and'Eastern Europe,-all the de
fendants boar responsibility oxcopt Sporrle end Blaskovrits, who v;crc never
involved in the Russian caiapaign.

The dofcndcnt Schr\iowind was relieved

as Chief of Staff of the Raval ear Staff (6 Ju::lo 1941) just before the
attack was lavnchod, but prior to hi^ transfer p..rticipatod actively in
the plaming of the campaign against the Soviet Union, T,;as present at con/

forcncGS at v^iiich these criminal policies were discussed, and received end
distributed to naval units certain of the crii'iinal orders mentioned above.

The defendants V/arlimont, Lchruam and Rcincckc, as leading officers of orC.7,
r

vrore heavily involved in the formulation and distribution of these orders.
The remaining eight defendants Vv'-cre all high rreaking field coitimanders
during the Russicoi campa3.gnj they received those orders frr":m the

and

the OlUi o.nd passed them do^wa to their subordinate units, and the orders

• were executed by troops imder their commando The defendant Lcob v/as the
I

• Ccmmander-in-Chief of Army Group North until Jmuary 1942, when ho'retired

from active service at the ago of sixty-five.

The defendant Eucchlcr,

Commondor-iii-Chiof of the Sightoonth Army at the outset of the campaign',
succeeded Locb as Commnandcr-in-Chicf of the *').rmy Group,

The defendant

• Hoth, who led a panzer group into Russia, was prsmotod to the comBiend of
the Sevcntoonth Army in Rundstcdt^s -.rmy Group South in October, 1941 and

in May 1942 v/as transferred to the command of the Fourth Panzer

The

•defendant'Roinhardt, at first a corps commander, sucooodod to the ecmnumd

of Koth's. Armoured Group, which was later designated, as the Third Pajazor
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Anny«,

Roinhardt vrriB made a full general in 1942, and bocomo tho Commander-

in-Chief of .Irmy Group Center in August 1944»

Tho defendant Salmuth v/as

also promoted from corps to army command, and bocarao a full general in
1943o

Prom June 1942 to August 1943 he commanded successively tho Seven

teenth, the Fourth and the Second Armies on tho eastern front; from .i-ugust

1945 to August 1944 ho commanded tho Fifteenth Army in Francoc

The defend

ant. Hollidt^ who led the 60th Infantry Division into Southern Russia, rose
rapidly to corps command in <Jaiuary 1942 and became Commandcr-in-Chief of

the Sixth Army in March 1943; in that samo year ho, too, became a full
gcncralo

Tho defendant von Roqucs romainod an Army Group Rear -..roa Com

mander until Docembor 1942 vmcn ho v;cnt bach ijito rctiromontu

ant Wochlcr served as Chief of Staff of tho Eleventh J^rmy

The defend

first under

von Schobcrt and later midor von Hanstoin — until February 1943c.

...ftor

a brief period of service as Chief of StcXf of Army Group Center end as a

corps commander, he -vvas promoted to the ranic of lieutenant general and
made Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Army in Southern Russia in August
1943, and in December 1944 became the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group
South,

lo Count Two:

Belligerents and Prisoners of War -- the "Commissar" Order

On 8 June 1941, tv.^o weeks before Russia VJ'as attacked. Field Marshal
von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the German Army, issued an order
entitled "Directives for the Treatment of Political Commissars" to the
commanders of the Army Groups and Armies then deployed along the Prussian

border .awaiting the word to attack.

This order read in part as follcwss

T/hen fighting Bolshevism one can not count on the enemy
acting in accordance vath the principles of humanity or
International Law, In particular it must be expected that
the treatment of our prisoners by the political commissars
of all types who are the true pillars of resistance, will be
cruel, inlT,umaia and dictated bj'* hate.

The troops must realize

l)

That in this fight it is wrong to treat such elements
"vvith clemency and consideration in accordance with
International I.aw«

They are a menace to our own safety •

and to the rapid pacification of tho conquered terri
tories,
•I" 7 3

2)

That the originators of the asiatic barbaric methods
of fighting are the political commissars* They must
be dealt \nth promptly and with the utmost severity.
Therefore, if taken vdiile fighting cr offering re

sistance, thej'- must, on principle, bo shot immediately.
For the rest, the following instructions will apply:
I.

Theatre of Cperationsp
I

:4i

4:
r,

•?!

,2)

Political coinniissars in thoir capacity of
officials attached to the enemy trcops arc
reoognibabie by their special insignia red star.ivith an inwoven golden hammer and
sickle oil the s l e e v e s T h e y are to bo
segregated, at once5, i,e. while still on the
battlefield, from the prisoners of war. This

V

is necessary in order to deprive them of any
possibility of influencing the captured
soldiers,

TIic-sc coinr.issars v/ill not be rc-

cognized as soldiers; the pretecti'r.n granted
to prisoners of war in accordance v/ith In
ternational Law will not apply to them.
After having been segregated they arc to be

v./"

dealt ivith.

If there were no other proof to be offered in this proceeding except
t>

that concerning the issuance and execution of this one order, it would
still more than justify the prosoncc in this dock of every defendant except

Spcrrle, Blasl:ov;itz, and Schniowind.

v

The Comniissar Order 7/as formulated

by the defendants Lvchmann and IVarlimont, issued by ".j'arlimcnt to nineteen

diffei^cnt officos of the Yifehrmacht inoludin^g the OIH, distributed by the .
OI(H to the defendants Loob, Kucchlor, Hoth, and ^Tochlor, passed on to

Pcinhardt, Salmuth, Hollidt end Poquos, end executed by units subordinated
'S

to them,

Reinecke. sav^ to its unforcemont in i^o prisoner of v/ar ccaaps

I

'il-

under his jurisdiction.
I av

The Commissnr Order was not tlic exclusive achievement of any oho man.

On 6 May 1941, the 0!Cd forwarded to Yifarlimonfa proposed draft of tn order
for the treatment of oommissars:

Warlimont submitted this draft to the

defendant Lolimonn in the Le^al Department of the OIQf'/o Lchmam approved
the draft with minor changes and returned it to iYarlimont the next day.

On. 12 May, Warliraont submitted the draft as approved by the Legal Deportliiont t« Jodl together 7/ith a momorandum in which ho stated:

Military functionaries (commissars) are, to bo dealt
with according to proposal 0101,

'•

Thoy are not vrocognizod

•

'''a

V ii'm H'i'ili I'lin'\| I'iiV

•'a''mMw

.a, : •'-.'•'.1."

•'.'"'''•1

rr'l idtY-tiii ii-- -i

•'•1

'V, .J

VViKifi it'y

as prisoners of v/ar and arc to be liquidated at the latest
in the transient FW camps and under no circumstances to bo
removed to the roar a.rc-a#

fyi '•

On 6 Juno, ITarlimont issued the order to the Supreme Comimnds cf the

Army, Navy, and Air Force v/ith instructions that it v^^as to be distributed
in Trriting to Army and Air Floot Commanders and orally to lov/cr corrmands,
Tvto days later, Brauchitsoh passed down the order v/ith the amondiacnt
that "Political commissars attached to the troops should bo sogrogatcd

and dealt ivith^'by order of an officer, inconspicuously and outside the

battle zone proper".

From army group to army, army to corps, corps to

division, division to rogimont -- down this order for murder v;cnt until it
was well knovm over the entire Eastern Front,

During the proceedings before the International Military Tribunal,
a veritable parade of Gorman field marshals and generals took the v-ritncss
stand and testified under oath that the German army commondcrs in Russia

refused to pass do\m the Commissar Order to their troops — or passed it

down \7ith oral instructions to disregard it — and that the order was
never carried out.

At the time this toctimony was given, most of the

documents relevant to this question v/orc not available to the prosecution.
The ovidonce to be offered in this procooding will, vrc believe, expose
the true nature of the testimony given by the Gorman generals before the
The Commissar Order was issued to be obeyed, not to be ignored, and
wo shall present conclusive evidence .that it was generally distributed
and extensively carried out on tho Eastern Front#

The minutes of a confcronco held on 17 Juno 1941 among gonorals of

the LVII Corps of Panzer Group 3, then under the command cf Hoth, contain

tho following notation:

"Tho Fuehrer has ordered that Russian political

Commissars are to bo 'liquidated^#

orally only#"

This order is to.be disseminated

Tho minutes of a meeting of the commanding officers mthin

the 454th Security Division,,subordinct od to dofondant Roquos, indicate
that by 20 Juno tho erdor had reached rogimcntal level.

At this mooting,

tho commanding goncraT locturod his subordinate officers on the essential
points of the Commissar Order directing thorn to report, .through channels,
on action taken against political commissars#.
-
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Oil the- morning of 22 Juiic 1941, the invasion of Soviet Russia

startcdo By the evening of the saiao day, the aXVIII Corps of the Siistoonth Army in Army Group North, under the defendant von Loeb, itus alrca.dy

in possession of a report listing executions carried out under the Conmisser Crdcrc

Cno of the divisions in Hoth^s Panzer Group 3 reported tc

higher headquarters the same evening that one comnissar and one civilian
had "been killcdc

In the i'ollcr.ring t;oo1-:s

months, the enforcement of

th'^ Commissar ©rder became routine iTork in the operations of the advancing
Gornan armies, and referonces to killings of comir-issars constantly occur

in the reports from subordinate to higher headquarters« They make monotonous reading and differ more in the numbers of executed coramissa.rs than in
their vrording- A report of one of the divisions in Kuochlor's Sightccnth

Army stated o:i 26 October 1941: "Nothing particular to report., 16
Commissars shot®

61st Infantry Division — IC,"

The Ceimaissa.r Order

itself explicitly required the submission of reports on its execution

through rcgula.r army channels; whatever those defendants may conjure up
in their defcusc thoj'- can novor honestly say that they did not knov/ that

tbis criminal order liTO-s being oxocutod by units subordinated to them.
2.

Count TwGt

Bolligorcnts and Prisoners of Vizir —

Iviurdor ?.nd Ill-trcc..tmc-nt Generally

As wo have just seen, the murder of commissars who vrnrc uniformed

mcmbors of the Red Army vvr.s the task of the Gorman combat troops. The
fate in storo for commissars was soon noised abroad in the Rod Army, end

naturally some of the prospoctivo victims vrcnt to some pams to conceal
their identity from the Germans in the event of capture. General Haider

uctod in his useful dir.ry on 1 -iugu^t 1S41, with rospoot te the "treat
ment of captured oeimissars", th:.t they wore "for the nost part identifiac

only in prisenor-of-war ooenps".

This possibility the ?Johri..aoht had

anticipated. The defendcuit Eeinoolco, as Chief of the SET/ department with

jurisdiction svcr prisoncr-of-Tr-.r matters, entered into an aeroeneut wi±i.
the notorious Kein/iardt Heydrioh, Chief of the Security Police end Himmler's right hand man. This agroomcnt oovored not only the apprehension
of cormissars, out also the wooding out from Eussiooa prisoners of certain
_
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typcs and categories regarded -as "subversive", 'vvhich v.'as to bo aocomplisiicd by the special SS gongs co.licd "Einsatzgruppcn".

The first -bvo para

graphs of the Roineoko-Hoydrich agrcciaont road:
r

T' •

The Wchrraacht must imcdiatoly free itself of all
those elements aiiiong the prisoners of "ivar v/ho must be

regarded as Bolshevist influences# The special situation
of the campaign in the East therefore demands special
measures, vrhich have to be carried out in a spirit free
from bureaucratic and administrative influences,and with

an eagerness to ass'ume responsibility.

While the regulations and orders of the prisoner of
vrar system were hitherto based exclusively on considera
tions of a military nature, now the political goal must

be attaine"^ namely to protect the German people from
Bolshevist agitators aiid to gain a firm grip on the
occupied territory at the earliest possible moment.
%

The agreement further provided that "suspects" and "intolerable
elements" among the prisoners should be segregated by the Einsatzlcommandos
and surrendered to them by the camp officials.

The fate of the prisoners

selected is made all too. clear by Heydrich^s instructions that:
Executions must not be carried out in or near the

Ci-mp.

If the camps arc in the Government General close

to the frontier, prisoners

to be moved to former

Soviet territory, if possible, for special treatment.

• In execution of this agreement, on 8 September 1941 the dofondant
Roinecke issued an order stating tnot:

....Selection according to the political attitude

of the prisoners of war will be carried out by the EinsatzkoiMiandos, which are ospecially assigned to this

task.

Close collaboration with the Einsatzkommandos

is the duty of camp commanders.

j

This injunction to murder helpless huinan beings was distributed t(
over two hundred separate agencies including the prisoner of war camps

in Germany and Poland, and to the Armed Forces Commanders in Riga, the
Ukraine, and Norway. Pursuant to those orders, mcjiy thousands of Russian

prisoners were shot dead by the Wchrmacht and the Einaatzkoimnandos.

Other portions of Roinockc's' order of 8 September 1941 stated:
The Bolshevist soldier has thorcforc lost all claim

to treatment as an honorable opponent, in aocoid..uice
with the Gonova Convention *** Tho order for ruthless

and energetic action must be given at the slightest
-
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indication of insubordination, cspocially in the caso of
Bolshevist fanaticso

Insubordination, active or passive resistcjicc, must bo

broken immediately by force of arms (bayonets, butts,
and firoarius) ***

^Vnyone carrying out the order who

doQ^ not use his woc.pons, or does so mth insufficient
energy, is punisho-blo
l^o yjarning shot must ever
be fired

The use of arms against prisoners of vfar

is as a rule Icgo.lo

This order, like the "Commando" Order, v/as revicvYcd by Admiral Canariso
In this case, too, Canaris' opinion that the order was a flagrant viola
tion of iiitomational lav,r v/as clearly given;

The Geneva Convention for the treatment of prisoners

of war is not binding in the relationship botviTCon Germany
and the U.S.S.TU Thoroforc only the principles of general
international law on the treatment of prisoners of "'/o.r
apply# Since the 18th conturjr those have gradually been
established along the linos that war oaptiviuy is neither
revenge nor puiiislmcnt, but solely protective custody,

the only purpose of vy-hich is to prevent the prisoners of
v;ar from further participation in the waro This principle
was developed in accordance with the vievf held by all
armies that it is contrary to military tro.dition to kill
or injure helpless pooplo
The decrees for the troatmont of Soviet prisoners of v/ar onclosod arc based on a
fundamcnt..\lly different viov/point.

The order just quoted plo.yod cua importcmt part in the IlfT's conviction of

Goncral Koitol, who noted on Canaris' memorandum of protest, "Those ob
jections arise from the military concept of chivalrous yra.rfarc«
is the destruction of an idcologye

This

Therefore I approve and back the

measure,"

Such orders as those inevitably resulted in cruelty and inhumanitj'*

on a •'/i'ido scale# .»s the Ii/iT stated in its Judgments^ "The treatment rf
Soviet prisoners of yr-r was charaotoriz^Jd by particular inhumanity,«

It "v/as the result of systematic plciis to murder,"

Those "systematic

pl-Tjis" v/ere embodied in orders from the CIh7, prepared by Warlimont and

Lohmannj orders for the transfer of prisoners to concentration co.mps,
signed by Roincckcj OI{H orders, diebributcd by field corrimr.ndcrs, for the

shooting of Russian soldiers in uniform on the pretext that they vrcro

"guorilli.s"; orders for the killing of escaped prisoners upon recapture,
a flagrant viol .tion of the usages of -w.r; aiid other similar diroct5.vos.

The crimes y/hich such orders resulted in arc reflected in numerous reports
from combat units under the comond of these defendants.

1, Volo 1, Trial of the Major hb,r Criminals^ p, 229
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Thus:
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,Cn 1!5 Soptonbor 1941 c. report by pno of the divisions nndor
the dofondmit Roquos stntod;

"Numerous escapes of Russian

prisoners of ^-irar from rail tr.-xsports have boon reported.
Guard Battalion 70S captured 13 and shot them."

On 13 April 1942 a report froai"thc Roar Area of Army Group
Horch, then ooi:im.anded by Kuochlcr stated: "Five escaped
prisoners of vjn«.r shot to dcatn.

A Security Division in the near Area of the dcfondrait Loeb's

Army Group reported on 10 October'1941: "In the course of a
patrol eleven Rod Army soldiers arrested. Seven of them

wore shot after detailed intcrrpi^ation, four -aprc hcndcd
over to the prisoner camps."

A report of 8 -October 1943 to the Eighth Army, GQinr,.cjidcd by
the defendant T-'oohler, shov^rs tliat the principles of the

"comnando order" v/cro also applied in the East: "Seven
eo-rachutists "iTCre captui'odo Of tiiesc, six destroyed. All
members of the Third Airborne Brigade."

':hosc reports,' suleotod alaost r.t r;j,doir., show 'the frightoiiiiiGly
routine oharaotor of these brutulitios. -not they do not show on thoir
fo.oe is thoir utter stupidity, • It ms ,e, ce.rdinal objootivc of tho Gormen

occupation of tho Ukraine to "pacify" and "exploit" tho l..nd in the
interests of Gormcai coonomyj such open mistreatoicnt and slaubh-ooi of
Russion soldiers was bound to frustrate the Gortn-ns' ovm objectives. A
young German lioutonant on the intelligenoo •staff of Himdstedt's Ainr.y
Group South reported on 8 October 1041 that German occupation policy in
tho Ulcraine was being seriously obstructed bucauso:

prisoners wore shot when thoy could not march any m.ore,
ri-'ht in tho middle of villages and some of tho bag';cr

hamlets, and tho corpses wore lc:ft lying about, ^a.nd the
poptilation saw in those facts tinvb vdiich thoy did not
unLrstand
and vdiich confirmed the worst diotoi^tions cf
undors

.«S

enemy propagcxida.

4
Jt

The f,vtc of onomy soldiers who survived -their capture and -vero taken

•m

to prisoner of war camps undor tho control of tho OLTf .'.ind tho Army Group
and Armies ooramandod bj- thcso' dofon-iants was oven more appallins. The
V;". •
iV*''' r'

Mp: %

M'f
W'.

.: "<*J

defendants will ur.doubtodly stress the circumstances which provailod during
the oajB-paigii in .Soviet Russia, and admittedly it is difficult to handle •

large masses of prisoners under primitive conditions of tra-nsportation.

''^^1

v'-'h?
But the situation was of tho dofond-ants' rnxkiug, not tho prisoners', -and.
•ovon Lialcing ovcry nllowanod, tho story is a horrible one. Tho r--,ports of
disease or.d death asnong the Eussirh prisoners reach such astronomical fig-ires
that it is difficult to boar In mind that;lhuw lives are being tabulated,
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A series of ontrics in tlio vra.r diary of Kuochlor's Sightconth. Army, at
that time subordinated to Loot's Army Group North, rovcals thit on 4
Novorabor 1941 about ton prisoners •'.fcrc

dying every night from exhaustion^

five days later "the prisoners' rations are so insufficient that ono

hundred raon will dio'do.ily,"

On 28 November it was cstiiiiatod that ""all

tho innatos of Camp East will have died within six months at the latest'*,
cuad that "in tho camp at Ploskau out of ti/cnty thous'-uad about ono thousand
perish v/ockly from cxh.austion."

A report of 21 Doccmbor 1941 from a prisoner of war district in PLoqucs

command, utilizing the porconta'^o of-mortality among the priso.iors up to
that date, ostimatod tliC-fif those mortality rates persisted, witliin a

year the percentage of deaths at four camps would bo 28^, 87/o, 82f^ and
80J^ respectively, mfbh prisoner of war carps thus transmuted into charnel
houses it is not surprising that an of 1 May 194-4 tho Prisoner of Aar

organisation of OKff reported tliat, out of a total of 5,163,381 prasoiiors
ta,ken since tho beginning of the war, 84-5,128 ha.d died in installa.tions

under the control of 0151 and 1,136,235 in those undor CM. This total pf

nearly tv/o million did not include prisoners handed over by tho ?/'ohrmacht
to the Binsatagruppcn and other o:rfcormina.tion units.

It is ironical that one of tho most darmiing" indiotmonts of Gcnr^niy's

treatment of Soviet prisoners was written by Alfred Rosenborg, a defendant
before tho BIT and himself ccrtainl;/ no angel, who on 28 February 1942 in
a letter to ICoitcl, stated:

Tho fa.tc of tho Soviet prisoners of war Ln Gorr.rny is....

a tragedy of the greatest extent.

Of 3.6 millions of prisoners

of war, only sovora.l hundred thousand arc still able to work

fully. -L large part of them have starved, or died, bccauso of
the hazards of tho weather. Thous-iids a.lso diod fron^ b^rphus.
It is understood, of course, that there ano difficulties oncountered in the feeding of such a 1-ngo iiui-ibcr of prisoners

of war. Anyhow, vrntli a certain a.r.iouit oi ULidorst'ir-ding^for

goals aimed ait by German politics, dying and deterioration could

have boon avoided
tho extent dcscribod. For inst':nco, accord
ing to information on hand, tho native population witnin the
Soviet Union arc absolutely willing to put food at tho disposal
of tho prisoners of war.

Several understanding camp comnana^rs

have suoccssfully chosen this course. However, in tho^m-joriby
of cases, the cai'p povmrndors h'^ve forbidden tho civiliaii popu

lation to put food at tho disposaa of tho prisoners, -nd they
have'rather let them starve to death. Even on tho march to the

o-aaps, tho civilian population was not aUo'wod to give the pri
soners of v/ar food. In many cases, when prisoners oi war could
no longer koep up on the march bccauso of hunger and cxhc.ustion.
-
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they v/cro shot before tho

of the horrified civilian

population, and the corpses -were lefto In numerous camps,
no shelter for prisoners of vrar "vas provided at all. They
lay under the open sky di.xring rain or sno;\rj,,o Utterances
such as these have been heard:

soners

"The more of these pri

die, the better it is for us,"0,0,

The prosecution is unable to improve on Rosenberg's description.
3,

Count Throe:

Civilians -- Murder and Ill-treatment Generally

As VTQ mentioned earlier, the Germans had very far-reaching economic

and political designs with respect to the Russian territories overrim by
the V/ehrmachtft

In order to exploit these areas for the benefit of Germany,

it was planned to "pacify" and crush all opposition, to obliterate the
Soviet political system and set up iievf regional political administrations,
and to convert the productive resources of the land to the uses of tho
Third Reich.

The economic features of this program ivere primarily en

trusted to civilian agencies, but the Uehrmacht too played its part.

The

Germans were most concerned with natural resources and factories, but they

did not overlook making arrangements, under Rosenberg, for the systematic
plujider of valuables and cultural objects.

The Army was directed to assist

Rosenberg's plunder gangs, and the evidence will show that Reinecke, Woehler

Roquos and other defendants were helpful to the Rosenberg vuiits, T7g will

postpone further discussion of tho evidence establishing the Wehrmacht's
paa-ticipation in plunder, destruction and devastation in violation of the
laws of war until its actual prcsontation in this preceoding.

For, revolting and crimini-.l as were these plundering activibies, and
terrible as was their effect on the standard of living

and indeed on

lifo itself — within tho occupied territories, they were as nothing

compared to tho outright slaugiitor of the inhabitants which began as soon
as the Gorman troops sot foot on Russian soil. The Tribunal should not
assume that the cause of this slaughter was any innate and peculiar

brutality of tho German soldiers. True it is that among tho troops vrero

many vAio had been filled with poisonous Nazi racial ideology and myths,
and who therefore ontorod gladly into the diabolical spirit of the occasion

But the primary responsibilityfor those millions of murders rests on the
men in this dock, and on others vdio, ur.lcss dead, might fittingly be
~
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sitting thoro too. •Hhc.t Impponod in Russin T,-oas dolitaratoly oonorired

niaong the loaders of the BohrrEaohts, and ttc-s ombedicd in orders, which
wore, circulated throughout the Gersan Army and which brcught about the
carnage that ensued*

Within the limits of available time, wo con only sketch the outlines

of this criminal structure. - The basic order was issued by the DIE/ scmo
five weeks before the invasien, on 15 Hay-1S41, to the Ccnmanders-in-Chiof
of the Army, Havy and Air Force. This order, in unmistakable terms,

legalized the murder of Hussion civilians by. Gorman troops. It acoomplishod this in two mys. Firstly, for the pEmishment of Russian civilians

suspected,of unfriendly acts, the order substituted summary oxocuticn by
the troops'for action ,by military courts. After a sweeping mandate direct
ing the troops to "take ruthless action against any throat from the enemy
population", the order stated:

1, Until further notice the military courts and thu courts
martial vdll not he competent far crimes committed by
enemy civilians• '

S. Lihowise all other attachs by enemy civilians on the
Armed Forces, its'mcmbirs cjid omploycoc, are to bo

suppressed at once by the military, using the most

orbrcmo methods, until the assailants are destroyed.

4. Ylfhero such measures have been noglectod^or were not at
first possible, persons suspectod of criminal action
will bo brought at onco before an officer. This officer
will decide whether thoy are to bo shot.

On the orders of on officer with the powers of at least a
Battalion Commandoa', collective despotic measures will bo
tal-cn without delay against loealities from which curjiing

• 'Vil

or malicious attacks arc m.adc on tho Armed Forces, if
circumstancovs do not permit quick identification of in
dividual offenders.

-'fj

Tho SQCond part of the order was oven more vicious; it guarcmi^ood

Gorman soldiors against any foar of punishment for crimes committed against,
tho civilian population, unless such crimes were likely to •ai.dermino tho
discipline of tho Army, ^hls v^ras accomplished as follows:
1

With regard to offonsos committed against enemy civilicui'S
by members of tho Wohrmacht end its employees, prosecu
tion is not obligatory oven whore tho deed is at tho,samo time a military crime dr offense.
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2» FViicn judging such offenses, it must be borne in mind,
Tz-hatcvor the circumsta,nccs, that the collapso of Ger

many in 1918, the subsequent sufferings ef the Gorman
people and the fight against Kational Socialism which
cost the blood of innumerable supporters of the move

ment, wore caused primarily by Bolshevik influence
and that no Grcnmrn has forgotten this fact,

3,

Thorofore the judicial authority will decide in such
cases vzhothcr a disciplinary penalty is indicated,
or whether legal measures arc ncoessarye In the case
of offenses against inhabitants it will order a court
martial only if maintenance of discipline or security
of the Forces call for such a measure..go

Warlimont and Lchmann wore in a unique position to know the purpose

of this order -- the so-oallGd "Barbarossa jurisdiction order" -- inas

much as they formulated it. Drafts of the order "v/ero prepared by thorn,

and by OICH, as early as April 1941. These drafts v^erc discussed (as his
diary shows) ^7ith the Chief of the Army General Staff, General Haider, on

6 hay; it appears that Ealdor wished to preserve the jurisdiction of the
military courts over minor offonsos by the inliabitants, in order to pre
vent the troops from shooting civilians for minor offonsos.

On this

suggestion, the defendant Lclimann commented:
I have objections to this..»rnow that wo have decided
to t:l:o this stop it has to bo done completely, otherwise

there is the danger that the troops v;ill push off matters

uncomfortable to thorn to the courts cuid in tha-c way (and
those will bo the doubtful cases) the contrary of that
which we want to achieve ivlll occuro

It would have boon indeed difficult t© have made murder and crime

c;.sicr or Taoro praiseworthy to the Gorman soldier.

Tnis order, so ter

rible in its intent e.nd in its consequences, vzas distributed by the de

fendants Loob, ICuechlor, lioth, Heinliardt, Salmuth, Hollidt, Schniowind,
Roquos, and Wochlor to units under their cciTimand.

course, precisely who,t vzas ordered.

The results vzcro, of

The diary of the lioar Area of the

Secoiid Army under Salmuth reported^

16 October 1942:

A largo niimber of suspects were

shot in the neighboring villages.

4 to 18 October 1942: Several hundred suspects were
seized and liquidated in the localities.

19 Octobor 1942;

A great nurabor of suspects were

shot in the mopping up *'<•*
-
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Another report on 19 Pohru:.ry 1943 to hcinho.rdt^ s 3rd Panzer Amy
described the following action;

In order to keep braids from resettling in this terri
tory
the population of villages and farms in this area
were killed without exception to the last baby^ All homos
wore burned doYsi*

Cattle and victuals wore confiscated

and taken from this o.rca»

Naturally onough, such bestial behavior onrr.gcd the Russian civilian
population.

No doubt they "would have- fiercely opposed the "acn.ian invaders

in any event; but the

conduct of the Gormr.n troops under those orders

won thousojids of recruits to the Russian partiscm bands which bcgoai to
form behind the Cornan linos.

The German Army's o.ttitudc toward those

partisans was based on Hitler's statement of 16 July 1941:
The Russians hivo how ordered partisan warfare behind
the front. This partisan warfare has some advantages for •
us; it enables us to oradicato everyone who opposes us.

It v/ould bo futile hero oven to attempt to enumv-rate the criminal ordo-rs

and atrocities perpetrated in the course of anti-partisan warfare.

The

defendants T/ill plead that the partisans, too, committed atrocities, and

•./ill attempt to justify their actions on the basis of military neccssaty.

They vfill, no doubt, mo.ko involved legal ongum^nts tnat tno partiso-ns
wore not entitled,to the rights cf bolligeronts under the laws of war,

despite the fact t}i0.t a directive issued on 11 November 1942 by •.u.rliinont's
office stated:

The partisuans arc military resources of the opponent
organized before the Y\rar end exp-nded during the w.r.
Novortholess wo do not recognize thmn,...

Tncy ..re led

by officers and coimnissars v.iio hava beer, left behind
systematically and •./lio e.ro ciirroiitly transported by air.
Their battle a.ssignmiant is directed by the Russian mili
tary Supremo Command according to uniform plan.

But the tVuo answer to those arguments is much simpler,

-.jerinan troops

whorcvor they appeared, by murder and ill troatmcnt of the civilian popu

lation, by conscription to forced labor, by plunder of property and f'^od,

by extermination of Jews, government functionaries, and tho intelligentsia,
forced the inlrabitcnts of the occupied countrioa to defend thomsclvos.
For tho defendants to say that they wero privileged to slaughter
-
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the populcition in retaliation for noasuros of solf-protoction provoked
by their ovm acts in preposterous. Frociscly analogous is the pica of
tho burglar that he had to kill the house omicr in sGlf-dcfonso. One
vj-ill not bo hoard to defend on the groimd that his circumstances re

quired him to commit a criiue when such circumstances were of his ov/n i.iakinf
That the resistance of the civilian population was the inevitable result

of the \Vehrmaoht* s oivn crimes is put beyond all doubt by the following

reportj dated 51 July 1942, on the development ?f the partisan movement,
directed to the coimianders of all army groups and armies in the East:

The requisitioning of horses and vehicles by the German

^ishrmaoht and the lack of agricultural machines had a very

bad effect on tho cultivation of the land.#.. The resentment

resulting from this, which is fostered by the Bolshevik
agitators, ho.s repeatedly formed e>Lpros5ion in the utterance:

"Stalin at least left us one cow in the shed, but the Ger
mans even take that"• . • •

....ivhen recruiting for labor allocation in Germany
first started, the most incredible rumors, as already montioned, were sorcad about the fate of the conscripted per
sons# men it v/as even said, that tho former Red Army
soldiers would be put into prisoner of v;ar camps, massos

of them loft their places of work and v/ent int© the vroods,
where they joined partisan bands. The great number of
prisoners of virar who died on the marcn to t o prisoner

camps, tho conditions and tho high death rate in the
camps themselves, had not rcmcdnod a secret, and tho former
Red Army soldiers lived in constant fear, therefore, that
one day they vrould have to suffer the same fate.

The prosecutioji wishes to stress once more that the Gorman troops wer
deliberately incited to commit those atrocities by tho defendants and othc
army loaders. ThoVo is today hardly a single German general, vrho, if

vdlling to talk frankly, will not admit that these orders, quite apart

from being crimiruil, were a military blunder of the first magnitude. But
blunder or no blunder, there is no difficulty in fixing tho primary re
sponsibility for those incredible outrages. That responsibility lies on

the Gorman military loaders who issued orders of which tho following, prfmulgatod by the defendant Hoth on IV Hovomber 1941, is ^ good example:

....stronger than over wo carry in ua our faith in a
turning point of history v/hon tho German

given the; leadership in Europe on tho strength of their
supori<;r race and their achiovomonta.... Ccmpassicn and
fioftnoGs toimrds tho population v/ould bo completely out of

plaoo,...o9pocially tho soldiors must understand the neces
sity •f harsh measures against elements alien to |ur people

• NV.\i

and our kindo.ocO. sound feeling of hatred is not to bo sup
pressed but must be strcngthonedc

Couiit Throe:

Civilians -- the Ei^itcrmination of the JcY.rs

It is only too well known that anti-Scroitism v/as a cardinal point of

Mazi ideology,

Througliout the early years of the Third Hcich, the Jews

pf Germany wore subjected to over more severe restrictions, persecd'tions
and barbarities, and by 1939 lifo in Germany vmis all but intolerable for
thcm«

The war presented Himinler and Hoydrich with what, to them, -.ids a

golden opportunity to carry those doctrines to their logical and terrible
conclusion

--

the extermination of all Jct/s in Germany and in the

countries overrun by the vvohrinacht,

Deliberate-' oxtcrminati^-n of Polish

Jews began soon after the conquest of that unhappj?- cotmtry.
cal pr'oblems soon cropped up.

But practi

Bo one, at least for centuries, had ever

tried to cradic.atc an entire national or racial group, and it soon be

came apparent that'such a prs'ject vras an ambitious undertrJcing, Yhioh
required time and money and mmpowor and pl.anning.

vYith the invasion of

the Soviet Union, the' prcjoct was for the first time put on a truly
systematic footing.

The triggormen in this gigantic progronn of slaught^-r wuro, for the

most part, the members of the so-called "Einsatzgruppcn" of the SS,

The

Sinso-tzgruppon vrcrc special purpose units composed of persermal dravm

from the Security-Police, Sichorheitsdicnst (SD), Gestapo and other olomonts of the SS.

Subordinate formr.tions of the Einsatzgruppcn were oallod'

Einsatzlcoramondcs and SondcrkomiTiandos«

they wore formed shortly before

the invasion of Pvussia to aocomprny the tronps for the express purpose cf

exterminating olomcnts of the population considered "inferior" and •
"politica.lly or ra.cia,lly und.csiro.blo".

The chiei "victims ci this genoci—

dal progrcjn were the Jews, o.nd it can bo consorva'bivcly ostima.ted that
i^carly one million Russian Jews wyrc slt.ughtcrod by the Einsatzgruppen,

For instance, a report from the Higher SS ^ind Police Loader for Soxith
Russia states that in 1942, in the threo-mbnth period bo-b.'/ocn Septembor

and Dcccmbor, 363,211 Jews wore killed in that aren^ alone..* Cthc-r "racially'
xindcsirahlc" end "inferior" peoples included the Gypsies,

the Einsa.tz-

gruppon were also entrusted with the mission cf dismantling tho oxisting
-
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regional and .-local governmental agencies, in order to malco v;ay for the
new govcrnmontal administration to bo established by the Gcrmaiis.

This

»

dismantling"

to bo accoinplishcd by killing all "bolitical undesirables'!

including Coiniiiunist Party functionaries and other officials of the local

administration •vvho might conceivably bo hcstilo to-the Gormen invadcrSo
In.,anothcr court room of this building, a trial of the loaders of

these SS murder squads is. now drawing to o. closebut in .this dock sit
ten men who made their work possible — Lcob, Kucchlcr, Eoth, Rcinhardt,
Salmuth, Hcllidt, Roqucs, Reinccko, T/arlimont and Woohlcro

The carnago

spread by the Einsatzgruppcn could never have ocGurrod Yfithout the per-

£-1

mission and full support of the f/ohrmacht„ As the TIT fouiid; 2'
Nor did these special units (Sinsatzgruppen) epor?i.to
ccnplotcly indopondently of the German Armed Forcca-

There

is clear cvidonco th?.t loaders of the Einsatzgruppcn ob
tained the cooperation of Army Ccmmmdors^ .

M

It is quite clear to any person v/ith ,tho slightest Icnovvlcdgo of

milito.ry matters thr.t the Einsatzgruppcn coUld never have oven entered
Russian territory without the permission of the Wohrmacht, ^nd could not
have survived thoro more th.n a' few hours v/ithout its supportp

They

•'I
) . . .fj

'"M

M

vrcro, in fo.ct, administrativ:,l,y attached to the 'lYolirmacht• each of the.

four Einsatzgruppcn was attached respv^ctivcly to tho three arm^' groups
and to tho Eleventh Army (which entered Russia frora RcuLiania), end the

. >

subordinate fcrmations of the Einsatzgruppcn (called Einsatzkorrimandes
and Sondorkoramm.dos) wore attached to tho subordinate military for:i:j:itions -- tho armies and corps.

•sH

To suggest that tho Einsatzgruppcn end

their subordinate units cculd' he-vc moved around throughout the ;opcra~

tiono.l area-of the army and could have killed over a million humnn brings,

without the full knov/lcdgo of tho army oommandors,^ is not" only false but
grotesquely false.

W"

di- •

Yet this was, again, the burden of much tostimony be-

for:/tho IMT by numorous Gormrn field marsho.ls and generals.

Wc h\vc como

to 1earn-that documentary proof is somev/hat more reliable, and such proo.f
'':'K

•:/:

• ''4i
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A

is at hruadp

On 28 April, the C-imifiandc'r-in-Ohi^-jf cf tho Gormrn Army, Field 'lL.\rj5hal

li?

f:". •:

Nnitcd States vs. Ohlonderf ot alj- Case No. 9 before Tribunal No, Hi

2,

Vol. 1, Trial of the

N-ar Grimin-.vla, ;p. 250.
-
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Ton Braucliitsoh, distributed to cill ".rmy group and army conmr-iidcrs, by
whori it v/as in turn passed doivn to divisional lovcl, a dircctivo concornI

ing the omploymont of the Einsatzgruppon in occupied Russia,

It read in

part as follovj-s:

The Conuiiandcr-in-Chief coji provent the utilisation of
the special detachriicnts in those parts of the Army territory
v/here such utilization vrould interfere with operations^•
•

V

, ,

The Sonderkcmiaandos of the Security'Police (SP) carry
'Out their m.issions upon tlieir ovni o.uthority®

They are sub

ordinate to the Armies with reference to order of march,

rations, and quarters. Disciplinary ~±id Icga] subordination
Lindcr the Chief of the Security Police and SD is not in- >
fluenood by this. They rccjivo their technical instructionsfrom the Chief of the Security Police end 3D, but if occasion
should arise are subordinated to restrictive orders of the

.'fl

Armies v/ith rcforonco to their activity.
A roprcsentativo of the Chief of the Security Police

rmd of the SD vjj.ll be omployod in the a.roa of each Arriy
for the central direction of this dotachmont.

He is ro-

q^uircd to bring to the attention of the Coiranohder-in-Chicf
of the Army, promptly, the instructions sent to hira by

tlio Chief of the Security Police and SDo

The Piilitary

Comimar.der is empoworcd to issuo the ropresentativo in
structions virhich are necessary to avoid an interruption
in operationsj they take precedence over all other in
structions •

i .f-

U ^.4

In the realm of their mission ojid upon their responsi

bility the Sondorkoirimaiidos are 'ompownrod to take executive
racasurcs, concerning the civilian population. They arc re
quired hereby to cooperate with '.Intolligcnco most closely.
Measures which could nave an effect on Army op-rations re

quire the approval of the Corfim-aridcr-in-Chief of the Army,

Thus, the Einsatzgruppcn could enter the- qpcr-ational area only by virtue

of agreement vfith the Army, •wore to roccivo their supplies and transport
from the Army coimmandcrs and had to report to them before and o-ftcr each
action, and all of their activities were subject to restrictive orders by
the Army coirimandcr,

Wc ho.vG previously detailed the close oooporo.tion between the Einsatz-

gruppbn and the Army in the murder of political commissars and the screen

.1

ing and oxo-cution of "hndosiro-blo" prisoners in the caxi:^.s under the jurisdiction of Roinocko.'

Tho cooperation in the wholcsalo slaughter of Jows
N

•

.
f

vxas no loss close.

Hero, for example, is a portion of the order wliich the

defendant Roquos, as Rundatodt's hear Army Commander, issued on 20 Maroh

1942, ViTith rospect t© the support which hia subordinate units Vforo to fumisl /
to the.3D unitsi
M 88 "•

A detachment of the SD.«,»is deployed in the territory
of the Rear Area Army Group Scuth, The dctacluncnt has the
duty to execute tasks of a security political nature by
direct order of the Roichsfucliror SS and on its o;vn re

sponsibility,

All authoritdos are ordered to assist the

detachment in the execution of its duties,

(Trcjisportr.tion,

billeting, supply),,,. Active participation of members of

;

the ..rmcd forces in executions is not permitted,,, ,.-uthority
to protest against measures of the SD dctaclimcnt by sub
ordinate military authorit.ic-s docs not exist.

i';

But the participation of the .^.rmy in the horrible v^ork of •the Sinso.t2gruppen Vfont beyond administrativo support,

ailthough some commanders,

p.v/aro of. the bestial character of the vrork v/hich they, wore performing
through the Sinsatzgruppen, refused to allce' ...rmy troops to participate .

m

in the executions, this was not the invariable rule; thus, Einso.tzgruppo

.i., operating under Lcob's Army Group North noted in one of its reports;

"From estimated figures, about 19,000 partispjas and criminals, that is
t

in the majority Jot/s, wore shot by the y/ohrmaoht up to December 1941,"
But even whore the T/chrmacht itself did not participate in the executions,
1

•

the troops assisted by arresting the unfortunate Jews and"turning them
over to the Einsatzgruppon to do the dirty work of mc.ss liilling.

For ex-

au^lc, a teletype of 16 October 1C41, to the Rear -j.rca of the Eleventh
Army, of which Tvochlcr was Chief of Staff, roportqd that scvcnty-fivo Jcv;s
had been turned over to the SD,

The reports cf tho Einsatzgruppon make terrible reading.

The report

attaoliad to Leeb's army groups,

of Einsatzgruppc ../for tho first four montl{LS of tho war, rftcr reciting

''rli

that "it must bo' stressed, from tlie beginning that cooperation vdth tho

.^'...rmed For^jcs- was- gcnervally good", proceeds to roCito tho difficulties which' • /•*",]
•

tho group encountered in inducing "nativo anti-semitic.forcesetc start

pogroms against the Jews",

.according to tho report, it was rocognizod
\

thc.t:

/

,,,,it was desirable that tho Security Pelioo should
not put in an-immodiato appearance, at least in the be
ginning,' since tho extraordinary harsh measures were apt
tb stir oven Gorman circles,

.It had to bo shov/n to tho '

world that tho native population itself took tho first
action by -.my of n.\turc.l reaction against the suppression

by Jews during several dccadoa,... To' our surprise it vmia
not easy, at first, to act in motion an cxtonsivo pogrom
against tho Jews,

Finally, howover, the Sinsatzgruppen suqcoodcd in persuading a hithucuiian''
.

-
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partisan unit to start a pogrom in Kovno (the capital of Lithuania) "in
such a \7ay that no Gorman order or- German instigation v>as noted from the

outside*"

The report continues:

During the first pogrom in the night from 25 to 26 June,
the Lithuanicui partisans did av/ay with laoro than 1,500

Jov7s, sotting fire to soToral synagogues or destroying them
by other means and burning dovn a Jewish dvrclliaig district
consisting of about.60 hcuscso During the following nights
2,300 Jc77s were oliminafcd in a simil?.r
In other ,
parts of Lithuania similar actions follov/ed the example of
Kovnd, though smaller and extending to the Communists vjho
had boon loft behind*

»

Those s.clf-cloansing actions vront smoothly because the

hrmy authorities, who had boon informed, shov/cd understand
ing for this procedure*

Such bostalitios were not confined to the area under Lcob's command;
\

they wore general over the entire front*

Thus an activity report ef 51

I

August 1941, from a subordinate unit of the Third Panzer -'-rmy under Roinhardt, contained the followingj

Operation against Jc77s (oast of Pejeomunc) up to
ncv;* ♦. ere suited in the capture of 21 Jcws^ partly armed,
26 women cjid 5 Jc\7isli children* ,* *

'M.

*,,*after brief skirmish 19 Jews and one Russian

captured. Simultaneously 24 vfomcn and 7 children of
Jewish origin arrested****
The Jovfs were, turned over to the SD in Jurbarhas.

The cmcicnt Russioea city of Kiev had not seen such carnage since

its destruction by the I'longols .centuries before*

subcrdiiiato unit of

Einsatzgruppc C which Y/as attached to von Rundstedt's .^rmy-Group,.re

ported on 28 September 1941 that it had entered Kiev dnd that the city
vrnis mined*

The report continued:

^;s has boon proved, Jcv7s played a preeminent part*

-vllogodly 150,000 Jews living hero,... Execution of at
least SO^jOOO Jews planned* V/ohrmaoht welcomes measures
and demands drastic procoduro*

The stery is continued by a report dated 12 October 194c.,- by the 454th
Security Division, v/hioh v/as' subordinated to the defend.-nt Rcqtios as
Rundstedt's Roar Area Commander:

The total population (of Kiev) is estimated at about
half the normca number, i*c, about 400,000*
1 90 -
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The Jews of

the city 7/crc ordered to present themselves at a certain

place and time for the purpose of numerical rcgistr/'.tion
and housing in a camp, About 34,000 reported, including
v/omon and children, .iftor they had boon made to give up
their clothing and valuo-blos, all v/crc killed; this took
several days.

These docuiacnts do not make pretty reading, but v/o are constrained to

quote one more example,

Einsatzgruppc D, under the notorious Ohlcndorf,

vic.s attached to the Eleventh Army, of v/hich the defendant T/oc-hlor v/as
Chief of St:iff.

Beginning in September 1941, the Cor.auandcr-in-Chiof .of

'the Eleventh -...rray nus General (later Field Marshal) %'-on Manstcin, T/hq
a.ssurcd the IMT from the.witness-box that ho had no loiowlodgo of tho

murder cf 90,000 Russian Jews by Einsat?gruppc D, to v/hich Ohlcndorf had
confessed.

¥c have scon that the Einsatzgruppon virorc under strict orders
\

from the Army to keep tho Intolligenco Division of tho -^rmy staff informed

as to their doings; hov/ meticulously they complied v/ith this directive is

shov/n by tho follovving report, dated 16 April 19-12, to tho mitolligonco

officer serving under Wochlor on tho Staff of tho Eleventh Army:
For your inforraation
beg to report the follo'ving
about the activities of Einsatzgruppc D in the Crimea o.nd
in tho area Taganrog-Fedorowko, and about the intcndodfurthor employmont:
'
-'
I,

^^otivitios since February 1942,
^

*
V

«

The results of tho olohnmg of the Crimea during the
time covered by this report are in detail as follows:

l) The Crimea is freed of Jows. Only occasionally some
small groups are turning up, ospocially in tho northern
areas.'

In eases where single Jov/s could camo-oflago them

selves by means of forged papers', etc. they v.'ill, novertholcss, bo r'ooognizod soonor or later, as oxporicnco has

taught.

The population which in the majority has vfolcomod

tho measures taken r.gainst the Jews, is assisting in -bliis

task by malcing denunciations. This, is only n.atural con
sidering the fact that the Crimea has boon a special domain
of Jowdom. About tho devolopmont* and the influence of
Jowdom on the Crimea a detailed report is attached,

We submit to the Tribunal tlm.t there can/be na blacker crimo ,than

v/hat vrc have Just described, Tho evidence of complicity in that crime of
ton of the defendants is c-onclusivc, Wo regret to add that there is no
evidence that the dofcndrjits, at that time, were in tho slightest dogroc

. ashojjiod of what they were doing, ' On tho contrary, they took active "stops

•j.!.

' 'a
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to convert their o\m. troops to c. frcunc of niiiid not only tolerant "ff

but aynipr.thotic to these incredible mass murders.

CM 1 October 1841 the

dofondcait Salmuth^ in an order of the day to his corps, stated that "The
battle against Bclshcvisia requires an cncr-vtic and ruthless attack^

especially against Jov/s, the chief c .rriors of Bolshevism.," and on 17
November 1941, the defendant Koth issued the following order to his
troops;

Ebrer^'' trace of active or passive resistance or of any
kind of machinations by Bolshevik-Jewish agitators arc to
be immodio.toly and pitilessly rooted out. The necessity
of Severe measures against elements foreign to people and

kind, must be understood precisely by the soldiers.

Those

circles are the spiritual pill'\rs of Bolshevism, the talobcarcrs «f its murder organization, the helpers of the

partisans.

It consists of the same Jovrish class of people

T/hich has done so much harm to tur Fxtherlmd by its

activity hostile to the people and anti-oulturc, which
promotes rnti-Gcrmm currents in the whole world and
which Vfants to be the bearer of revenge^

Their annihila

tion is a lew of self-preservation. Any soldier critieizinE^
these measures has no memory f»r the former demoralizia^s
traitorous activity lasting for years carried on among our
Qwm. people by Jov/ish-ma.rmist elements.

C, V/ar Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity — Slave Labor
Under Count Two of the indictment, the defendants are charged with

utilising prisoners .f war held by the Germans as an unrestricted source

of labor for purposes forbidden by the laws of war. Under Count Three
of the indictment, they are charged vdth the deportation and enslaver^nt
of millions -^f members of the clviliar. populations of the eooupied
countries. These crmes are recognised as such not only under inter

national law, but by the ordinary ponal laws of all civilized nations.

The Hague and Geneva Conventions contain rnmierous applicable provisions
with respect to the treatiaent of prisoners of war and the civilian popula

tion of occupied countries. The definitions of 'W crimes" and "orhnes

' against tamanity" in Article II of Control Council LawUo, 10, specifically
proscribe "murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any
other purpose, of civilian populations from occupied territories, murder
or illetreatment of prisoners of war" and "extermination, enslavement,

deportation, Lmprisonment" and "other inhumane acts committed against any

civilian population, or persecution on political, racial, or religious
^ dZ ^

grounds".

The evidence under these charges relates primarily to' the use

and abuse of prisoners of Trar, and the enslavement and'deportation to
slave Labor and mistreatment of many thousands of civilians in and from
the countries occupied by Germany,.

The slave labor program of the Third Reich was the revolting offspring

of the aggressive wars which it planned and waged,. It -vvC'-s- designed t#;
keep the German war machine rolling at the frightful expense of the free
dom and lives of millions of persons.

The tyranny and brutality of Rasi

conquest v/as felt by them net only in their own homelands of France, Bel

gium, Holland, Russia, Polcuid, Czechoslovakia and Denmark,. Hundreds of •
thousands suffered the additional misery of being torn loose from homes

and families and shipped to Germany into slavery and often to a miserable
•and premature death,

1,

Eastern Europe

In the East, the use of prisoners-ofr-uar cuid civilians in German arma

ment production vras widespread. As early as, 4 July 1941, representatives
of the defendant Reinecke vrere conferring vfith other Reich agencies con

cerning the utilization of Russioui prisoners in war industries.
October 1941, an
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order di'aftod by V/arlimont pointed out that the lack

af v/orkers v/as increasingly .Celt in the armo.Li^nt industry and that tnis
could be remedied by a lan-ge scale use of Russian prisoners.

This order

directed thc.t work units were to be used particularly for ooastc.l forti
fications.

All of the defendants who held field commands in the East made avail

able largo numbers of prisoners for employracnt in prohibited labor.

For

example, en 2 March 1942 Army Group North under Kuoehlor, in reply-to a
reciuest from the roar area for more prisoners, sta-cod:
It is not possible at this tinie to trrjisfcr r.my more

prisoners of v/ar as requested by tolophonc sijico the avail
able prisoners of war able to work arc noodcd for employ
ment on road construction and in the armament industr5*

and/or plants in the operational thoatro, Roquosting
E.gonoics have not boon aatiafied fully up to t)iis point.

A report of 6 April 1942 to OIRI by the Eleventh Army, of which V/oohlcr v/as
Chief of Staff, so-id:^
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For Ir.bor in the r.rmmcnt factories at home," 5,529

prisoners of war v/orc deported to the Prisoner of War
Organization of the 0K7»

The employment of these prisoners was attended by all manner of ill-»

troatmont^ but those retained for vrork in the operational area of these
defendants wore particularly unfortunate.

In October 1941, Brauchitsch

ordered that mine fields wore to bo cleared only by Russi::n prisoners of
•»var.

But the defendants Locb and Kucohlcr had boon practicing this flagrant

violc.tion of the IC'.vrs end customs of war for at least two months prior t^^

the Brauchitsch order.

An order of 3 August 1941 by the 2l7th Irifr.ntry

Division in the Eighteenth Army under- ICuechler, within Array Group North
comrriandod by-Loob, stated:

In order to counteract the ciiomy* s malicious m.-jirior

of fighting in the iiiining of roads and rivers, the greatest
attention is ordered at the "placc-s mentioned. Prisoners
are to be used for roraoviiiir the mines.

Other such orders were issued by Hoth and Rcinhordt.

Russian prisoners

wore also used in the operational area for the digging of trenches, con
struction of fortifications, military high'ways, railroads, and the loading
of ojmiiunition.

The fate of the civilian population in the East 7/as equally harsh.

On 21 July 1941 the defendant Puoquos, as commander of the Roar Area of
-•.rmy Group South, ordered tliat Jews bo selected for compulsory labor end
tnat they bo required to wear identifying armbands,

similar order was

issued on 11 December 1941 by a, corps subordinated to tho El-^vcnth Ani^,
of which TVoohler was Chief of Staff, stating that:

All Jov/s of both Boxes have to identify themselves by

vfCLaring a white armband, "with the Star of De.vid on both
arms',,,, all Juv;g of both sexes betv/oon 16 oaid 5 0 years of

ago arc at the disposal of tho h.-ad of the community for
performing labor.

This Nazi racial policy, hovrovor, did not alone produce siofi icic'ut
V7orlcors for the Gorman war machine.

In order to obtain the required number

of vmrkors, all pretext of voluntary recruitment was ab.vndonod and l-abor
conscription became progressively more inhumane o.s-the fortioncs ®f v/ar

turned against the Wohrrnacht. Thus, in October 1942, tho dofciidant iwinhardi
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0.3 comraondcr of the Third Panzer Army, ordered the use of "the ontiro
ablo-hodicd c.ivilian population" for digging trcnchs.

In March 1943,

the defendant Hcllidt issued an order stating that:

Russian men and v/omon have to bo omplcyod ruthlessly
for the construction of defenses.

By Juno 1943, over 50,000 ciTilians wore reported to bo working on fortin

fications in the area of the Sixth Array under Holiidt,

In May 1943,

Roinliardt ordered that all men betwccii the ages of 16 and 50 and all v7omen

botv7oon 16 and 40 capable of bearing arras and of vrorking bo rounded up for

•labor allocation.

By August 1945, 17-yoar-old children wore ordered to

bo drafted, and by September, in the frenzied search for workers, the
Rear Aroa ccmiafuidor of KuoOhlcr's Army G-r«up north ordered seizing all

available laborers and driying thorn on forced marches to the roar, with

only broad for fond.

The order specified that children over 10 wore con

sidered as laborers.

Along 77ith this.brutal extension of the slave labor program to inciudo old men, women and children, the drai'ting measures also increased
in harslniess.

Rcinhardt would not permit the granting of short loaves

to laborers for the purpose of packing tholr belongings for fear they would

oscapo, v/hich ho said "must bo provonted at all costs".

In a Top Secret

order of 2 January 1944, to bo destroyed after reading, ho oxliortod his
men to act ruthlessly in the drafting of civilians and put this pencilled
notation on the order:

Any measure is justified and urgently desirable if it

produces a quick and considorablc increase in the neimbor of
civilians working for us.

Those documents do not begin to reflect the human misery and degrada

tion involved in this slave traffic,

Sarly in 1944, engineer and fortress

units of Roinhardt's Third Panzer Army reported that many of the civilians

pressed into slave labor by thorn 7roro escaping., dpftn inquiry,
c,

♦no

*f the

subordinate units act forth the reasons v/hy so many •f these miserable

laborers sought rofugo in flight:

..yT^^
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ii"ii^i'ii"Ti'rY-..nnnd

The high figure of Russi(xu laborers v/ho have escaped
from, their places of v/ork.^.^is cxplainod»««»by the follow
ing reasons*., ••

They "were partly approhonded in the streets and talcon
av/ay under the protoxt that thoy "weuld go on a 2 or S days*'
job, without v/intor clothes, shoos, mossjfkit or blankets#*,
• • Married couples were taken avjay, the children being
left behind by themselves••••

'

Men end women were a.llocatod by the Labor Camp ^Vitebsk
who had been unfit for work for a long time*

Among tnom

wore 78-yoar-old or blind or paraly-iod people and people
sufl'cring from heart disca.so. vrho collapsed unaor the
least strain, epileptics, vromcn vrith child up to the 9th
month, people suffering from severe abscess-with pus
r^annin'^ out of thoir shoes and some with frozen limbs****
2*

lYo stern Europe

In the Uost as in the East, prisoners of v/ar and civilians raikc wore
forced to lhabor \m.dor inhumoiio conditions for the German vrar machine.

The

defendant Roincckc "vms one of the principal figures in obtaining thousands

of French prisoners of wa.r to labor in the German arimniiont indusor^;.-, es

pecially in aircraft plants. On 17 Septombor 1942, 1/arlimont fonrnxdod a
Fuehrer decree to the throe branches of the YIehrraacht, tho Commandor-in-

Chiof Wost (Rraidstodt), and the liilitary Commandor in Holl^md, which^
stated that:

Tho oxtonsivc coastal fortifications, ordered by mo

(Kitlor) for the area of Army Group d-st, r'-quiro tho

employment and the groatost exertion of cdl labsr avail
able in tho occupied territory.

Tho allocation, so far,

of indigenous ?-rorkors is insufficient* In order to in
crease it I order for tho occupied territories_thc intro
duction of compulsory service and the prohibition of

chenging the assigned place of work vmthout permission
of tho competent authority.
9

Tho Army cooperated actively with.tho so-callcd.recruiting commissions
of the Sauckel slave labor organization end tho GS in the conscription and

deportation of slave labor to Gormcny. On 25 January 1943, Rimdstodt,
as Commandor-in-Chiof West, ordered all units subordinated to hiiu to

support tho work of those cominissions• And rn 7 June 1943, tho defendant
Spcrrlc, at that time Deputy Commandor-in-Chief Wost, stated in a report
forwDr dod to the OKW that:

According to a report from the Military Commander in

Belgium and Northern Franco it has again occurred, in spite
-
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of orders to the contrary, that G-erman agencies without
being entitled to, recruit workers vathin the area of
the military commander of Belgium and Northern France..".,
Through such procedure these v/orkers for the most part
v«rere lost to recruitment for Germany.

I shall examine

to what extent military authorities are involved in
this prohibited recruiting.

Sperrle's cooperation v/ith the civilian master of the slave labor
program, Fritz Sauckel (v;ho 7ra.s convicted, and sentenced to-hang by tne
BiT solely on slave labor charges) ivas such that Sauckel was moved to say
at a meeting of the Central Planning Board on 1 March 1944 that

Field Marshal Sperrle assisted my task with forvisr".

A few years earlier,

during 1941 and 1942, units of Un'tflotte 3 subordinated to Sperrle were
using Russian prisoners of war in construction vrork on airfields and
fortifications

in the "^^iTest.

On 1 August 1944, the defendant Blaskowitz, as Commander of Army
Group G in France, issued the follovfing order:
•M
n

The entire able-bodied male population convicted
of .cooperating with bands of the Resistance Organisations

.•,,or ;rhich may be designated as suspect and/or 37/mpathizing, is to be sent in a closed body to reception camps to
be prepared by the Military CoiraTiander in France. From
there they are to be transported to the Reich for labor
allocation.

m

And ten days later, Blaskowitz passed dovwi a further order stating that;

Every^vhero that centers of resistance are ostablishod

or the forimtion of guerilla bands is discovered, all male
residents, fit for milito.ry service, between the age of
18 and 55, ph3'-sicians excepted, shall be arrested, re
gardless of their pj^cs0nt occupation, and niade ready for
shipment to Germany...,

CCKCLUSICN

If it please your Hcncrs, the v/ide scope of the subject matter of
this case has made it quite impossible to set forth the evidence in any

detail -vvithin the compass of this presentation, b'e have sought .^nly tf

outline the charges, ilnd the same limitations of time and space rule out

any full analysis of the legal matters ivhich the defense Ty-ill, no doubt,
suggest in due course#

As to the basis for Counts One and Pour of the indictment,

Ym.sh

merely to mal:e a fevr brief preliminary observations. That the "wars and
invasions, launched by the Third hoich vfith the participation of these
defendants, were aggressive in character is the law of this case. The BiT
has so held in its Judgment, and Article X of Military Government Ordinance
Ko. 7, under which this Tribunal is established, provides that:
The determinations of the International Military Tri

bunal in the judgTAQnt in Case No. 1 that invasions, ag

gressive acts and aggressive v^-ars, crimes, atrocities ^or
inhumane acts were planned or occurred, shall be binding
on the tribimals established herounder and shall not be

questioned o:ccGpt insofar as participation thoroin or
knowledge thereof of any particular person may be con-^
cernod.

Thus, our starting point is that the invasions and vrars of aggrossion

ohargod in the indictment were planned and did occur in violation of inter
national l».r. The only ciuestion at issue under Ccrr.ts Or^e and Four of the
indictment, therefore, is the ontcnt to r,hich the defendants Imoningly
participated in these invasions and fmirs of aggrossion,

The necessary dogroe of connection with those crimes in order to

establish the guilt of the defendants is to be determined by Paragraph c,

,
i

|

•

1

of Article II .f Control Council Law No. 10. and in the light of rocgnised •
principles of criminal law. Paragraph 2 sots forth that an individual

shall bo found guilty of the crimes defined in Law No, 10 if ho was (a)

aprincipal, or (b) on accessory. ,r if he (c) took acnscnting part

j

therein,, .r (d) was o.nncotod with plans and cntorprisos invclvlng the
comml3si.r. rf the crime, .r (o) .vas a member of an orgor.isc.ti.n or gr.up

•cnnootod with the c.mmdssion of the crime, Afurther provision .f this

paragrajh, applicable, .nly with rospoot to orimos against peace, states
98 -
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inter ciXia that the holders of high military (including General Staff)
positions in Germany are deemed to haTe committed such crimes*

This pro

vision, Vie believe, is not intended to attach criminal guilt autcmatically
.

'

to all holders of high military nositions such as these defendants.

It

does require, however, that the fact that a person held such a position be
taken into consideration together with all the other evidence in deter

mining the extent of his Icnowlodge and participo.tion.
It is. the position of the prosecution that Crimes against Peace, as
in the case of most crimes, require Imowing participation in the crime;

both an act and a state of mind.

The act is the extent of participation

of the defendants in the planning, preparation, initir.tion, or Y/aging 'vars
of aggression and invasions.

The stats of mind is the Icnowlodge on the

s

part of the defendants of the aggressive aims of tiitlor and the other

leaders of the Third I-ieich, including themselves, tov/ards other coiuitries.
r

It is not necessary to shov/ that the defendants believed that military

force TYould noccssarily bo used to achioyo such aims if throats would

t

suffice. Thus, the IIvlT said:^
The defendant Racder testified that neither ho, nor
von Fritsoh, nor von Blomborg, believed that Hitler

f

actually meant war, a conviction v;hich the defendant

Eaeder claiuLS that ho held up to 22 August 1939. The
basis of this conviction was his hope that Hitler YYOuld

obta,in a "political solution" of Germany's problems.
But all that this means, when examined, is the belief
that Germany's position v/ould be so good, and Germany's
armed might so oveirwholming that the territory desired
could be obtained without fighting for it.
fk

That crimes against peace arc susceptible of commission by milito.ry

K,.

leaders is established by the specific language of Lav/- No, 10 o-lro.ady
described, and by the weighty precedents of the ILT's convictions of
Iieitel, Jodl, Raodcr and Doenitz.

In its discussion of the General Staff

and High Comraand, the XIi/IT further sot forth that it had heard much evidence

as to the pai'ticipation of military officers in the planning raid waging
of aggressive Y/ar, and that

"this evidence ip as to many of thorn clear

and convincing."
Per the Ss'Jco of clarity, howovor, it must bo emphasized that those

dofondants are not accused on the ground that thoy arc soldiers.
1.
E.

Vol. I, Trial ff the Ma.jor War Orimlnals, p, 191.
Vol. 1, Trial of the Ila.-jor "k.r Criminals, p. E78i
-
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They arc

not nccuscd merely for doing the usual things a soldier is expected to do,

such as making military plans rjid commanding troops.

It is, I suppose,

among the noi-mal duties of a diplomat to engage in ncgctiatioiis eaid con~
forencos, to entortr.in at dinner p?vrtics, and to cultivate good -will t#-

•v/ard the government ho represents•

The leaders of the Gfcrman Foreign

•

Office, now on trial before another •f these Tribunals, are not indicted

for doing those things.

It is an innocent and rospectablc business t» bo

a locksmith; but it is none the loss a crime, if the locksmith turns his
talents to picking the locks of noi^bors Djid looting their homes.

The

accusation in all those oases whore crimes against peace are charged is

that, in performing the fimctions of diplomats, politicians, soldiers,
industrialists or whe.tovcr the defendants happen to bo, thoy planned raid
waged wars of aggression.

It is no defense for thosu who committed such

crimes to plead that they practice a particular profession.

It is perfectly legal for military men to prepare military pleois to
moot national contingencies, and such plans may legally bo drai,vn whbthor

they arc- offensive or dofonsivo in a military sense.

It is perfectly legal

for military loaders to carry out such plans and engage in vnr, if in do
ing so they do not plan ?-nd launch raid ivc.go illegal aggressive wars.
There may v;cll bo individual cases whore drawing the lino bct-woon lejal

raid illegal behavior might involve some difficulties.
comiiion situation in the legal field.

That is not roi uti-

But xro do not belicvo that there is

any such doubt or difficulty hero.
The military defendants i/ill perhaps argue that thoy arc pure techni
cians.

This amounts to sajring that military men are a r-acc apart from and

different from the ordinary run of human beings — men above and beyond

the moral and legal roquiromouts that apply to others, and incapable of

exercising moral Judgment on their own behalf.
In the nature of things, planning raid executing aggr^-ssivo v/ar is

accomplished by agreement -md consultation among all tj/pcs of a nation's
loaders.

And if the leaders in raiy notably import:'ait field of activity

straid aside or resist or fail to cooperate, then the criminal program will

at the very least bo seriously obstructed^

That is vdiy the principal

loaders in ail fields of activity share responsibility for the crime, and
100

military loaders no loss than the othurs. As the IMT stated in its
Judgment:

1

Hitler could not make o.ggressive v/ar by himself,, Ho
had to have the cooperation of statesmen, military loaders,
diplomats, and business men. ^Hion they, v/ith ki:io'Vvlodgo

of his aims, gave him their cooperation, they made them
selves parties to the plan ho had initiated.

The defendants will no doubt object stronuausly to the notion that

aggressive

is a crime. Their mentor. General von Soockt, vvroto in

1928 that^ "the question of v/ar guilt virill bo asked after each war; it
is the question vrho started the vmir which means who attacked first.

It

will alv/ays be 'naswerod according to the point of view of the iJitcrestod
person and -- according to the winner."

This ccrnfortablo view that it

is impossible to tell who started a vrar is a

convenient trend of

thought for the Germeai military caste, who have started one war after
raiothor throughout the past century*

But it docs not square with the

proof available in this case, and it'^docs not square vfith the viow of
international law generally acknowledged to bo necessary if civilization
is to bo pratoctod against its destruction from vfithin.

As an eminent

authority on international law has recently v/ritton, in connection with

the Ju^ _'nt of the BIT: ^
....the precedent will not stand" still.

If we do not

strengthen it and move it forward, it will slide backward.
Inaction by the whole society of nations from now on would
constitute a repudiation of the precedent vdth the con
sequence that the last state of the world would be yrorso
than the first.

It would constitute an assertion that

aggressive war is not a crime and that the individual
who is guilty of endangering the international public
repose is not to be treated as a criminal..

Hor is it any defense to these charges

emphasize, as the defense

no doubt will, that personal relations between Hitler and the generals

were often strained, and in particular that Hitler distrusted the General

Staff and the senior Army officers.

Ho doubt this is quite true.

Hitler,

as well as being a man of unusual, if malignant, capacities, was an

1-.

Vol., I, Crial of tlic Major V/ar Criminals, p. 228.

2,

Von Soocirt,, Ideas of a Soldier, p.. 15.

3.

iJossup,. The Orimc of A.'-.v:ressi;.ji and tho Future of Intornatirnal Law,
62 Political Scionco 'quarterly, 1, 4 (1947),
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inorodibly vain and solf-oentered man, "vviio couXd not abide to ackndw-

IcdgG that other people had abilities which he himslef lacked,. Aware
of his o-vm lack'of military education, ho socffcd at those who possessed

it, though he loved nothing better than to play at map maneuvers u-ith
favorite soldiers, such as Pvcmmol. But Hitler did not by any means single

out tho generals as an object for his derision; the other professions
fared no better. Hitler had no ongincoring education, but was lascinatcd
with construction probloims, and delighted to plan imagin&d cities and

design gigantic buildings vd.th a favored architect, Albert Spcer. But
hear him on the subject of engineers as reported by cno who noted down

much of Hitlor^s private conversation:^
Enginocrs. arc fools, Thoy have an occasional idea
that might be useful but it booomos madness if it is
gcnoralizcd.
2

Industrial leaders met with a simil:-.r fo.tc at his-hands.
I shall not bo deceived by those captains of industry

oithorl

Captains indeodl

ships thoy navigate i

I should like to ?<aiow what

Thoy arc stupid fools ^/ho cannot

soo beyond tho v/aros they pcddlol

Tho bettor one gets •

to Icnov/ them, the loss one respects thorn.

So it is not very moaningful to say that Hitler did not admire the

generals. Ho did not admire much of cujybody except.hirasolf. And in
any event, the point is quite irrolovant. Tho question hero is not one

of personal likes coid dislikes, but of acts.

If those defendants and

• ^sk

their fclloTJS did not give Hitler thoir trust thoy certainly lent liim
thoir active and energetic collaboration :-n.d put their talents at his
\

disposal.

Thoy sv/ore an oath of lo^.-alty to his person.

They built him

a gigantic t/ar machine. Under his political leadership, thoy provided

the military leadership which guided this machine on its course of con
quest in Europe. Tliey used tho machine to porpotro-te the most catastrophic
crimes in tho modern history of the profession of arms.

Indeed, as we sought to stress at tho outset, the points of friction
between Hitler and the gonorals served only tc vjiderline their comploto

agreement on fundamentals.

Tho most iiriportant points «f tho Nazi Party.

program were cardinal objootivcs of tho military loadc^rs long before
Hitler becams vicll icnoynit Points One and Throe —r "tho uiiif ioation of all
Tl Hermarbi K'ausdining, The- Voioo of Uostr^totion, p. '24:.
2.

Idon, p. 21.
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Gerorxns in tho Greater Gcrmny" and "land and territory f.r the suatcnanoo

of our people" vforo merely a reatateraent of traditional Pan-Gormanism,
of Tdiicli tho German militarists vforo the effeotivo core. Point I-vfo vfo.s
tho abrosa'oion of tho Vorsaillos Troaty; tovrard this ob300.1^0 -cno _
-.•.;ilitai-ists had nado graat strides lone, boloro hitler caiT.c tc power.

;'

Point Four excluded the JoYrz frc,.... G-ermn citizcns/iip. But Jews naa long
boon cxcludod fro-n tno officers' corps, c.nd von ScccVt's ofiiciul o.tograpjii.i

boustod ti-iut,^ '^the Arm;y resisted the poiietrition of Jcvn-sh olood.

Fniilly, Point Twenty-fivG of the progrcu: cnlle'd for "the fornation of a

strong central govornnont in tnc hcich/J This was completay in lino_ with
the traditional faich of the officers' corps in .h.. ' -

- authoritanen-.

' isn, o.nd led logioo.lly to dicto-torship.
-

...

4--

'

So it is not difficult to understand the roasoiis Uiticn undorlaj- tnc-

^

,

alliance bctwoo;i Hitler and the generals,and why the generals vaado the • •

-.yohriaacht a min pllUr of the Third heich. This alliance .vas based upon " ' :
nu-ny opinions and objectives ccraion to both pareios, and mor^ ^'nan a.ry-

^

'a'

thing else, upon faith in

'

as ameans 'of attohning one's objcc'CiveB

and, indovjd, as a norn.al o.nd adiairablc part of lif-. Tnis laien nas Doon
*

^

' * **\

repeatedly oupressod in the m-itings of Crorman military leaders f^^r nec.rly,
tvfo oonturlis. If -.K. lister, fcr the last timo today ti tho words of Ton

3oecht on this subject, v/o h;ar hiiri rcmarhing with delight in 19Jd upon
th'?' ''rclationc^-ip botwoen Leonardo da Vinci's shetch book and the suetches
t

of Kiiig Frcdorick for his manouvcn-s. rh^ genius at -v.'orkl" Fignt years
5

I

•

I la.ter he tolls usj

"'vhar is the highest pinnacle of human effort. It is tho^ natural
end last stop of' evdution in the histcrj'' of marJsind. ,1-1 is

tho father of all things and at tho saim^ tiio the prepar'-r of
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tho end of an opooh, or a people, in order to becomo tne latnor
of a nov/ development... .Xh.c vrar is born by the vdll, condvictod
and olovatod to ita purest porfootion.
. eisfa

And tihercforu, shoclciiv^ :vnd inerodiblo as is t<ie cvidcnco in tiilis'
• 1

case, there is notliin;;; herein tint should coiuo.as a. complete surprise to
who imdc-rstands tho histcry and ideology of the Gv;rmcni Af.accrs^ •
•yiy

• i-.'
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1. "Von Soo.ckt, Au_(3 ; ( 1 9 3 9 ) ,
Yon Soeoht, Ideas" of a Bolaicr, p. 131.

6, . Mom, p, 16C "
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corps.

Lien v-rho bolioTro in war o.rc not likely to talco a strong stand in

opposition to invading tno noutrdlity of Belgium, Holland or Hor*.-^;/.

An

officers' corps v/Loso military nim.ual scoffs Jjponly at tno laws of './ar is

not likoly to take a strong stand in opposition to v^von tno most cv.tr-^g';'^us
crimina.1 moasuros called for by their loaders.

A profossicn wticn f#r

doco-dos ho.s rigor.tsusly excluded Jcw's has alreadg' mado tooa progress to^'-rards
understanding the reasons for their eradication — no matter now mucn tney
may throve up their hends p.\ foi. nod horror, thoy wrLll not be found rca.dy
to risk ruoh in opposition, nor, oven, will thoy bo uiv./illing to lend it

support if -vdiat thoy conceive to be "larger objectives" so require.
Kuch of this case is summarizod in c, single document, consisting of
an order issued by the defendant Kucchlor, as Commandor-in-Ciiicf of the

Eighteenth Army, on 22 July 194:0. The conquest of'France, in vdiicn the

Eighteenth Arrey participated, had boon triumphantly concluded a fcv; weeks

prior, and orders had just been given to transfer the hjxmv to Poland near
the Russian frontier.

Some very unplcascnt things were going on in Poland

at that time, and Kucchlor feared that the soldiers mi^„t hoar "rumors and
false inforror-tion" concerning the true meaning and justification of those
things.

So he Ynroto;

The follo\/ing reasons for the transfer of the A.C.IC. 18
and its subordinate units to the East from the i/est r/ill Cc
anaounccd to the troops:

Protootion of the newly acquired living space in thu Fast
DoiTionstro.uion of our militcn'y strcngtn to tiic. Poles.

Preparation for the estabXislim'nit of pcaco-tmc garrisons
in the Eastern territory for Army units.

I should lik^ to stress....the necossity for ensurin^

that every soldier of the Army, particularly every officer,

refrains from criticizing the otiaiioal struggle bcin^^ curried

•out in the

c"ohe treatment of the^

Polish minorities and of t.'..e Je'virs cuid tne hciiidliifj of cnuj.cn

mr.ttcrs. The find ethmical solution of the^^•.thniod strugde

vfnicji has boon raging on tn^- Eastern oord^r for centuries c.dls
for measui'^os of such ho.rsLii'iess a.nd directiiess tn^c o-ie up/lioa-^
tion of the'm i.dll

suffice.

Certain agencies of the Party and tn^ State have bo^n
charged with the conduct of this otlmical stinig lo in tne East.
Soldiers must, therefore, rcreain alooi from these em-tters,
vrhich are the concern of other agencies. Ivioitiior are t:.ey tt
involve themselves in siich "mattors by criticism#

r
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Mo.ny f^r^ccts of "this co.sc o.rc reflected in those fov/ para^rcpr.s •!— the
proud mention of "living, space" which had been acquired by tbe sv/ord; the
scornful roforencos to Poles md Jctjsj the indoctrination of the troops to

accept the most brutal troo.tncrt of those "iziferior" peoples.

Alrcadp the

seeds o.ro boinp sovni in preparation for the so,vag,ory vhiich would oe dornc.ndcd of the German soldier the no—b year; already tne laivpaago is not oi r./^ro

won- but of "ctliiilcal strua,glcs" which arc "ra..ing on th^ Sastorn Dordor".
This is not a soldier's order.

the troops.

It is a vicious, foul effort to brutalize

It points as accusing,ly o.s ever a document can to \r.iurc the

deepest ruilt lies for the crimes thc-.t wc have rehearsed today,
comes to po.ss that the only "vo.y in

lu'id so it

;ioh the behavior of the Gorman troops

ill the recent war cm be made comprehensible as the be.iavior of lumim
bein^f^s is b^'- a full exposure of t]ie criminal doctrines and orders •vdiich

'viTorc pressed upon them from o.oove, by tlicse dofendi-nts and otiiers.

In tnat

oxposuro, the Germo.n people tiicmselvcs haVv^ thv^ gjreo.tosv stalco.
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